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ABSTRACT 
FACULTY OF SPORT, EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Doctor of Philosophy 
ORDER EFFECTS IN ASSESSMENTS OF SPORTING ABILITY 
by Matthew Smith 
Research (e. g. McKelvie, 1990) has shown that order of information can influence 
judgments. In light of equivocal findings in this research, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
developed their belief-adjustment model to present a more detailed approach to 
predicting order effects. Greenlees, Dicks, Thelwell and Holder (2007) were the first to 
test the predictions of the belief-adjustment model in sport. The aim of this thesis was to 
extend Greenlees et al. 's work through a more systematic examination of order effects in 
sport. Specifically, the aims were to examine the generalisability of Greenlees et al. 's 
findings, to examine the impact of differing processing strategies on order effects, to 
investigate the influence of personality traits, and to consider variables that might offset 
order effects. To achieve these aims, four experimental studies were conducted. 
In Study 1, ultimate frisbee players watched DVD footage of two players (a control and 
target player) performing a catching and throwing drill, and assessed the ability of each 
target player. Participants viewed the same footage for the control player. For the target 
player, participants viewed the same footage, with half viewing a declining (successful 
to unsuccessful) performance pattern, and half viewing an ascending pattern. Study 1 
found primacy effects when participants made one end-of-sequence (EoS) judgment. In 
addition, step-by-step (SbS) judgments eliminated primacy effects. Study 1 also 
controlled for the time delay inherent in making the SbS judgments, and found that SbS 
processing, rather than the time delays, eliminated order effects. 
Study 2 examined the effect of individual differences on order effects. Using the same 
methodology as in Study 1, the impact of participants' theory of learning, level of 
motivation to think, and level of experience were examined. In the EoS condition, 
primacy effects were displayed regardless of participants' theory of learning belief, and 
regardless of level of experience. However, in the EoS condition, primacy effects were 
only displayed by participants with high motivation to think. Studies 3 and 4 examined 
the impact of situational manipulations on order effects. The results of Study 3 revealed 
primacy effects in the EoS condition, regardless of level of accountability. Study 4 
revealed recency effects when an interpolated task was carried out half way between 
viewing the footage. 
This research provides support for Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model when applied to 
assessments of ability in sport. Overall, the findings suggest that primacy effects can 
influence assessments of ability when EoS judgments are required. This has applied 
implications for those who make assessments of ability; who should be aware that early 
information might bias their overall judgments of players they observe. The results also 
suggest that SbS processing offsets this primacy bias, and thus using such additional 
processing strategies might be an applied suggestion to offset the primacy bias. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Person perception, the way we perceive others, has been much studied since the seminal 
work of Asch (1946). Asch's pioneering series of studies investigated how impressions of 
a stimulus person were derived from lists of character traits, and also explored whether 
the order in which characteristics of a target person were presented had an effect on 
impressions formed. Human judgment has been seen to be sensitive to the order in which 
individuals receive information (Richter & Kruglanski, 1998). When the information 
early in a sequence is disproportionately influential, the effect is known as primacy; at 
other times, later information can exert a greater influence, and this is termed a recency 
effect (Bergus, Levin, & Elstein, 2002). Asch found evidence for primacy effects in 
person perception, with individuals basing their judgments more on initial pieces of 
evidence they viewed. 
Following Asch's (1946) investigations, a large body of research across a variety of 
domains has investigated order effects. The findings of early research were largely 
equivocal, with primacy effects observed in some studies (e. g. Anderson & Barrios, 
1961; McKelvie, 1990) and recency effects emerging in others (e. g. Ashton & Ashton, 
1988; Tubbs, Messier, & Knechel, 1990). In considering the contrasting findings in order 
effect research, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) developed a belief-adjustment model. This 
conceptual framework seeks to explain conditions in which certain order effects occur. 
Hogarth and Einhorn proposed that an initial impression (an anchor) is formed when 
early information is viewed, and this impression is adjusted as new evidence is evaluated. 
The model offers six factors that determine the presence and direction of order effects. 
The principal factor is the mode of processing information, with Hogarth and Einhorn 
predicting that when a single judgment is made at the end of the sequence of evidence, 
primacy effects will emerge. However, recency effects are predicted when the anchor is 
adjusted after every piece of information, in a step-by-step processing mode. Hogarth and 
Einhorn proposed that in the step-by-step mode, people are forced to pay similar attention 
to all evidence in a sequence. Thus, later information is weighted more heavily than 
earlier information, and recency is predicted. 
The other factors in the belief-adjustment model include the response mode required, 
whether evidence is in a long or short series, whether evidence is simple or complex, 
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whether evidence is mixed or consistent, and whether an evaluation or estimation 
response is required. Further predictions of the model include that long series of 
information result in primacy effects, and recency effects occur when more complex 
information is assessed. The predictions made by the belief-adjustment model, and the 
way various factors interact to produce order effects, are summarised in Table 2.1 (see 
page 31). Support for the predictions of the belief-adjustment model has been found 
across a variety of domains, for example, in clinical judgments (e. g. Chapman, Bergus, & 
Elstein, 1996), personnel decision-making (e. g. Highhouse & Gallo, 1997), and military 
decision-making (e. g. Aldeman, Tolcott, & Bresnick, 1993). 
A limited amount of research has also investigated the influence of order effects on 
assessments of ability, with primacy effects the principle fording (e. g., Jones, Rock, 
Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 1968; Allen & Feldman, 1974; McAndrew, 1981). 
Assessments of ability can be defined as a perceiver's cognitive representations of certain 
qualities, which might allow a target person to perform certain tasks successfully. Over a 
series of studies, Jones and his colleagues examined participants' perceptions of a target 
person's ability to solve logic problem-solving questions. When the target person was 
viewed having early success before a decline in performance, participants judged the 
target to have higher ability compared to when they started poorly and then seen to 
improve. In replications of Jones' research, further evidence of primacy effects has 
emerged when judging a target person's ability from solving intelligence problems 
(Newtson & Rindner, 1979; McAndrew, 1981; Benasssi, 1982). Primacy effects have 
also been revealed in an educational setting (Allen & Feldman, 1974) with order of 
information influencing tutors' perceptions of students' ability. 
Until recently, no research had addressed order effects in sport. This is somewhat 
surprising considering judgments concerning ability and performance are regularly made 
in sport, with all sporting participants frequently assessed throughout their career. In 
some sports (e. g. gymnastics, trampolining) judges assess performance to provide 
specific gradings to determine overall finishing positions. Journalists and commentators 
regularly make assessments of players in their reports, and players and coaches make 
judgments of opponents' ability, which might inform their decisions on appropriate 
strategy. Furthermore, coaches and managers watch players in training or competition to 
make decisions on whom to buy or recruit for their squads, and from game to game, who 
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should make the starting line-up. Consequently, it appears crucial that impressions of 
players' ability and performance are not biased by any internal or external factors 
(Plessner & Haar, 2006). 
Greenlees, Dicks, Thelwell, and Holder (2007) sought to address the gap in the order 
effects literature by investigating the influence of order effects on ability assessments in 
sport. Greenlees and colleagues showed footage to soccer players and coaches of a target 
soccer player performing a simple passing task. All participants viewed the same eight 
video clips, with half viewing a declining (successful to unsuccessful) performance 
pattern, and half viewing an ascending pattern. Primacy effects emerged, with the 
player's ability rated significantly higher in the successful/unsuccessful condition. 
Furthermore, primacy effects occurred regardless of the judgment condition or 
participants' level of experience. These findings are consistent with previous studies of 
order effects in ability assessments, and suggest primacy effects in assessments of ability 
are a fairly robust finding. Nevertheless, Greenlees et al. acknowledged that their study 
was conducted within a specific sporting population, and therefore proposed the need for 
more widespread research to investigate whether their results would replicate in a 
different sporting domain. Furthermore, Greenlees et al. suggested further research might 
examine other conditions that influence order effects, for example, moderating variables 
that might offset primacy effects. 
The aim of this thesis was, therefore, to extend the work of Greenlees and his colleagues 
by providing a more systematic examination of order effects in the sporting domain. In 
addition to seeking to replicate Greenlees et al. 's findings, the programme of research 
sought to explore situations in which order effects occur in sport, and variables (both 
situational and personal) that influence the strength and direction of order effects. The 
findings will have applied implications for those who make judgments of players' level of 
ability levels in sport. With a fuller understanding of situations in which order effects 
occur when making sporting judgments, applied recommendations can be made to reduce 
potential biases when making judgments of ability. 
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OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature, drawing 
on theory and research that has examined order effects in the impression formation 
literature. This chapter presents the historical progression of research into order effects, 
and examines theories that researchers have presented to explain why order effects occur. 
In addition, this chapter assesses the findings of order effect research across a variety of 
domains, and evaluates in more detail order effects research concerning ability 
assessments. Furthermore, this chapter will explore variables that might moderate the 
influence of order effects. 
Chapters 3 to 6 investigate the influence of order effects when making assessments of 
sporting ability, testing the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief- 
adjustment model in a sporting context. Chapter 3 extends the work of Greenlees and 
colleagues (2007) by replicating their study in a different sport (ultimate frisbee). This 
chapter also explores whether the delay between pieces of evidence influences the order 
effects found. Chapter 4 examines whether certain personality variables moderate order 
effects. Chapter 5 investigates the influence of participants' level of accountability on 
order effects in the end-of-sequence judgment condition. Chapter 6 examines the impact 
of an interpolated activity on order effects in the end-of-sequence condition. Finally, 
Chapter 7 (general discussion and conclusions) provides an overview of the findings in 
Chapters 3 to 6, discusses the implications for coaches and other individuals who make 
assessments of ability in sport, and highlights areas for future order effects research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Social cognition refers to the thought processes in which we interpret, analyse, and use 
information around the social world (Baron & Bryne, 2002). Within the social 
psychology literature, interpersonal perceptions, the way people develop impressions of 
another, have been extensively researched (Jones, 1996). Impression formation is the 
process by which observers integrate various sources of information into a unified 
consistent judgment. Social cognition theorists (e. g., Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) have 
proposed when people enter into social interactions, information is sought to help predict 
how these interactions are likely to progress and conclude. Forming impressions is 
viewed as a dynamic process, with judgments continually updated in response to new 
information (Franzoi, 2000). However, there are limits on our capacity to think about 
others and process information. As such, we adapt shortcuts designed to save mental 
effort and preserve cognitive capacity (Jonas et al., 2001), which reduces cognitive effort 
in processing information, but can lead to errors in one's thoughts about others. 
In social psychology, a large body of research has examined factors that influence the 
way individuals make judgments of others. In an experimental setting, Chaplin et al., 
(2000) investigated the impact of different types of handshakes on impressions formed. 
Findings revealed that a firm handshake produced more positive impressions, and this 
effect was magnified for women who provided such a handshake. In a study concerning 
perceptions of ability in the workplace, Heilman and Stopeck (1985) found that 
attractive male executives were considered more able than less attractive ones. In a 
further study, Mueller and Mazur (1996) found teenage boys, whose facial appearance 
was perceived to be dominant and assertive, achieved higher rank attainment in the 
military. In sporting judgments, impressions have been influenced by the colour of 
clothing (Frank & Gilovich, 1988), reputation (Findlay & Ste-Marie, 2004), and body 
language and sport-specific clothing (Greenlees et al., 2005). 
Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2005) describe how a person forms impressions of another 
quickly and effortlessly without much conscious analysis of this process. This involves a 
process of automatic thinking, which allows a person to understand new situations by 
relating them to prior experiences. These mental structures, or schemas, help people 
organise knowledge about the social world around them (Fiske &Taylor, 1991). A 
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schema is a `cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of 
stimulus, including its attributes and the relation between those attributes' (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991, p. 98). For example, in sport, a schema for a "good player" could comprise 
of the type of clothing they wear, and certain aspects of their physical appearance. 
When schemas are applied to members of a social group such as gender or race, they are 
commonly referred to as stereotypes (Aronson et al., 2005). Payne (2001) investigated 
whether people's stereotypes about African Americans can influence their perceptions 
on whether people are holding a weapon. Participants were shown pictures of people 
with white and black faces, and then were shown follow-up pictures in which they were 
asked whether they saw a gun or a tool. The results showed people were significantly 
more likely to mis-identify a tool as a gun when it was preceded by a black face rather 
than a white face. In another study, Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2002) asked 
participants to play a video game in which they saw young men in settings such as a 
park or a train station. Half of the men viewed in the footage were white, and half were 
African American. Half the men in each group were holding a handgun, with the other 
half holding a non-threatening object such as a phone or camera. Participants were 
instructed to press a button labelled "shoot" if the man had a gun, and "don't shoot" if 
they did not. The results showed that participants were significantly more likely to press 
the "shoot" button when the person in the picture was black. In both studies, participants 
had to respond quickly to the stimuli, consequently, they had little time to control their 
responses, or to think fully about their actions. Thus, the results indicated stereotypical 
attitudes about African Americans and violence. In sport, stereotypes about gender 
(Coulomb-Cabagno, Rascle, & Souchon, 2005) and race (Stone, Perry, & Darley, 1997) 
have been shown to influence judgments made concerning sporting performance. 
Social cognition follows a framework of information processing, which investigates the 
way information is processed, and how this leads to people making judgments and 
decisions (Bless et al., 2004). Baron and Bryne (2002) suggest that sometimes people are 
successful in their attempts to understand others, but often they make errors in these 
attempts. Evidence suggests that schemas and stereotypes can lead to errors being made, 
due to automatic thinking (e. g., Payne, 2001; Correll et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
researchers in the social psychology literature have identified a number of systematic 
errors (biases) in the way social judgments are made (Plessner & Haar, 2006). Indeed, in 
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a review of the social cognition literature, Funder (2003) highlighted 39 different biases 
that have been reported. For example, the fundamental attribution error is one such bias, 
which refers to a tendency to overestimate the impact of dispositional cues on others' 
behaviour (Baron & Bryne, 2002). 
In social psychology, one such bias that can impact on a person's judgments is the order 
effect. An order effect is said to occur when a person's judgment is sensitive to the order 
in which evidence has been presented (Asch, 1946). The specific types of order effect 
are described as primacy and recency; a primacy effect occurs when judgments are 
disproportionally influenced by evidence presented earlier in a sequence, and a recency 
effect occurs when judgments are disproportionally influenced by evidence later in a 
sequence (Highhouse & Gallo, 1997). In a classic study in impression formation, Asch 
(1946) investigated how order of information impacted on a person's impressions of 
another. From Asch's work, a large body of research on order effects has following to 
investigate whether primacy or recency effects impact on people's judgments in a 
variety of situations, across a variety of domains. 
ASCH'S WORK AND THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF ORDER EFFECTS 
RESEARCH 
Solomon Asch (1946) explored the way impressions of people are formed and developed. 
In his work, Asch sought to more fully understand and explain how humans develop 
perceptions of other human beings. Asch considered how impressions are formed quickly 
and easily, and proposed first impressions can be enhanced or diminished depending on 
subsequent information. Consequently, Asch was interested in examining how people 
form an overall impression of others, in spite of the number of diverse characteristics 
other people have. 
Asch (1946) conducted a series of studies to investigate how people form impressions of 
others, and whether the order of presenting characteristics influenced impressions formed. 
Asch was interested in examining whether identical sets of characteristics would produce 
a constant impression, or if altering the order of these characteristics might change this 
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impression. In the first of this series of studies, Asch presented six adjectives (intelligent- 
industrious-impulsive-critical-stubborn-envious), which were said to describe a target 
person. The adjectives were presented in order from favourable to unfavourable, and vice 
versa. Participants were then asked to write a brief paragraph to summarise the 
impression they had formed of the target person. Participants were also provided with an 
additional 18 pairs of adjectives (one positive and one negative, e. g. unpopular/popular) 
and instructed to chose the one from each pair they felt best characterised the target 
person. Asch reported that participants receiving the favourable-unfavourable list 
perceived the target person more positively compared to those receiving the opposite list. 
These results provided evidence of a primacy effect, indicating that impressions of people 
may depend more on initial compared to later information. 
Asch (1946) conducted a similar study with a different series of adjectives (intelligent- 
skillful-industrious-determined-practical-cautious-evasive) to further investigate this 
primacy effect. The results again showed a definite tendency to primacy, as the series 
starting with the positive characteristics created a more favourable impression. Asch 
proposed that when a person forms an impression of another, each trait interacts with one 
or more of the others, and the overall impression is the summation of these effects. In 
light of this theorising, Asch presented the `directed impression hypothesis' to explain his 
findings. He postulated that primacy effects occurred as early adjectives from the list set 
up a direction or context to which the other adjectives are fitted. In addition, Asch 
suggested the initial adjectives produced a certain expectancy, and subsequent adjectives 
were interpreted in line with this expectancy. For example, Asch suggested that the 
adjective `impulsive' in his sequence could be interpreted positively or negatively, 
depending on the expectancy developed by earlier adjectives. This implied that for social 
interactions, one's overall impressions of another person might be influenced by the order 
in which the characteristics of that person are observed. 
Asch's (1946) studies provided the first evidence of order effects in impression formation. 
However, a number of limitations were observed. Luchins (1948) highlighted the 
measures used involved participants having to choose between extreme characteristics, 
which didn't allow an accurate impression to be formed. Asch himself acknowledged the 
procedures he used were very different from everyday situations in which people make 
judgments of others, stating that impressions were `weak, incipient... based on 
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abbreviated descriptions of personal qualities' (p. 261). Moreover, Luchins proposed that 
Asch's research design failed to make the transition from the experimental situations used 
to real-life situations. Thus, Luchins questioned whether Asch's procedures were relevant 
to more natural judgments made in everyday life. Asch maintained his procedures had 
merit for investigating changes in impressions, arguing that developing impressions from 
lists of trait-characteristics is a partial aspect of the broader process involved in making 
natural judgments of others. Certainly though, Asch's work provided the springboard for 
a subsequent body of research into order effects, that has been conducted in a range of 
situations, and across a variety of domains. 
Luchins (1957) aimed to build on Asch's (1946) work by carrying out a further series of 
studies to investigate order effects in impression formation. Instead of the discrete traits 
used in Asch's research, Luchins used written paragraphs. Luchins manipulated the order 
in which these descriptions were presented to examine whether contrasting orders of the 
descriptive information influenced the judgments made about an individual. In a series of 
studies, participants read two paragraphs describing a target person's behaviour. One of 
the paragraphs reported the target person exhibiting friendly, outgoing behaviour 
(extrovert description), whereas the other reported the target person behaving in a more 
withdrawn, shy manner (introvert description). Luchins examined whether impressions 
would be more influenced by the first half of information (a primacy effect), the second 
half (recency effect), or whether equal weight would be given to both halves. The 
information was presented to participants in a booklet form, with the descriptions either 
with the extrovert passage followed by the introvert passage, or vice versa. Participants 
were then asked to make ratings on various personality traits to give their impressions of 
the target person. The results showed evidence of primacy effects, with the first 
paragraph having greater influence on participants' ratings. For example, when the 
extrovert passage was presented before the introvert passage, the target person was rated 
as significantly more friendly than when the paragraphs were presented in the opposite 
order. 
Findings of primacy effects in Luchins' (1957) initial study were only based on one task, 
and Luchins acknowledged this gave a limited view of the participants' impressions, and 
consequently, he conducted two more studies. In one of these studies, participants were 
asked to write a paragraph to more fully convey their impressions of the target person. 
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Student assistants judged these written responses and categorised them with regards to 
the extent the responses were in line with the extrovert or introvert paragraphs. In another 
study, a broader questionnaire was developed to determine participants' impressions of 
the target person. The results of these additional studies supported the initial finding of 
the first paragraph having a greater influence on impressions formed. 
Luchins (1957) suggested that participants might not have approached the two blocks of 
information in the same manner, probably reading the first paragraph with more of an 
open mind. He proposed the `interference phenomena' as an explanation for the primacy 
effects he found. When participants read the second paragraph, this might have been 
influenced by previous learning from reading the first paragraph. Similar to Asch's (1946) 
`directed impression hypothesis', Luchins postulated that early information may have 
interfered with interpretations of the second paragraph. Thus, primacy effects would be a 
consequence of this interference. In addition, Luchins speculated that participants paid 
more attention to the initial evidence. Consequently, once subjects had derived 
information about the target person from early information, remaining information may 
have been regarded as less important and less attention was paid to it. 
With results revealing primacy effects, Luchins (1957) became interested in exploring 
ways primacy effects might be weakened or even eliminated. Using the same materials as 
in the preceding experiments, groups were additionally given either a warning about 
primacy effects or an interpolated task before making their assessments. In the warning 
condition, participants were told how initial opinions formed were likely to be held 
throughout a period of acquaintance, despite contradicting later actions. Participants were 
then allowed to discuss this idea before being further instructed to suspend their 
judgments until they had read all the information. In the interpolated warning condition, 
participants were given this same warning between reading the two written paragraphs. 
The interpolated number task involved participants solving simple mathematical 
problems between reading the two paragraphs. The results revealed both the interpolated 
warning and the interpolated activity were effective for reducing primacy effects. Luchins 
hypothesised that the interpolation created a break between the blocks of information, 
which consequently made it less likely that information was perceived as a homogeneous 
unit. Furthermore, Luchins proposed the interpolated number task successfully reduced 
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primacy effects as it was not related to information presented and thus made for a sharper 
break between the two written passages. 
Luchins' (1957) explanations, however, can be questioned with regards to whether the 
warning and interpolated activity simply reduced the strength of primacy, or actually 
created a full shift towards recency. Luchins used phrases such as "trend towards 
primacy" (p. 54), "primacy was more pronounced" (p. 54), and "more effective in 
weakening primacy" (p. 70) to describe his results. A weakness of this and other early 
order effects research was the way the results were interpreted, as inferential statistics 
were not used in the analyses. Consequently, while Luchins' and Asch's (1946) research 
appear to offer evidence of primacy effects, these findings should be treated with caution 
due to the limitations in the statistical analyses employed. 
Following these early studies on impression formation, Anderson and various colleagues 
looked to extend the body of research concerning order effects. Anderson and Barrios 
(1961) presented participants with lists of adjectives describing a target person, including 
the list used in Asch's (1946) original study. Participants were then asked to give their 
impressions of the target person on a (-4 to +4) rating scale of favourability. The results 
supported the findings of Asch's study, with strong primacy effects found overall, and for 
Asch's list of adjectives in particular. Anderson and Norman (1964) conducted a study 
examining four impression formation tasks, to investigate order effects in three other 
classes of stimuli besides personality adjectives. Findings from these studies revealed 
primacy effects when using adjectives describing a person, foods describing a meal, and 
headlines describing a newspaper. The authors offered an alternative to Asch's `directed 
impression hypothesis' to explain primacy effects. They argued that a more likely 
explanation for primacy is that latter items do not change meaning, but simply carry less 
weight in the impression than earlier items. Thus, primacy effects occurred as participants 
paid more attention to earlier information in the sequence. 
Anderson and Hubert (1963) suggested that the existence of primacy effects had now 
been confirmed, but the cause of these effects were not yet certain. Anderson and Hubert 
suggested primacy effects could result from participants paying less attention to later 
adjectives in a set. To test this proposed explanation, participants in Anderson and 
Hubert's study were instructed not only to give their impressions, but also to recall the 
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adjectives after making their judgments. Thus, knowing they had to recall each adjective 
forced participants to pay attention to all adjectives in each set. The results showed 
primacy effects for the standard impression task, but these primacy effects were 
eliminated or recency took its place when subjects expected a recall test for the list of 
adjectives. Anderson and Hubert offered these results as support for attention decrement, 
suggesting that attention reduced as successive information was presented. They 
proposed that earlier information exerted more influence, as less attention was paid to 
later information. However, when recall was asked for, increased attention was given to 
later information, and thus, the weight of later information was greater. 
Anderson (1965) found further evidence of primacy effects when presenting participants 
with sets of adjective arranged in positive-negative and negative-positive order. The 
study involved a varying number of positive and negative adjectives in each sequence, 
and found primacy effects, with the net influence of an adjective decreasing linearly with 
its ordinal position in the set. Anderson (1965) offered these results as evidence of a 
weighted-average model. He proposed that each piece of information has a weighting on 
the overall judgment made, and that primacy effects occur due to greater weighting given 
to the terms early in the list due to increased attention to this earlier information 
(Anderson & Hubert, 1963). In addition, Anderson and Jacobson (1965) proposed that 
primacy effects emerged due to the discounting of later information. They suggested 
participants viewed later information as unreliable or invalid indicators of the overall 
impression, if this information contrasted with early evidence viewed. Having made an 
initial judgment to which a person feels committed, the dissonance created by 
disconfirming subsequent information is reduced by ignoring or devaluing it (Walster & 
Presthold, 1966). Thus, later information is discounted and earlier information has a 
greater influence on impressions formed. 
Anderson (1981) brought together the various explanations for order effects in his 
Information Integration Theory (IIT). Anderson suggested that human judgments result 
from the evaluation and combination of information about judged objects. IIT describes 
the way information is processed in order to develop an overall judgment. The theory 
involves a series of evaluation processes, which integrates two internal parameters. The 
first parameter is the scale value, which refers to an item of information to be judged. The 
second parameter is the weight value of the information, which refers to the importance 
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or relevance of each item. Once the stimulus information has been evaluated, the weight 
and scale values are combined to form an overall judgment, with the final judgment a 
weighted average of the individual pieces of information. Using the IIT as a framework, a 
primacy effect would be observed when the first pieces of information are given a higher 
weighting. This bias might occur when earlier stimuli are considered more central to the 
judgment and leads to the discounting of later stimuli, especially when the information 
presented is of a mixed nature. Recency effects are observed when the last pieces of 
information are given a higher weighting. Anderson (1981) stated that primacy and 
recency effects are due to attention; this process affects the weight of a stimulus at each 
particular position. If a response is elicited at the end of the presentation, attention is 
considered to decrease across the sequence causing a primacy effect. If a response is 
elicited after each stimulus is presented, attention is considered to increase across the 
sequence causing a recency effect. 
Some criticisms of Anderson's (1981) model have been raised. Wang (2005) suggested 
the lIT fails to specify what factors affect the attention decrement. Furthermore, Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1992) point to research revealing recency effects when both a single 
judgment is made after all information is viewed, and also when responses are made after 
viewing each individual stimulus. Hogarth and Einhorn identify that although Anderson's 
theory describes decreasing attention as an explanation for primacy, the theory fails to 
offer an explanation for why recency effects occur in the end-of-sequence condition, 
where there is no accounting for additional processing. 
Until 1992, there were diverse findings in order effects research, and various theorising 
for why both primacy and recency effects occur in impression formation. The early work 
of Asch (1946) and a subsequent body of research that followed indicated primacy effects 
were a fairly robust finding. In the industrial/organisational psychology literature, some 
texts argue that primacy effects predominate (Dipboye, Smith, & Howell, 1994; Smither, 
1994). Indeed, Nisbett and Ross (1980) suggested that while order of information 
presented has at times revealed a recency effect on final judgments, and sometimes no 
effect at all, they concluded that "several decades of psychological research have shown 
that primacy effects are overwhelmingly more probable" (p. 172). However, more recent 
research has provided greater evidence of recency effects (e. g. Ashton & Ashton, 1988; 
Tubbs, Messier, & Knechel, 1990). For example, Nisbett and Ross' statement concerning 
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primacy effects has been contradicted by Davis' (1984) review of studies of jury decision 
making that indicated a greater tendency towards recency, and Patel's (2001) findings of 
prevalent recency effects in his review of order effects in auditing judgments. In 
evaluating 76 studies that had explored order effects, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) found 
primacy effects emerged in 36 studies, 35 found recency effects, and five found no effect 
for order of presentation. Thus, it may be premature to conclude that one effect (i. e., 
primacy or recency) predominates (Highhouse & Gallo, 1997). Hogarth and Einhorn 
sought to address and explain these diverse findings, and aimed to bring order to the 
literature that has examined order effects in impression formation tasks. Consequently, 
Hogarth and Einhorn proposed their belief-adjustment model as a practical, theoretical 
framework to explain the divergent findings in the order effects research. 
HOGARTH AND EINHORN' S BELIEF-ADJUSTMENT MODEL 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) presented a more detailed approach to predicting order 
effects with their belief-adjustment model. According to this model, an initial impression 
(an anchor) is formed after the first piece of evidence viewed, and this impression is 
adjusted as new information is presented, depending on how strongly this information 
confirms or disconfirms the initial impression. Thus, the model predicts people will 
anchor on their current judgment position, and then adjust their beliefs depending on the 
strength or direction of each new piece of information. Hogarth and Einhorn proposed the 
presence of primary or recency effects is dependent on six factors: when judgments are 
made (end-of-sequence or step-by-step); the mode of information processing (end-of- 
sequence or step-by-step); whether the sequence of information is long or short; the 
complexity of the information; whether the judgment is an evaluation or an estimation; 
and whether evidence is mixed or consistent. The conceptual framework provided by the 
belief-adjustment model predicts primacy or recency as a function of the interaction 
between these various factors. The predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's model, and how 
these factors interact to produce order effects, are summarised in Table 2.1 (page 31). 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) theory of belief-updating involves an anchoring and 
adjustment process. 
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This can be written in algebraic terms as 
Sk = Sk-1 + Wk[S(Xk) - R] 
where 
Sk = The belief after evaluating k pieces of evidence 
Sk-1 = prior impression or anchor (maybe also based on earlier evidence) 
s(zk) = an individual's subjective evaluation of a certain piece (kth piece) of evidence. 
Wk = the adjustment weight of a piece (the kth piece) of evidence. 
R= The reference point against which the impact of evidence is evaluated. 
To summarise this equation, a final judgement (Sk) is made from taking the current 
anchor 
(Sk_I), and adjusting the anchor in light of succeeding pieces of evidence (wk[s(xk) - 
R]). This adjustment is dependent on an individual's own assessment of that piece of 
evidence [s(xk)], and the weighting (wk) of that evidence. The model proposes a 
number of factors that influence the occurrence of order effects. One of these is the 
processing of evidence, whether beliefs are revised once after all the evidence has 
been processed, in an end-of-sequence manner, or whether belief-revision occurs after 
each individual piece of evidence, in a step-by-step manner. The following sections 
describe how the response mode impacts on order effects. 
Mode of Responding: Response mode asked for (end-of-sequence or step-by-step 
response) 
A key postulate of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model is that the 
occurrence of order effects will be influenced by the mode of response that the 
observer is asked to make. Hogarth and Einhorn propose that 2 basic modes of 
response are end-of-sequence (EoS) responses and step-by-step (SbS) responses. In 
the end-of-sequence (EoS) response mode, observers are asked to make one final 
judgment after all the information has been presented. Alternatively, in the step-by- 
step (SbS) mode, observers are required to revise their beliefs after each piece of 
information, thus updating their judgments in light of new evidence. 
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Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) predict primacy effects for EoS judgments. Previous 
researchers have presented theoretical explanations for primacy effects occurring 
when EoS judgments are made. Asch (1946) theorised that early information sets up a 
direction or context to which remaining information is fitted, and thus, the early 
information has greater weighting and primacy effects occur. Alternatively, Anderson 
and Hubert (1963) proposed early information has greater weighting as less attention 
is paid to later information. Anderson and Jacobson (1965) also suggested early 
information has greater weighting compared to later evidence, as information viewed 
later is discounted as it fails to match the initial impression developed. 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model provides an alternate, yet compatible, 
explanation for the occurrence of primacy effects in the EoS condition. 
Mathematically, when EoS judgments are made, the model can be represented by 
Sk = S(xi) + Wk[S(X2, ....... xk)ln - 
R] 
In this representation of the model, when there is no prior information (Sk., = 0), the 
first piece of evidence (S(xj)) becomes the anchor. Following this, the remaining 
evidence (s(x2, ....... xk)/n) is `some 
function, possibly weighted average, of the 
individual subjective evaluations of items of evidence that follow the anchor' (p. 12). 
Thus, Hogarth and Einhorn's model proposes that initial evidence creates the anchor, 
which exerts a strong influence on the overall impression. Each subsequent piece of 
information has an equal effect, as it forms part of an aggregation of all the evidence 
following the anchor. Consequently, later evidence fails to strongly influence the 
overall impression compared to the strength of the anchor, and primacy occurs due to 
the initial piece of information having a greater impact. 
In the SbS mode, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) explain that a new anchor is created by 
each new piece of information, as SbS processing forces equal attention to be paid to 
all the information. Thus mathematically, for SbS judgments, the model can be 
represented by 
Sk = Sk-1 + Wk[S(Xk) - Rý 
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Encoding: Estimation Evaluation 
Type of All Mixed Consistent 
Evidence: 
Response Mode: EoS SbS EoS SbS EoS SbS 
Short Series 
Simple Primacy Recency Primacy Recency Primacy No effect 
Complex Recency Recency Recency Recency No-effect No effect 
Long Series Force towards Force Force Force Primacy Primacy 
primacy towards towards towards 
primacy primacy primacy 
Table 2.1. Belief-Adjustment Model; Summary of Order-Effect Predictions (Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992) 
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In the SbS mode, the process of belief revision is repeated for each piece of new 
information, and so the anchor (Sk_1) changes in light of each piece of new evidence. 
Thus, when evaluating later pieces of evidence, beliefs are adjusted against an anchor 
created by all of the previous pieces of evidence. Consequently, later information has 
a greater impact on overall assessments, and thus recency effects are predicted when 
SbS judgments are required. 
Mode of Processing: How information is processed (EoS or SbS processing). 
A feature of the belief-adjustment model is the distinction between the response mode 
asked for, and the actual mode of processing used. As stated by Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992), `It would be convenient to assume that people always use an SbS process 
when faced with an SbS response mode, and an EoS process when faced with an EoS 
response mode'. (p. 12). However, Hogarth and Einhorn recognise this is not the case, 
as when an EoS response is asked for, information might still be processed using an 
EoS or an SbS strategy. Therefore, the primary postulate of Hogarth and Einhorn's 
belief-adjustment model is the actual mode of information processing used. 
In proposing their model, Hogarth and Einhorn evaluated 76 experiments (see Table 
2.2) and found that in the 54 studies that participants made EoS judgments, 36 
revealed primacy effects. In the 22 studies that asked for SbS judgments, 20 found a 
recency effect. This offered an empirical basis for the model's predictions of primacy 
in the EoS condition, and recency in the SbS condition. For example, in Asch's (1946) 
study, EoS judgments were asked for when assessing the target person, and primacy 
effects were found. Furthermore, when Stewart (1965) asked participants to form 
impressions from lists of adjectives presented in different orders, primacy effects 
were found when just one rating was made after all adjectives had been presented 
(EoS mode). However, Stewart found a recency effect when participants made 
ratings after each individual adjective was presented (SbS mode). 
In a more recent study that tested the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) 
model, Kerstholt and Jackson (1998) examined the influence of response mode 
through exploring judgments of guilt in criminal trials. Kerstholt and Jackson 
manipulated the order of defence and prosecution evidence (descriptive information), 
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Evidence Items 
Response Mode EoS 
Simple 
SbS 
Complex 
EoS SbS Total 
Short series 
Primacy 19 - 1- 20 
Recency 5 16 72 30 
No Effect 3 - 1- 4 
Long series 
Primacy 12 2 2- 16 
Recency 2 - 12 5 
No effect - - 1- 1 
Total 41 18 13 4 76 
(Reproduced from Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) 
Table 2.2. Classification of results of order effects studies according to task characteristics 
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and asked participants to judge the defendant's probability of guilt either after each 
witness statement (SbS mode) or after having read all witness statements (EoS mode). 
As predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model, recency effects were found in 
the SbS condition, and primacy effects were found when EoS judgments were made. 
Kerstholt and Jackson concurred with the belief adjustment model, suggesting that in 
SbS conditions, when new pieces of evidence are compared to an overall judgment of 
previous information, more weight is given to the latest evidence. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) distinguish between the response mode asked for, and the 
actual mode of processing used. When participants are asked for an SbS response, they 
can't use an EoS strategy, thus SbS processing must be used. In contrast, if asked for an 
EoS response, participants can use either EoS or SbS processing. From Table 2.2,34 out 
of 54 studies asking for EoS responses were seen to result in primacy effects. However, 
15 studies asking for EoS responses found recency effects. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
proposed that EoS studies resulting in recency were most likely due to participants 
adopting an SbS mode of processing, even when asked for EoS judgments were asked for. 
Hogarth and Einhorn suggested that when participants are faced with a series of 
information to process, the key to which processing strategy used depends on the 
cognitive demands the information being assessed places on participants. Aggregating 
information using an EoS strategy might place a high demand on mental resources, while 
step-by-step integration of items of information using an SbS strategy gives participants a 
strategy to deal with the demands of processing information. Therefore, the choice of 
which processing strategy to use is determined by the effects of task characteristics on 
cognitive capacity. These characteristics include the length of information series, and the 
complexity of information, which are further factors in Hogarth and Einhorn's model 
which will be examined in the following sections. 
A participant's motivation to actively process information to reach an accurate judgment, 
and their capability to process information might determine which mode of processing is 
used (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM: Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) explains how external or internal variables might impact on judgments 
made. Petty and Wegener (1999) suggest that the most critical construct in the ELM is 
the elaboration continuum, which is defined by how motivated and able people are to 
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assess the merits of evidence presented to them. The more motivated and able people are, 
the more likely they are to effortfully scrutinize all available relevant information. 
Therefore, if people are highly motivated to think, they are likely to assess information 
much more thoroughly, and arrive at a more reasoned and thorough judgment. 
Alternatively, with low motivation to think, there is a reduction in information scrutiny, 
with people looking for a simple and quick way to make judgments rather than examining 
all of the information carefully. Thus, with less scrutiny of all the information, people 
might base their judgment on the first information processed, the number of arguments 
presented, or even on a brief analysis of the target (e. g. does he/she seem attractive, 
likable? ). Consequently, with less motivation to think, it appears more likely that people 
will adopt an EoS manner of processing, making a single judgment, which is predicted to 
result in primacy effects. Alternatively, when motivated and able to engage in greater 
scrutiny, it is more likely that initial impressions can be modified. Thus, a high level of 
motivation to think is likely to replicate an SbS processing strategy, even if an EoS 
response is asked for. This greater motivation to process information would offer one 
explanation for why recency effects might occur in the EoS condition. 
In order to measure an individual's level of motivation to think, an assessment instrument 
was developed (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), with a pool of 
statements generated concerning a person's reactions to engaging in effortful thinking in 
a variety of situations. From this, the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) was designed to 
distinguish those individuals who tend to engage in effortful thinking from those who do 
not. Ahlering and Parker (1989) investigated order effects in an impression formation 
task, and used the NCS to classify levels of motivation to think. Participants were given 
eight positive and eight negatives trait adjectives to describe a target person, with the 
positive adjectives either preceding or following the negative adjectives. The results 
showed people low in need for cognition displayed primacy effects in their judgments of 
the target, while these primacy effects were offset for the high need for cognition group. 
Ahlering and Parker proposed that people with low motivation to think formed 
impressions early and then ceased paying attention to remaining evidence. However, 
more highly motivated thinkers were thought to pay greater attention to all relevant 
information. This is in line with Hogarth and Einhorn's theorising, that higher motivation 
to think would mean the use of an SbS style of processing, with judgments updated in 
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light of each new piece of information, and this would explain the absence of primacy 
effects. 
Other research in the impression formation literature has supported these findings using 
alternate classifications of the extent of an individual's thinking. Richter and Kruglanski 
(1996) proposed that if cognitive capacity is limited, a person is likely to freeze on their 
current judgments, and then they fail to modify these judgments in light of new 
information. This need for cognitive closure has resulted in greater primacy effects in 
impression formation tasks (e. g. Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Heaton & Kruglanski, 
1991). Kruglanski and Freund (1983) linked this theorising with Anderson and 
Jacobson's (1965) discounting theory, as inconsistent later information is denied (or 
discounted) as it is not compatible with the early impression developed. Furthermore, 
Richter and Kruglanski suggest the need for closure notion is compatible with the 
attention-decrement hypothesis (Anderson & Hubert, 1963), as less attention is paid to 
new evidence once closure has been attained. 
Another factor that might affect the processing strategy used is the level of accountability 
participants have for making accurate judgments, with greater accountability likely to 
increase active processing of all information in a SbS manner. Tetlock (1983) studied pro 
and anti-defendant information provided in criminal trials, and found primacy effects in 
judgments of guilt, but only when participants didn't expect to provide justifications for 
their decisions. In addition, Cushing and Ahlawat (1996) asked participants to provide a 
rationale for their audit decisions and found order effects to be offset. Cushing and 
Ahlawat proposed that through the greater involvement from making the auditors 
accountable for their judgments, they paid more attention to all the evidence. This 
resulted in an absence of order effects that biased overall judgments. In their study 
examining order effects in personnel decision-making, Highhouse and Gallo (1997) 
proposed the greatest limitation of their study was the lack of incentives for participants 
to provide accurate ratings, and suggested that order effects might have occurred due to 
participants having little motivation to consider all the evidence. In view of this, greater 
accountability is likely to make individuals pay closer attention to all information in 
striving to make an accurate judgment, which is similar to an SbS processing strategy. 
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Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) also suggested some EoS studies resulting in recency 
involved experimental manipulations that probably impacted on the judgment process. 
Such manipulations might have meant SbS processing was used, even though EoS 
responses were asked for. Providing instructions warning against the influence of first 
impressions may be such a manipulation that reduces primacy effects, as Luchins (1957) 
found when warning participants against making snap judgments. Instead, participants 
were told to suspend their judgments until they had received all the information about the 
target person. The results showed this advanced warning weakened the primacy effects 
found in Luchins' earlier studies when using the same stimuli. Greenlees and colleagues 
(2008) also found that warning coaches about the primacy bias eliminated primacy 
effects in the EoS condition. Intuitively, warning participants against making an early 
impression would reduce the strength of order effects occurring, as individuals might be 
more likely to correct for a judgmental bias if they are aware of it and are motivated to 
correct it (Wegener & Petty, 1995). Thus, participants would be more likely to pay 
attention to all evidence, thus updating their judgments regularly in a SbS style of 
processing. 
Research has therefore shown that making participants accountable for their decisions, 
and warning against being overly influenced by early information might impact on order 
effects as each manipulation can be conceptually linked with producing an SbS 
processing strategy. In contrast, fatigue is a variable that could create a move away from 
effortful processing, and back towards EoS processing. Webster, Richter and Kruglanski 
(1996) found that students who had just sat an examination and were mentally fatigued 
showed greater primacy effects than non-fatigued students in forming impressions of a 
job applicant. When fatigued, participants are unlikely to pay equal attention to each 
piece of information, as they don't have the cognitive resources available to fully process 
to all the evidence and continually update their judgments. Thus, when fatigued, a move 
away from recency and towards primacy would result. It is likely that emotional 
responses such as a person's mood or level of tiredness could reduce the level of 
processing (Webster et al., 1996). In this situation, people are looking for a simple, quick, 
and easy way to form an impression, as they have less cognitive resources available to 
process all the information. Thus, they are more likely to make one judgment, thus 
replicating the EoS condition in Hogarth and Einhorn's model. 
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Length of the Sequence of Evidence (short or Ionia series) 
The length of the series of evidence is a further factor that Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) 
propose will influence the occurrence of order effects, with primacy effects predicted for 
long series of information. Hogarth and Einhorn categorized order effects studies into 
short series (between 2-12 pieces) and long series (17 items or more) of evidence. Their 
classification was due purely to the studies falling conveniently into these two categories. 
Hogarth and Einhorn argued that primacy effects are predicted for long sequences as 
more information is processed across time. In such cases, people become less sensitive to 
incoming information, as this represents an increasingly small proportion of the evidence 
already processed. Furthermore, Hogarth and Einhorn suggested that participants could 
tire if asked to process many pieces of information in the EoS response mode. This 
theorising can be conceptually linked to Anderson and Hubert's (1963) theory of 
attention decrement, with a reduction in attention resulting in a lack of motivation to 
actively process later information. Consequently, an SbS processing strategy is unlikely 
for long series of information, unless specifically asked for. An alternative explanation is 
that for a long sequence of information, and when only one judgment is made (EoS 
response), participants reach a decision they are confident in, and discount further 
information that doesn't fit in with their initial impression (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965). 
Curley, Young, Kingry, and Yates (1988) presented medical and nursing students with a 
`long' series of 28 slides, each with a specific clinical symptom and disease. At the end of 
the sequence, participants estimated the strength of the relationship between the symptom 
and the disease. As Hogarth and Einhorn's model predicts, Curley et al. found 
information earlier in the sequence was more influential, and primacy effects were 
displayed for this long series of information. 
Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) provided one of only two studies that Hogarth and Einhorn 
identified that found recency for a long series of simple items. In their study, participants 
were asked to make judgments about the likeability of a stimulus person after reading a 
series of behaviour statements. Half the participants received the majority of favourable 
statements at the beginning of the list and the other half received the majority of 
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unfavourable statements at the beginning. The groups were further divided, with half 
asked to recall as much information as possible before making their judgments, and the 
other half completing these two measures in the reverse order. As predicted by Hogarth 
and Einhorn's model, primacy effects were found for a long series when no recall was 
needed. However, when participants had to recall evidence items for comprehension, 
recency effects were found. Lichtenstein and Srull suggested that conditions encouraging 
additional processing would offset the judgment biases causing primacy effects, even for 
long series of information. 
The findings of Lichtenstein and Srull (1987) suggested that having to recall evidence 
created a move away from primacy and towards recency. Indeed, Anderson and Hubert 
(1963) found that when participants were expected to recall all adjectives describing a 
target person, primacy effects were eliminated or recency took its place. Anderson and 
Hubert theorised that expecting to have to recall all the adjectives would force 
participants to pay attention to all the adjectives in the sequence, thus increasing their 
motivation to attend to all the information. In Curley et al. 's (1988) study, when 
participants were warned they would be expected to recall evidence presented to them, 
this reduced the primacy effects in the medical judgments made. In line with the 
theorising of Petty and Wegener (1999), being asked to recall information would increase 
motivation to think, thus creating more active processing of all information. 
Consequently, asking for recall of evidence would indicate that even in the EoS response 
mode, an SbS strategy is utilised, due to the more active processing of information. 
Therefore, the influence of early information is reduced, as greater attention is paid to all 
evidence, and a move away from primacy and towards recency is the result. 
One criticism of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model concerns the classification of a 
long or short series of information. They categorised a short series of information as 2-12 
items, and more than 17 was classified as a long series. Greenlees et al. (2007) suggested 
this was based on an arbitrary split of the research studies conducted at the time of their 
investigation, rather than on any theoretical standpoint. Furthermore, Newtson (1973) 
proposed that individuals control information by splitting incoming evidence into finer 
units of information. For example, Newtson and Rindner (1979) slowed down the speed 
of footage shown or asked participants to focus on smaller units to split information 
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provided into smaller units. This could produce a longer series of information, and 
primacy effects were seen to emerge. Thus, these results were in line with primacy effects 
predicted by Hogarth and Einhorn's model for long series of information. Greenlees and 
his colleagues found primacy effects in a short (8 items) series of evidence. However, in 
light of Newtson and Rindner's theorising, Greenlees et al. postulated that each item of 
skill could be broken down into 3 subcomponents. Therefore, the sequence length would 
be 24 items. Thus, the `long' series could account for the primacy effect. If this was the 
case, Greenlees et al. suggested that more research is needed to `refine the notion of 
sequence length' (p. 487). 
Complexity of Information (simple or complex) 
Table 2.2 shows that when information is simple, particularly for long series of 
information, primacy effects are more likely. In contrast, studies using complex 
information have found recency to be a more consistent finding. Thus, the complexity of 
information is a further variable that Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) identified as an 
influence on order effects. Hogarth and Einhorn defined complexity as a function of the 
amount of information processed and the perceiver's familiarity with this information. 
Simple tasks were categorised as ones familiar to participants, or which require them to 
process only a single item for each piece of evidence. Complex information was defined 
as unfamiliar information or a large amount of information contained in a single piece of 
evidence. Hogarth and Einhorn proposed that as complexity of evidence becomes greater, 
an increase occurs in the information-processing demands placed on participants. In this 
situation, aggregating all the information and integrating this with the initial anchor can 
take up a large amount of mental resources. Consequently, even when EoS responses are 
asked for, people are likely to be forced into using an SbS strategy after encountering 
new pieces of complex evidence, in order to cope with the cognitive demands of the task. 
The use of SbS processing would explain why complex information would result in 
recency effects, even in the EoS condition. 
In evaluating the 76 experiments, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) found that for evidence 
categorized as simple, 31 out of 40 studies using the EoS response mode found primacy 
effects, and 18 out of 18 studies in the SbS mode revealed recency effects. In comparison, 
for evidence classified as complex, 11 of 15 studies showed recency effects regardless of 
judgment condition. Thus, Hogarth and Einhorn proposed that for simple evidence, 
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primacy is predicted in the EoS condition, and recency is predicted in the SbS condition. 
However, for complex evidence, recency is predicted in both judgment conditions. In 
light of this, it is likely complexity is a further factor that will result in an SbS strategy 
being used, even when an EoS response is asked for, in order to deal with the demands of 
processing complex information. 
A number of applied studies across a variety of domains have supported predictions of 
the belief-adjustment model concerning complexity of information. Early order effects 
research (e. g. Asch, 1946; Anderson & Barrios, 1961; Anderson, 1965) found primacy 
effects when using simple series of adjectives. In a study exploring order effects in 
personnel decision-making, Highhouse and Gallo (1997) asked participants to view a 
candidate's performance in two role-play exercises, and made ratings either in the EoS or 
SbS mode. The results showed evidence of a recency effect regardless of the response 
mode. Highhouse and Gallo argued that this was because the information presented was 
complex. Therefore, even in the EoS condition, it was likely that SbS processing was 
used to cope with the cognitive demands of processing such complex information. Thus, 
these results were consistent with Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model. 
Complexity is also proposed to be a function of judgers' experience levels. Expertise in a 
specific domain is likely to provide a person with strategies to cope more effectively with 
greater amounts of information (Newell & Simon, 1972), as greater experience results in 
evidence being more familiar to participants. In this instance, less cognitive resources are 
needed to process the information. In contrast, inexperienced participants find 
information unfamiliar and therefore more complex (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). 
Consequently, less experienced people are likely to use SbS processing to cope with 
increased cognitive demands created by complex evidence, even when an EoS response is 
asked for. Thus, Hogarth and Einhorn's belief adjustment model predicts recency for 
inexperienced participants. 
Researchers have operationalised complexity in terms of familiarity. Adelman, Tolcott, 
and Bresnick (1993) used trained Army air defence personnel as participants to 
investigate how incoming information would lead to the perception of an aircraft being 
friendly or hostile. The findings revealed recency effects, and furthermore, enlisted 
personnel showed larger recency effects compared to officers in the SbS mode. Aldeman 
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et al. hypothesised that the lesser experience of the enlisted personnel meant they 
perceived evidence as complex, compared to the officers. Thus, greater complexity 
resulted in SbS processing and recency effects. Similar results have been shown in 
auditing judgments. Kennedy (1993) found less experienced participants were more 
susceptible to recency effects, and Messier and Tubbs' (1994) also found recency effects 
in the judgments of less experienced auditors. 
Evidence has been presented to support Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model with 
regards to the complexity of information. However, there is uncertainty regarding 
whether items of information should be defined as simple or complex. Moreover, when 
reviewing order effects research, Hogarth and Einhorn acknowledged the difficulties they 
had in distinguishing whether information was simple or complex. For example, evidence 
items from Dreben et al. 's (1979) juror study were classified as simple because `subjects 
were only given 10 seconds to read the words and provide ratings' (p. 6). This definition 
of whether an item is simple or complex can be seen as arbitrary. Furthermore, Cortez 
and Walkyria (2005) criticised the model in view of this, suggesting that defining the 
level of complexity is very subjective in nature. In addition, Cortez and Walkyria pointed 
to the definition for complexity being confounded with length, and length categorization 
is constrained by the number of items. Furthermore that the term `item' is not 
operationalised, as it could be a word, a number, or a sentence. 
Tyne of judgment made (evaluation vs. estimation: mixed vs. consistent). 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) further considered the way judgments are made, by 
distinguishing between evaluation tasks and estimation tasks. In evaluation tasks, 
individuals encode evidence as positive or negative with respect to the hypothesis under 
consideration. For example this might involve a true or false response, or in sport, to 
select or leave out a player in a team. In contrast, in estimation tasks, evidence is relative 
to the current level of belief. In sport, an estimation task might refer to the extent to 
which a player has ability. The belief-adjustment model also predicts that order effects 
depend on whether the evidence sequence is consistent (all positive or all negative 
evidence) or mixed (mixed positive and negative evidence). Hogarth and Einhorn's 
model predicts an interaction between whether the task involves evaluation or estimation, 
and whether evidence is consistent or inconsistent. More specifically, the model predicts 
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that in evaluation tasks, consistent evidence produces no order effects; whereas 
inconsistent (positive and negative) evidence produces recency effect due to the increased 
weighting of evidence coming second in a sequence rather than first. 
These predictions of Hogarth and Einhor's (1992) model have been supported in the 
social psychology literature. For example, Ashton and Ashton (1988) carried out a series 
of four experiments to test for order effects for consistent or mixed evidence. They 
presented four pieces of evidence and asked accountants and auditing students to perform 
judgment updating tasks in an auditing context, using SbS methods to process 
information. As predicted, for mixed evidence, a recency effect was observed with later 
evidence having a greater influence on the final judgments. In these studies, no order 
effects were found when the evidence was consistently positive or negative. Ashton and 
Ashton suggested that their findings should be tested in more realistic audit contexts, as 
they used a simplified, well-defined setting. A subsequent investigation by Tubbs, 
Messier, and Knechel (1990) extended this work in more realistic audit contexts, using 
more content-rich audit scenarios. Tubbs et al. found recency effects for mixed evidence, 
but not for consistent evidence. These findings offer further support for Ashton and 
Ashton's results, and for the predictions of the belief-adjustment model. 
After detailing the predictions of their belief-adjustment model, Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992) carried out a series of studies themselves to examine and validate the model's 
predictions. The purpose of these studies was specifically to examine differences for 
consistent and mixed information, when evaluations or estimations are made. In these 
studies, participants watched footage from four scenarios. For example, one scenario 
concerned a target baseball player, whose form had sharply improved after a coaching 
program. The findings were fully consistent with the predictions the model makes about 
no order effects for consistent evidence, recency for mixed evidence (across both EoS and 
SbS response modes), and recency in consistent evidence for estimation but not 
evaluation tasks. Hogarth and Einhorn concluded that their results offered support for the 
predictions of their belief-adjustment model. 
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Limitations and criticisms of Hogarth and Einhorns' (1992) model 
While their framework has shown how task variables and processes interact to produce 
order effects in belief updating, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) acknowledged that further 
research should explore how other procedural and task variables affect this process. 
Hogarth and Einhorn pointed to variables such as time pressure, expertise, and temporal 
delays, and proposed it would be worthwhile to investigate the influence of these 
variables on order effects. In addition, Hogarth and Einhorn suggested how factors such 
as physical appearance (Benassi, 1982) may influence order effects by interacting with 
various task characteristics. Hogarth and Einhorn acknowledged their belief-adjustment 
model fails to account for such variables. In addition, variables such as recall of 
information, fatigue, background information, and accountability might be considered in 
view of how they might influence order effects. 
A further limitation of the belief-adjustment model is that it makes no allowance for 
personality differences of participants making judgments. The model fails to recognise 
that participants might have different traits that influence their final judgments, and how 
these traits might make them more or less susceptible to order effects. For example, 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) suggested people might have different levels of sensitivity 
toward negative and positive evidence. Furthermore, Wang (1998) criticised the model on 
the grounds that some people might weight positive and negative information differently. 
Consequently, this is an individual difference that could influence order effects but is not 
accounted for in Hogarth and Einhorn's model. Indeed, in his original studies, Asch 
(1946) reflected on his own failure to deal with the role of individual differences, and 
how participants' own personal qualities might influence impressions formed. 
Furthermore, Luchins (1957) postulated: `One wonders what kind of individual 
differences played a role in determining why one subject consistently showed primacy 
effects, another showed recency effects, and yet another did not show either of these 
responses consistently' (p. 57). Luchins identified some potential individual differences, 
for example closure, and tendencies towards "Pragnanz" (making a regular, stable 
impression and working against irregularities or inconsistencies). Further research is 
needed to examine the impact of individual differences on the incidence of order effects. 
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The role of individual differences in order effects 
Asch (1946) acknowledged the role of individual differences was not investigated in his 
research and questioned whether participants' own personal qualities might impact on 
their impressions formed of others. Asch suggested that when a theoretical clarification 
has been reached, a proper study of individual differences could be pursued. Hogarth and 
Einhorn (1992) have formulated a theoretical belief-adjustment model to predict 
conditions in which order effects may occur. However, in their belief adjustment model, 
Hogarth and Einhorn failed to fully acknowledge how personality traits of the person 
making judgments might influence order effects. 
A person's motivation to think (e. g., Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) and scrutinise all 
information carefully is one such individual difference that might influence the incidence 
of order effects. Similarly, a person's need for cognitive closure (e. g., Kruglanski & 
Freund, 1983) and their tendency to fix on early impressions would be likely to influence 
order effects. A further personality variable that might impact on order effects concerning 
judgments of another's ability is a person's beliefs in how ability can be developed. 
Erdley and Dweck (1993) explored whether those children who believe personality is a 
fixed quality (entity theorists) would make more long-term social judgments than those 
who believe personality is malleable (incremental theorists). Participants aged 9 to 11 
years, were shown slide shows of a target child displaying negative behaviours. 
Following this, half the participants were shown negative behaviour consistent with the 
original evidence, and the other half shown positive behaviour inconsistent with the 
earlier negative behaviour. Participants rated the target on a range of positive and 
negative personality traits. The results showed that the children categorised as entity 
theorists did not differ in their ratings of the target, even when disconfirming positive 
evidence was viewed second. However, incremental theorists did differ in their ratings in 
light of the positive evidence. Erdley and Dweck concluded that incremental theorists 
were more flexible in their judgments. Such flexibility might be linked to a SbS strategy, 
as both involve greater processing of later evidence to fully update judgments. In 
contrast, entity theorists were more influenced by early information and thus prone to 
primacy effects, as they were less likely to revise their judgments in the face of 
disconfirming evidence. 
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More recently, in a study exploring impressions of mathematical ability, Butler (2000) 
presented participants with sets of mathematical scores of a target pupil, with half the 
participants viewing ascending scores, and the other half viewing a descending trend. 
Butler gave participants statements such as `everyone has a certain amount of 
mathematical ability, and one can't do much to change that', and their level of agreement 
to these statements determined if they were entity or incremental theorists. The results 
provided strong support for the proposal that people's theories about the nature of ability 
moderate the effects of the order of information presented to them on their inferences 
about the level of that ability. More specifically, entity theorists inferred higher ability 
about others (and themselves) when performance declined, and incremental theorists 
inferred higher ability in the event of improving performance. In light of this research and 
theorising, a person's beliefs about the nature of ability might be a personality trait that 
influences order effects. 
Summary 
Despite these limitations, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) have produced a model with a 
sound theoretical underpinning that researchers have used as a focus to explore order 
effects in a variety of domains (e. g. Trotman & Wright, 2000; Igou & Bless, 2002). In 
addition, Hogarth and Einhorn's predictions provide a rationale for testable hypotheses 
that researchers have used in their experiments. Consequently, Hogarth and Einhorn's 
belief-adjustment model provides the underpinning theory used in the present thesis to 
investigate order effects. 
ORDER EFFECTS IN ASSESSMENTS OF ABILITY 
Since Asch's (1946) series of studies, researchers have explored order effects in different 
situations and across a variety of domains. However, only a limited number of studies 
have examined how assessments of ability could be influenced by order effects. 
Assessments of ability can be defined as a perceiver's cognitive representations of the 
certain qualities of another, which might allow the perceived individual to perform 
certain tasks successfully. In a series of experiments, Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and 
Ward (1968) found primacy effects when perceivers made ability judgments concerning a 
target person. Jones et al. asked participants to observe a stimulus person attempting to 
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solve a series of intellectual problems. Participants watched 30 difficult multiple choice 
questions being attempted by the target person. In the first experiment, participants saw 
15 questions out of the 30 being answered correctly. One group observed more questions 
being solved correctly at the beginning of the test (a descending order that replicated the 
favourable to unfavourable conditions in Asch's 1946 tests). Another group saw more 
questions being answered correctly in the latter part of the test. A third group saw the 15 
correct answers given in a random order. In the first study, participants also attempted to 
solve the problems themselves. According to the pre-designed feedback, they were 
always seen to "solve" 10 problems correctly. Following this procedure, participants were 
asked to rate the level of intelligence of the target person, and asked to predict the target's 
success in a follow up test. 
The results revealed the target person was perceived to perform better in the descending 
pattern of success compared to either the ascending or the random success group 
(primacy effect). More specifically, the participants in the descending condition predicted 
the stimulus person would solve significantly more problems in the second series 
compared to participants who viewed the ascending condition. Furthermore, when asked 
to recall how many correct answers were made in the first series, scores in the descending 
condition were significantly higher than in the ascending group. Jones and his colleagues 
(1968) were surprised by these unexpected results. They had initially hypothesized 
greater ability would be attributed to a performer showing systematic improvement. To 
explain their findings, Jones et al. suggested that the early success of the target person 
might have meant participants ceased to make comparisons with the person they were 
viewing. Thus, participants sought to maintain their self-esteem through viewing the 
stimulus person as unusually talented. Consequently, participants might have distorted 
recall scores in the direction of their initial impression. 
Jones et al. (1968) acknowledged these speculations were tentative, until the results were 
replicated under more rigorous conditions. In four follow-up experiments, the target 
person was videoed to create ascending, descending and random conditions. Jones et al. 
postulated that the target person might have exhibited non-verbal cues resulting in the 
participants' ability assessments being unwittingly influenced. With the target person on 
film, all of their expressions and behaviour were identical in all conditions, with just the 
order of the successful performance varied. Thus, videoing the target person in action 
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removed any potential sources of judgment bias. When the videotaped footage was used 
in the second of Jones et al. 's (1968) series of studies, the primacy effects of the initial 
study were replicated. 
Jones and his colleagues (1968) made small alterations to their following two studies. In 
the third study, some participants were led to believe that results of their performance 
would be publicised. Jones et al. suggested primacy effects might have been amplified in 
the declining condition when the results were made public in order to maintain self- 
esteem (through comparisons with the target's own scores). This variation failed to result 
in any differences in the strength of the primacy effects. In the fourth study, participants 
were not asked to solve the problems, and primacy effects were still observed. These 
findings weakened Jones et al. 's theory that participants attributed higher levels of ability 
to the target person in order to maintain levels of self-esteem. 
The fifth of Jones et al. 's (1968) series of experiments examined whether males and 
females would produce the same pattern of results. The primacy effects observed meant 
Jones and his colleagues eliminated gender as a possible influence on order effects. The 
findings of this fifth study were consistent with the earlier studies, thus, Jones et al. 
concluded that they were dealing with a robust finding of primacy. Furthermore, they 
speculated that decisions concerning ability are made quickly, despite often on the basis 
of inadequate or misleading information. Thus, Jones et al. pointed to information 
discounting (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965) to explain how once a level of ability is 
assigned, it is variations in factors such as luck or motivation that account for subsequent 
variations in performance. Furthermore, Jones and his colleagues suggested it is easier to 
form an impression than change one, and proposed this may be especially true of stable 
dispositions like ability. Jones et al. also reflected on the potential applied implications of 
these results. For example, if a person performs well at first but then their performance 
level drops, a perceiver might judge their ability overly high. Alternatively, an improving 
performer might be removed from a team or squad just at the time of improvement, or a 
`late blooming' worker or student may not get the recognition his/her ability deserves. 
In response to the primacy found in Jones et al. 's (1968) research, Jones and Welsh (1971) 
suggested that primacy is a limited effect, and in everyday life, recency is the rule. They 
pointed to the nature of the questions solved in Jones et al. 's (1968) experiments, and 
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proposed that the target person solving the questions either knew the answer, could make 
educated guesses, or did not know the answer. In these situations, Jones and Welsh 
proposed that no learning opportunities were provided for the participant. In contrast, 
games of strategy mean players must be flexible, adapting to the situation, and utilising 
information gained to develop their methods of play. Thus, if participants believed the 
target person was learning the skill, and ability levels could be improved, then recency 
would occur as later information would have more influence. This is in line with Butler's 
(2000) theorising that incremental theorists will exhibit recency effects. Incremental 
theorists are proposed to be more flexible in their judgments, as they don't consider early 
information to be key to overall ability, as they believe ability can be improved. 
In Jones and Welsh's (1971) study, two students were seen to play a strategy game, in 
which student X was seen to be losing steadily in the first third of the game, holding his 
own in the middle third, and then gaining ground on student Y in the final third to 
eventually draw even in the game. The performance of student Y was reversed, as he was 
seen to start well and then decline in performance. The results demonstrated recency 
effects, with participants in the study judging student X (ascending condition) as being 
more retentive, successful, and generally smarter than student Y. Theoretically, in line 
with Butler's (2000) theorising, Jones and Welsh (1971) suggested that recency effects 
were due to participants observing a learning effect in such games of strategy. Therefore, 
later evidence had a greater influence on overall impressions of ability. 
Since this early work, a number of other researchers have explored order effects in ability 
assessments, with primacy effects emerging as a consistent finding. Allen and Feldman 
(1974) conducted their research in an applied setting, exploring the impact of order 
effects on judgments of academic ability. Tutors viewed students answering mathematical 
questions, with the performance of the tutee controlled to create different patterns of 
success and failure in two halves of the task: success-success, failure-failure, success- 
failure, and failure-success. The results showed a primacy effect, with early performance 
more strongly influencing the tutor's assessments of ability. Furthermore, the tutor 
reported perceiving the tutee more as more likeable when they performed well in the first 
half compared to when he performed poorly. Additional evidence for primacy effects 
were demonstrated in the success-failure condition, in which most participants perceived 
the tutee as being successful throughout the session. In contrast, in the failure-success 
49 
condition, many participants wrongly reported poor performance in the second half of the 
session. In agreement with Asch's (1946) `directed attention hypothesis', Allen and 
Feldman speculated that primacy effects had resulted from later performance being 
distorted in the direction of the earlier performance. 
Newtson and Rindner (1979) also examined order effects in assessments of ability. Their 
study involved a target person answering a series of intelligence questions. Performance 
was controlled to allow participants to view the target answering questions correctly in 
either an ascending or descending success pattern. The target person's ability was judged 
significantly higher when starting well followed by a decline in performance, compared 
to when a poor start was made and subsequent improvement was shown. Newtson and 
Rindner proposed that primacy effects emerged as individuals paid more attention to 
earlier information (Anderson, 1965), and having reached a point of subjectively 
sufficient information, they ceased to process further information. 
McAndrew (1981) identified that participants in the studies of Jones et al. (1968) and 
Newtson and Rindner (1979) had a number of cues available when making their 
judgments of ability. This included the stimulus person's gender, dress, and attractiveness, 
as well as the specific nature of the problems being attempted. Thus, McAndrew (1981) 
examined whether primacy effects would still occur if cues about the person and the 
nature of the test were lacking. Participants were asked to grade 30 responses from a 
phantom student, either in an ascending or descending pattern of success. Then 
participants turned the paper over before counting the number of correct answers and 
were asked to estimate how many questions the student had answered correctly. In 
addition, participants predicted how many correct answers there would be in the next set 
of 30 questions, and also gave a rating of the target student's level of intelligence. Results 
revealed primacy effects, with the target student in the descending pattern of success 
perceived to have solved more problems correctly in the first series. Furthermore, the 
student in the descending condition was perceived as more intelligent, and was predicted 
to perform significantly better in the second series of problems. 
Benassi (1982) looked to extend this research by considering the effects of physical 
attractiveness of a stimulus person, a factor previously shown to influence attributions 
concerned with ability and performance (e. g., Clifford & Walster, 1973). Benassi 
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replicated the procedure used by Jones et al. (1968), with participants shown 30 multiple- 
choice questions answered in ascending or descending patterns of success. In addition, 
Benassi manipulated the physical attractiveness of the stimulus person by attaching 
photos to booklets containing the answers to the task. Primacy effects emerged in the low 
physical attractiveness group, with the ability of the descending performance group rated 
significantly higher than the random or ascending group, when participants viewed the 
photo of the less attractive target. However, in the high physical attractiveness group, 
ability was assessed highly regardless of performance. 
Schema theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) proposes individuals automatically use cues (e. g., 
physical appearance, clothing) available early on in a social interaction to assign a person 
to a certain category. In line with schema-theory, it is plausible to suggest that aspects 
such as the appearance of a target person could result in a particular schema being 
developed. From Benassi's experiments, the schema developed was that a physically 
attractive person was considered to be more intelligent and thus able to answer more 
questions correctly. Relating this to sport, an example could be a tall, muscular target 
player eliciting a certain schema of a more talented player, which in turn would influence 
overall impressions. The work of Benassi suggested that a positive schema might produce 
high ratings of performance regardless of order, but primacy effects would still occur 
with a less favourable schema. 
The research into assessments of ability has found primacy effects to be a consistent 
fording (e. g. Jones et al., 1968; Allen & Feldman, 1974; McAndrew, 1981). This research 
offers support for the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment 
model. For example, the studies in which primacy emerged all involved assessments of 
ability made at the end of the sequence (EoS) of information, as predicted by the belief- 
adjustment model for EoS judgments. However, these studies have focused on the 
incidence of order effects, and failed to test the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's 
model through a systematic examination of situations in which order effects occur. 
Therefore, the studies only provide a limited understanding of how order effects might 
influence assessments of ability. In light of this, it would be premature to say that 
primacy is a robust finding (e. g. Jones et al., 1968) until other conditions have been 
explored, especially when different processing strategies are used (EoS and SbS). 
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Furthermore, the research is limited as it has not explored ability assessments across a 
variety of domains, for example in sport. 
ORDER EFFECTS IN ASSESSMENTS OF SPORTING ABILITY 
In sport, judgments concerning ability and performance are made regularly, with all 
sporting participants frequently assessed in their career. For example, coaches and 
managers watch players to inform decisions on who to recruit for squads, or who to select 
for teams. In some sports, judges assess performance to provide gradings that determine 
overall finishing positions. It appears very important the ability and performance of a 
sporting participant is assessed accurately and objectively (Plessner & Haar, 2006). 
However, until recently, the impact of order effects on judgments of ability in a sporting 
context had not been explored. 
Greenlees et al. (2007) were the first to investigate whether order effects could influence 
judgments of sporting ability. Greenlees and his colleagues showed participants footage 
of a target soccer player performing a series of skills. This skill involved the player 
controlling a pass from a teammate, turning past a marking player, and passing to a 
second teammate. All participants viewed the same eight video clips, with half viewing a 
declining (successful to unsuccessful) performance pattern, and half viewing an 
ascending pattern. Participants made ratings of the target players on five criteria; soccer 
ability, ball control, speed of thought, attitude and athleticism. Half the participants 
provided one set of ratings after all clips had been viewed (end-of-sequence condition: 
EoS) and the other half updated their ratings after viewing each individual clip (step-by- 
step condition: SbS). Greenlees and his colleagues hypothesised primacy effects when 
participants made EoS judgments after viewing all the evidence. In contrast, recency 
effects were hypothesised when participants made SbS judgments. These hypotheses 
were in line with the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment 
model. 
In addition, Greenlees et al. (2007) used soccer coaches, players, and non-players for 
their participant sample. The purpose of this was to explore whether participants' level of 
experience would influence order effects. In line with predictions of Hogarth and 
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Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment, less experienced participants were expected to view 
evidence as unfamiliar and thus complex. Consequently, Greenlees et al. hypothesised 
less experienced participants would show recency effects. However, results of Greenlees 
et al. 's (2007) study revealed primacy effects regardless of judgment condition and level 
of participants' experience. These findings are consistent with previous studies of order 
effects in ability assessments (e. g. Jones et al. 1968), and indicated primacy effects may 
be a fairly robust finding. In view of the constant findings of primacy, it is also possible 
that primacy effects are simply inherent in stable attributions such as ability (Jones et al., 
1968). In light of their findings, Greenlees et al. postulated that the way athletes' abilities 
are assessed are biased due to the order of information viewed. More specifically, it was 
proposed that initial evidence viewed has a greater influence on overall assessments of 
ability, compared to later evidence. 
Unexpectedly, the results of Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study were in contrast to the 
hypothesised recency effects in SbS conditions. In accord with Hogarth and Einhorn's 
(1992) belief adjustment model, Greenlees at al. speculated primacy effects may have 
emerged in the SbS condition due to the length of the information series. Greenlees et al. 
argued that if participants used finer units of analysis in judging the football skill (i. e. 
breaking down the skill into 3 smaller units), this could be considered a `long series' of 
information. With 8 clips and 3 units of information in each clip, this meant 24 units 
would need to be processed. This was over the figure of 17 that Hogarth and Einhorn 
classified as a long series of information. For a long series, Hogarth and Einhorn's model 
predicts primacy effects, due to people forming impressions after a certain point of a long 
series, and having sufficient confidence to discount further information. However, this 
suggestion was tentative and not explored further. 
Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study can be criticised with regards to methods used in the SbS 
condition. More specifically, participants only made one assessment of overall ability 
after each item of information when making SbS judgments. However, after viewing the 
final piece of information, participants gave five ratings to assess the target player's 
ability. In view of this, it was questionable whether participants carried out full SbS 
processing between viewing each piece of evidence. Greenlees et al. had hypothesised 
recency effects in the SbS condition, but primacy effects were seen. However, it is 
possible that the predicted recency effects did not emerge as full SbS judgments were not 
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made. Nevertheless, the results of Greenlees et al. 's study offered evidence that ability 
assessments might be biased by the order information is presented, although, it is clear 
that a fuller examination of order effects in sport is needed. Thus, the present programme 
of research sought to provide such an examination of order effects. 
SUMMARY OF AIMS AND STRUCTURE OF THESIS 
The preceding review of the order effects literature has shown order of information 
viewed can impact on final judgments made, with evidence revealing order effects across 
a variety of domains. In studies examining ability assessments, primacy effects have been 
the general finding (Jones et al., 1968; Newtson & Rindner, 1979; McAndrew, 1981; 
Benassi, 1982). Greenlees and his colleagues (2007) were the first to examine order 
effects in sport, and their results revealed primacy effects that influenced ability 
judgments. The aim of this thesis was to build on Greenlees et al. 's study, and provide a 
more systematic examination of order effects in the sporting domain. The purpose of this 
thesis was to provide further evidence of order effects as a bias in judgments of sporting 
ability. In addition, the aim of this thesis was to provide the rationale for applied 
suggestions to those who make judgments of sporting ability concerning how their 
judgments might become more accurate in light of this bias. Thus, the following specific 
aims were generated: 
1) To replicate Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study in a different sport (ultimate frisbee), 
thus investigating the generalisability of Greenlees et al. 's findings. 
2) To use an improved method of step-by-step processing to further examine the 
influence of processing mode on order effects. 
3) To investigate whether step-by-step processing offsets primacy, or whether the time 
delay created by making step-by-step judgments is a confounding variable. 
4) To explore personality traits (e. g. entity or incremental theorist, motivation to think) 
that might moderate order effects. 
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5) To examine whether participants' level of experience influences order effects. 
6) To examine whether participants' accountability for providing accurate judgments 
influences order effects in the EoS condition. 
7) To investigate experimental conditions (e. g. interpolated activities) that might 
eliminate the primacy bias when end-of-sequence judgments are made. 
8) To provide evidence to inform those making ability assessments in sport, as to how 
primacy effects might best be avoided. 
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CHAPTER 3 
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STUDY 1: EXAMINING THE INFLUENCE OF RESPONSE MODE ON 
ASSESSMENTS OF ABILITY. 
INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, no research had examined whether order effects influence judgments of 
ability in sport. Greenlees et al. (2007) sought to address this gap in the sport psychology 
literature by examining order effects in a sporting environment. Based on the predictions 
of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief adjustment model, Greenlees et al. hypothesised 
order effects would vary according to the type of judgment participants were asked to 
make. More specifically, primacy effects were predicted in the end-of-sequence (EoS) 
condition, and recency effects predicted in the step-by-step (SbS) condition. However, 
Greenlees et al. found primacy effects regardless of judgment condition, with 
participants' assessments of a target player's soccer ability significantly higher when 
viewing the declining performance pattern, compared to the ascending pattern. These 
findings were consistent with previous studies of order effects in assessments of ability 
(e. g. Newtson & Rindner, 1979; McAndrew, 1981) and supported the suggestion that 
primacy effects are a fairly robust fording when assessing ability (Jones et al., 1968). 
From these findings, Greenlees et al. (2007) postulated that assessments of a player's 
ability might be biased by the order in which their performances are judged. However, 
Greenlees and his colleagues acknowledged a limitation of their study was that only one 
skill (controlling and passing the ball) in a single sport (soccer) was examined. 
Greenlees et al. pointed to the strength of early research into order effects that used 
multiple stimulus materials to examine the generalisibility of order effects found. Thus, 
the first aim of the present study was to investigate whether order effects occurred in 
another sport. A catching and throwing skill in ultimate frisbee was used, and a target 
player's performance was rated by ultimate frisbee players. Thus, the study examined 
whether the order effects found by Greenlees et al. replicated in a different sport setting. 
The findings of primacy in Greenlees et al. 's study were in contrast to Hogarth and 
Einhorn's (1992) predictions of recency in the SbS mode. However, Greenlees et al. 's 
study can be criticised with regards to the methods used in the SbS condition. 
Specifically, participants only made one assessment of overall ability after each item of 
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information when making SbS judgments. However, after viewing the final piece of 
information, participants gave five ratings to assess the ability of the target player. 
Consequently, it appears the study failed to produce a satisfactory manipulation of the 
SbS mode, as participants were not asked to engage in full SbS processing between 
viewing each piece of evidence. Thus, the predicted recency effects might not have 
emerged as a complete SbS measure was not used. Hogarth and Einhorn suggest an SbS 
processing strategy means later evidence has more weighting towards the final 
judgment, and thus recency is predicted. In light of this theorising, the second aim of the 
present study was to explore the influence of order effects in the SbS judgment mode 
when more complete SbS processing was required. 
A further consideration in the present study was that the delay created by making full 
step-by-step judgements could be a confounding variable. For example, in Greenlees and 
colleagues' (2007) study, the non-viewing time between each clip was not controlled. 
Previous research by Luchins (1957) and Miller and Campbell (1959) revealed that 
temporal delays between evidence created a move away from primacy and towards 
recency. Miller and Campbell suggested that time delays create a break between 
participants accessing evidence. Thus, recency effects would emerge since more recent 
information would have a stronger presence in short-term memory. In light of this, if 
recency effects were to emerge in the step-by-step condition, it is possible that the delay 
created between viewing each clip influenced these findings. Therefore, an additional 
group was created, in which participants made an end-of-sequence assessment, but a 
time delay was inserted between clips. This time delay of 12 seconds was equal to the 
time taken by participants to update their assessments after each clip in the extended 
step-by-step condition. 
In summary, we examined order effects in a sporting environment to explore whether the 
mode of processing (EoS or SbS) influences the presence of order effects. In addition, 
the present study examined whether an extended SbS strategy influences order effects. 
First, in accord with the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment 
model, and consistent with previous findings in studies exploring assessments of ability 
(e. g., Jones et al., 1968; McAndrew, 1981; Greenlees et al., 2007), it was hypothesised 
that participants in the EoS condition would display primacy effects. Second, it was 
hypothesised that participants would also display primacy effects when an incomplete 
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method of SbS processing was required. Third, and in line with Hogarth and Einhorn's 
theorising, participants using a more thorough method of SbS processing were 
hypothesised to display recency effects. Fourth, in considering the delay condition, the 
delays in Luchins (1957) and Miller and Campbell's (1959) investigations involved a 
large break between two blocks of evidence. This was a different type of delay than the 
short period between each clip created by making SbS assessments in the present study. 
Thus, it was proposed that in the delay condition, participants would still be processing 
information using an EoS judgment, and therefore would show primacy effects. 
Hypothesis 1 
In the EoS response condition, primacy effects are predicted. 
Hypothesis 2 
In the SbS (short) response condition, primacy effects are predicted. 
Hypothesis 3 
In the SbS (extended) response condition, recency effects are predicted. 
Hypothesis 4 
In the delay condition, primacy effects are predicted. 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study consisted of 240 club standard ultimate frisbee players (187 
male, 53 female), with a mean age of 23.29 years (SD = 4.18 years). Participants' mean 
playing experience was 4.01 years (SD = 3.46 years). The sample was predominantly 
white Caucasian (n = 230), with the remainder coming from Asian (n = 7) and mixed race 
(n = 3) backgrounds. All were volunteers and signed informed consent forms prior to 
participation. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of 
Chichester. 
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Materials 
The stimuli used in this experiment were two DVDs, each comprising footage of two 
ultimate frisbee players performing a skill eight times. The skill involved the players 
making a short run to receive the disc, pivoting, and executing a forehand lead pass to a 
team-mate making a run across the pitch (see Figures 3.1-3.5 for more detail of the skill 
performed). The footage of the players performing the skills was all filmed at the same 
venue, using a Panasonic AG-DP800E video camera. The clips were then edited into 
two DVDs following a similar procedure used by Greenlees et al. (2007). 
For the first player shown (i. e. the control player) the eight examples of the skill were 
randomly selected from a database of 22 examples. For the second player (i. e. the target 
player) the eight examples of performance were selected from a database of 24 
examples. Following the filming, these 24 examples were rated by eight experienced 
ultimate frisbee players and coaches (mean age = 26.87 years, SD = 3.27; mean playing 
experience = 7.63 years, SD = 1.77 years) who had each played for their club's first 
team in the UK national finals, and who each had a minimum of 2 years coaching 
experience (mean coaching experience = 4.50 years, SD = 1.23 years). There was no 
control for order, with the coaches rating the 24 clips in the chronological order they 
were filmed in. The examples were rated on a scale of 1= very poor execution of the 
skill to 10 = excellent execution of the skill. The three highest, lowest, and median rated 
examples were identified respectively. A one-way ANOVA was conducted on these nine 
ratings, and revealed a significant main effect of the video footage (F7,49 = 51.08, p< 
.0 1). 
Follow up Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed that the three `good' performances 
were significantly more positively rated than the three `moderate' performances and the 
three `poor' performances. Additionally, the `poor' performances were rated 
significantly more negatively than two of the `moderate' performances. On the basis of 
this finding, the footage of the `moderate' performance that was not rated significantly 
differently to the three `poor' performances was removed from the stimulus materials 
used in the actual experiment. Thus, the stimulus materials consisted of eight examples 
of the skill. These eight clips were edited into two DVDs, each with a different order of 
presentation. The first DVD consisted of the three good clips, followed by the two 
moderate and then the three poor clips. In the second DVD, this order was reversed. 
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Figures 3.1 - 3.5. Sequences of Ultimate Frisbee Skill Used in the Study 
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Figure 3.1. The ultimate frisbee 
player runs directly in line 
towards the disc being thrown 
to him. 
Figure 3.2. He catches the disc. 
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Figure 3.3. He turns in 
preparation to make a pass. 
Figure 3.4. He pivots in readiness 
to make a forehand pass. 
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Figure 3.5. He makes a forehand pass, 
looking to time the pass correctly to 
meet the run of the receiver. 
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Measures 
Ratings of the player's ability. To examine their impressions of the two players 
observed, participants were asked to rate each player on five factors. These were 
ultimate frisbee ability (general), disc control, speed of thought, attitude and athleticism. 
These factors were adapted from those used in Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study. Each 
aspect was measured on a 10 point, likert-type scale (e. g., 1= poor to 10 = excellent). 
Procedure 
Participants were recruited at National Ultimate Frisbee tournaments. Ultimate Frisbee 
was used as a focus for data collection as it was a different team sport from the 
Greenlees et al. (2007) study, and thus, the present study would examine whether the 
results of Greenlees et al. 's study would replicate in a different sport. Ultimate Frisbee 
was also the focus for practical reasons, as the author had many contacts in the sport, 
which provided access to a large number of participants (across the programme of 
studies in the present thesis). Furthermore, the nature of Ultimate Frisbee tournaments, 
which are usually held over a full weekend, provided suitable opportunities for data 
collection. 
In the present study, data was collected at five different weekend competitions. The 
author made contact with team captains to outline the study, and to request permission to 
speak to the players in their team. Following this, the author spoke to players to request 
their participation in the study. If they were willing to participate, a convenient time was 
agreed for players to come and complete the ratings task during a break in their 
competition schedule. A table and chairs were set up in a quiet part of each competition 
venue, with a laptop set up to show the footage. Participants were informed that the 
purpose of watching the video footage was to examine how people make judgments of 
sports players they observe. It was emphasised to each participant that there were no 
right or wrong answers, but their own impressions that mattered. Participants either 
watched the footage individually, or in pairs. If footage was viewed in pairs, participants 
were instructed not to discuss the footage or any aspect of the study until all ratings had 
been completed. 
Participants were randomly assigned to view either the declining pattern of success 
(starting with the good clips, and finishing with the poor clips), or the ascending pattern 
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of success (same clips as the declining pattern but with the order reversed). In addition, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Those in the EoS condition 
completed the five ratings after viewing the full sequence of eight clips for each of the 
two players (target and control player). Participants in the first SbS condition, a 
condition that replicated the SbS processing in Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study, made a 
single judgment of overall ability after each clip, and then rated the players on all five 
criteria after having viewed the last clip. The data points for this condition were 
collected approximately 12 months after the data points for the other three conditions. 
Participants in the second (extended) SbS condition completed the five ratings after 
viewing each individual clip, thus making 8 sets of ratings. In this condition, the 
researcher manually paused the DVD to allow participants time to complete their 
ratings. Although ratings were made eight times in each SbS condition, only the final 
sets of ratings were used in the analyses. A fourth group of participants were assigned to 
the delay condition. Pilot testing using the stimuli revealed that participants took 
approximately 12 s to make the ratings after each clip in the step-by-step condition. 
Therefore, participants in the delay group viewed footage of the control and target 
players that had a gap of 12 s inserted between each individual clip in both series. As in 
the end-of-sequence condition, participants in the delay condition completed one set of 
ratings after viewing all the clips for each of the two players. 
Data Analysis 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for the ratings of the control 
player and target player are presented in Table 3.1. Pearson product-moment 
correlations were conducted on the dependent variables to assess the data for multi- 
collinearity. In Greenlees et al. 's study of order effects, the five dependent variables 
were combined into one MANOVA analysis. However, Tabacknick and Fidell (1996) 
state that if you put highly correlated variables into a MANOVA, you will hide possible 
effects, because you are effectively measuring the same thing. In accord with the 
guidelines of Tabacknick and Fidell, any correlations of . 70 and 
higher were deemed to 
indicate that the dependent variables were measuring the same construct. The Pearson 
correlations (shown in Table 3.1) indicated that for the target player, the correlation 
between ultimate ability and disc control (. 74), and the correlation between ultimate 
ability and speed of thought (. 72) exceeded Tabacknick and Fidell's (1996) criterion 
value of . 70. The correlation 
between disc control and speed of thought (. 68) was 
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Variable M SD 
Control ratings (n = 240) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 6.45 1.08 
2. Athleticism 6.34 1.20 
3. Disc Control 6.42 1.13 
4. Speed of Thought 6.37 1.25 
5. Attitude 6.60 1.29 
Target ratings (n = 240) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 5.16 1.40 
2. Athleticism 4.68 1.43 
3. Disc Control 5.23 1.49 
4. Speed of Thought 5.18 1.44 
5. Attitude 5.65 1.52 
* *p<. 01 
Subscale 
12345 
- 62(**) . 67(**) 
- . 
44(**) . 
60(**) . 47(**) 
. 42(**) . 
53(**) 
. 56(**) . 30(**) 
- . 47(**) 
- 71(**) . 
78(**) 
. 
72(**) . 50(**) 
- . 50(**) . 
58(**) . 48(**) 
- . 69(**) . 30(**) 
- . 47(* *) 
Table 3.1. Rating means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between subscales 
Order of Judgment Group Combined Athleticism Attitude 
Information Construct 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Declining End-of-Sequence 5.89 1.04 4.63 1.35 5.87 1.41 
order Step-by-step (short) 5.50 1.31 4.70 1.75 5.73 1.48 
Step-by-step (extended) 4.81 1.51 4.37 1.45 4.87 1.45 
Delay 5.66 1.13 5.03 1.33 5.77 1.52 
Total 5.43 1.31 4.68 1.48 5.55 1.51 
Ascending End-of-sequence 4.98 1.06 4.60 0.97 5.67 1.24 
Order Step-by Step (short) 4.94 1.19 4.70 1.70 5.80 1.54 
Step-by-step (extended) 5.17 1.45 4.77 1.48 5.53 1.74 
Delay 4.67 1.29 4.67 1.37 5.97 1.63 
Total 4.94 1.25 4.68 1.39 5.74 1.54 
Total End-of-sequence 5.43 1.14 4.62 1.17 5.77 1.32 
Step-by-step (short) 5.17 1.26 4.70 1.71 5.77 5.77 
Step-by-step (extended) 4.99 1.48 4.57 1.47 5.20 1.62 
Delay 5.16 1.30 4.85 1.35 5.87 1.57 
Total 5.19 1.30 4.68 1.43 5.65 1.52 
Table 3.2. Means and standard deviations for the target player for the three dependent 
variables in the different subgroups. 
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approaching this . 70 level. In light of these high correlations, it was decided to combine 
these three dependent variables (ultimate ability, disc control, speed of thought) into 
one construct. The scores of the ultimate ability, disc control, and speed of thought 
were averaged to give a single rating for this combined construct, which formed one 
independent variable, which was analysed in one ANCOVA rather than a MANCOVA. 
A further justification for combining these variables, is that a number of separate 
univariate tests might be misleading, especially with correlated variables, as one rating 
is being measured repeatedly (Tabacknick & Fidell). This serves as a `protection 
against inflated Type 1 errors due to multiple tests of (likely) correlated DVs' (p. 376). 
Thus, for data analysis, the combined construct, athleticism and attitude were the three 
dependent variables. 
To test the hypotheses, a2x4 (order x judgment condition) analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted on the ratings of the target player. The scores of the control 
player were used as a covariate to control for any differences in rating scores when 
viewing identical footage. Before conducting each analysis, the data were examined to 
determine if they satisfied the assumptions of ANCOVA (Pallant, 2001). Independent 
sample t-tests were used when necessary to evaluate main effects, using a change value 
to control for the score of the covariate. Alpha was set at P=0.05 for all statistical 
analyses. 
RESULTS 
Impact of order and judgment mode on ratings of the target player 
The main assumption of ANCOVA is the test of equality of regression slopes. For each 
of the dependent variables (the combined construct, athleticism and attitude), the 
interactions between order and judgment condition for the covariates were not 
significant (see Appendix 2.4). Thus, this assumption was satisfied. In addition, 
Levene's test was not statistically significant for either of the covariates, therefore the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was satisfied. 
The 2 (ascending vs. declining order) x4 (EoS vs. SbS_short vs. SbS extended vs. 
delay condition) ANCOVA conducted on the ratings of the combined construct 
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revealed a significant order by judgment condition interaction effect (F3,231= 2.62, P< 
. 05, effect size il 
2= 
. 03, estimated power at 5% probability = . 64). In addition, the 
results revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,231 = 12.54, P <. 05, effect size rJ 2 
_ . 05, estimated power at 5% probability =. 94), but not a significant main effect for 
judgment condition (F1,231= 1.71, P> . 05, effect size i2 = . 02, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 45). 
Independent sample t-tests, using a change value to control for the score of the 
covariate, revealed the ratings for the declining order were significantly higher than the 
ratings for the ascending order in the EoS condition (mean difference = 0.76, t=2.35, 
df. = 58, P< . 05). In addition, the results revealed a significant difference between the 
declining and ascending orders in the SbS (short) condition (mean difference = 1.13, t= 
3.58, df. = 58, P< . 05). These significant differences revealed primacy effects in the 
EoS condition, and the SbS condition that replicated the SbS processing used in 
Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study. The t-tests revealed no significant differences between 
the declining and ascending order in the SbS (extended) condition (mean difference = 
0.01, t=0.03, df. = 58, P> . 05). Thus, no order effects were revealed for the extended 
SbS processing strategy. Finally, the t-tests revealed a significant difference between 
the declining and ascending orders in the delay condition (mean difference = 0.69, t= 
2.01, df. = 58, P <. 05). Thus, primacy effects were revealed in the delay condition. 
These significant differences are illustrated in Figure 3.6. To further investigate the way 
judgments were formed in the SbS (extended) condition, mean scores after each piece 
of evidence were calculated. These results can be seen in Figure 3.7. 
For athleticism, the ANCOVA revealed no significant main effects for order (F1,231= 
. 05, p> . 05, effect size i2 < . 
01, estimated power at 5% probability = . 05), or judgment 
condition (F3,231= . 71, p> . 05, effect size i2= . 
01, estimated power at 5% probability = 
. 20). 
In addition, no significant order by judgment condition interaction effect for 
athleticism were observed (F3,231 -"2.46, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 01, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 14). 
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Figure 3.6. Mean (+SE) ratings for combined construct for end-of-sequence, step-by- 
step (short), step-by-step (extended), and delay condition in declining and ascending 
orders of information. 
** Significant difference between declining and ascending order (p <. 01). 
* Significant difference between declining and ascending order (p < . 05). 
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Figure 3.7. Mean scores in the SbS extended condition (for the combined construct) for 
the declining and ascending orders of information after each piece of evidence. 
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For attitude, the ANCOVA revealed no significant main effects for order (F1,231= . 31, p 
> . 05, effect size i2 < . 01, estimated power at 5% probability = . 09), or judgment 
condition (F3,231 = 2.35, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 03, estimated power at 5% probability 
= . 59). In addition, no significant order by judgment condition interaction effects for 
attitude were observed (F3,231= 1.79, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 02, estimated power at 
5% probability =. 46). 
DISCUSSION 
This study examined whether order effects would be observed when individuals make 
assessments of sporting ability. More specifically, the study sought to explore whether 
order effects would be influenced by the type of judgment participants were asked to 
make. First, for the combined construct of ultimate frisbee ability, disc control, and 
speed-of-thought, -primacy effects were 
found in the end-of-sequence (EoS) condition, 
as hypothesised. Second, it was hypothesised that primacy effects would be found in 
the step-by-step (SbS) condition that replicated the SbS manner of processing used in 
Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study. As hypothesised, primacy effects were displayed in this 
condition for the combined construct. Third, it was hypothesised that recency effects 
would be found in the extended SbS condition. However, our results failed to support 
the third hypothesis, as no order effects were revealed in this condition. Fourth, it was 
hypothesised that primacy effects would be found in the delay condition. This 
hypothesis was supported, with the delay condition exhibiting a primacy effect similar 
to that in the end-of-sequence condition. These findings in the delay condition indicated 
the extended step-by-step processing condition, rather than any time delay, eliminated 
the primacy effects. No significant order effects were found for athleticism or attitude. 
The results supported the first hypothesis that primacy effects would be displayed in the 
EoS condition, where participants were asked to make just one judgment of ability after 
viewing all the clips. This finding is in line with the predictions of Hogarth and 
Einhorn's (1992) model and is consistent with the results of Greenlees et al. 's (2007) 
study and previous published reports of order effects in ability assessments (Jones et al., 
1968; Newtson & Rindner, 1979; McAndrew, 1981; Benassi, 1982). Thus, the results 
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of the present study support the notion that primacy effects are a robust finding when a 
single EoS assessment of ability is made. Hogarth and Einhorn propose in the EoS 
condition, a person anchors their judgment on initial evidence, and only one further 
adjustment is made after all evidence is viewed. Thus, primacy emerges due to the 
heavy weighting of early information, and lesser weighting of later information. 
The findings have implications for coaches, selectors, and others who make a single 
judgment of ability after viewing a player, as the results suggest initial information will 
bias assessments of a player's overall ability. Coaches might assess ability differently 
depending on the player's initial performance levels. In light of this, observers should 
be made aware how order of information might bias their judgments of a player. In 
addition, athletes should be made aware that a strong initial start in their performance 
may create a positive impression on those assessing them. In the competitive 
environment, such impressions might create favourable outcomes for a player in view 
of the responses opponents make as consequences of the impressions developed (Wan 
& Knapper, 1968). For example, strong initial play might result in an opponent's 
confidence declining, leading to the opponent having negative expectations of success. 
Second, it was hypothesised that primacy effects would be found for the SbS processing 
used in Greenlees at al. 's (2007) study. The results supported this hypothesis. Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1992) explain how SbS processing results in later information having 
greater weighting. This can be represented by the equation Sk = Sk_j + wk[s(xk) - R], 
where Wk represents the adjustment weight of a piece (the kth piece) of evidence. With a 
weak method of SbS processing, the adjustment weight (wk) is reduced, meaning later 
evidence had less weighting on the overall judgment. Thus, it appears the weighting of 
the later evidence was not strong enough to offset the influence of the initial anchor, 
and consequently this SbS processing strategy failed to eliminate primacy effects. 
Third, it was hypothesised that recency effects would occur when participants made 
more thorough SbS judgments. The results indicated this SbS processing strategy 
eliminated primacy effects, but the predicted recency effects did not occur. This can 
tentatively be explained by considering the strength of initial information (the anchor) 
compared to the weighting of later evidence. Jones et al. (1968) argued that as ability is 
seen as a stable entity, initial information is given much greater weighting than may be 
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the case when other judgments are required. Referring back to the equation Sk = Sk_J + 
wk[s(xk) - R], the extended SbS strategy meant the adjustment weight (wk) of later 
information for this processing was greater than the weighting for the incomplete 
measure of SbS processing. Consequently, the increased weighting of later evidence 
meant the influence of the anchor was offset. However, if the initial anchor was 
sufficiently strong, then this SbS manipulation may only have the strength to reduce 
primacy effects and leave no order effects (rather than reversing primacy effects to 
recency effects as suggested by Hogarth and Einhorn). Further research is needed 
before such a proposal can be substantiated. The temporal patterning of the mean 
ratings after each piece of evidence, are represented in Figure 3.7. This line graph 
shows how the anchor is formed by the first piece of evidence, and then the remaining 
evidence in the declining and ascending orders brings the judgments to an 
(approximately) equal score. Thus, the graphs demonstrate visually how additional 
processing from the SbS strategy reduces the strength of the initial impression, and 
offsets primacy, but not by enough to produce a recency effect. 
These results extend the findings of Greenlees et al. (2007) who only asked for one 
overall assessment of ability after each clip in the SbS condition. These results were 
replicated in the present study in the similar SbS condition. The present study also used 
a more thorough measure of SbS processing in an additional SbS condition, with 
participants asked to provide all four ratings after each single piece of evidence. 
Therefore, the improved manipulation forced participants to fully update their judgment 
after each new piece of evidence. Thus, the results of the present study indicate it is 
through the process of making fuller SbS judgments that primacy effects are offset. 
The results of the present study supported hypothesis 4, with primacy effects found 
when a delay was inserted between pieces of evidence. This finding suggests that the 
delay created by making step-by-step judgments had been controlled for, thus 
eliminating delay as a potential confounding variable. Consequently, it is proposed that 
it was through making step-by-step judgments that a move away from primacy 
occurred. These results in the delay condition failed to replicate the findings of Luchins 
(1957) and Miller and Campbell (1959), who found that a delay caused a move away 
from primacy and towards recency. The delay in these latter studies, however, was 
different to the nature of the delay in the present study. In these earlier studies, evidence 
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was presented in two blocks of information in either an ascending or descending order, 
with a single delay included between the two blocks of evidence. In light of this, it is 
plausible to suggest that small, regular delays are not enough to impact on primacy 
effects. In contrast, one lengthy delay might create a break between information, thus 
producing recency effects, as more recent information has a stronger presence in the 
short-term memory (Miller & Campbell, 1959). Thus, in Luchins' study, earlier 
information had less influence as the delay allowed greater consideration of the 
contrasting evidence. It is unlikely in the present study that small delays of only 12 
seconds between clips were long enough to prevent the evidence being viewed as one 
block of information. Consequently, primacy effects emerged in the delay condition as 
in the EoS condition. 
Luchins (1957) found a delay of five minutes between blocks of evidence weakened 
primacy and caused a move towards recency. In further studies investigating delay, 
Luchins found that a 17 minute delay caused a greater recency effect. In light of these 
findings, Luchins highlighted the need for a systematic investigation of how various 
time intervals might influence order effects. Such an investigation is beyond the scope 
of the present thesis, but does provide an interesting future line of research to 
investigate the impact of delays on order effects. Such information would have applied 
implications for selectors or coaches when making assessments of ability in a sporting 
context. For example, if a player is viewed, and then a delay occurs before they are 
viewed again, this delay might impact on order effects. Furthermore, various lengths of 
delay might have differing influences on order effects in overall judgments of ability. 
The results of the present study support the notion that primacy may be a robust finding 
in ability assessments when end-of-sequence judgements are made, but has shown that 
a fuller step-by-step processing strategy offsets primacy effects. Consequently, these 
findings could inform the development of practical coaching guidelines. More 
specifically, individuals who frequently make attributions of ability should be guided to 
make detailed evaluations of performance regularly in order to offset primacy effects, 
thus replicating the extended step-by-step condition. For example, coaches might devise 
an assessment template, thus allowing judgements to be updated after new evidence is 
viewed. 
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In summary, the results of this study provide further support that primacy effects are 
found when EoS judgments are made, and no order effects emerge when more thorough 
SbS judgments are made. In addition, the results of the present study eliminated the time 
delay between evidence as a confounding variable in the SbS condition. Consequently, 
these findings suggest that primacy effects can be offset when SbS processing is used. 
Following his early studies on order effects in impression formation, Luchins (1957) 
suggested future research might explore whether certain personality traits impact on 
order effects. Thus, future research is needed to investigate if people have a tendency 
towards primacy or recency, in light of various personality differences, or whether the 
results of the present study can be generalised. 
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CHAPTER 4 
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STUDY 2: INVESTIGATING PERSONALITY VARIABLES AS POTENTIAL 
MODERATORS OF ORDER EFFECTS. 
Researchers (e. g. Asch, 1946; Anderson, 1991; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) have offered 
various theories and models to explain the presence of order effects. For example, 
Hogarth and Einhorn proposed in their belief-adjustment model that six factors 
influence whether primacy or recency effects occur. However, these theories and 
models each fail to consider how trait characteristics of participants making the 
judgments might influence order effects. Indeed, following his early findings of order 
effects in impression formation, Luchins (1957) suggested it might be worth exploring 
whether certain personality traits impact on order effects. The purpose of the present 
study was therefore to provide a more thorough examination of certain personality traits 
that might influence primacy or recency effects occurring. Furthermore, from an 
applied perspective, an understanding of how personality traits influence order effects 
could help inform which individuals are susceptible to judgmental biases caused by 
order effects. 
Only a limited number of studies have examined the role of personality variables in 
determining the direction of order effects. Therefore, the present study aimed to extend 
understanding of how order effects might impact on assessments of sporting ability, 
through investigating whether personality variables impact on the incidence of order 
effects. The three variables examined were an individual's theory of the nature of 
learning (whether they are an entity or incremental theorist); an individual's level of 
motivation to think; and an individual's level of experience. These variables were 
chosen as they have previously been investigated in order effect research (e. g. nature of 
theory of learning, Butler, 2000; motivation to think, Ahlering & Parker, 1989; 
experience, Aldeman, Tolcott, & Bresnick, 1993). Furthermore, previous findings from 
research in this area, together with theoretical arguments (e. g. Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992), allowed specific hypotheses to be developed and tested in the present study. 
Implicit theory of ability 
The first personality variable worthy of exploration is a person's belief in the nature of 
ability. There are two beliefs concerning ability, entity beliefs which view ability as 
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fixed, and incremental beliefs which view ability as changeable, and able to be 
improved (Butler, 2000). Erdley and Dweck (1993) investigated judgments children 
made after viewing behaviours of a target child. The results showed children 
categorised as entity theorists were more influenced by early information (primacy 
effects), and were less likely to revise their judgments in the face of disconfirming 
evidence. In another study examining impressions of academic ability, Butler (2000) 
found entity theorists inferred higher ability about others when performance declined 
(primacy effects), and incremental theorists inferred higher ability when viewing an 
improving performance (recency effect). 
In light of these findings, it appears those who view ability as being at a fixed level 
(entity theorists) would be more susceptible to primacy effects when making 
assessments of ability. Theoretically, entity theorists believe ability is fixed, and settle 
on their initial impressions, and later information will have low weighting on the 
overall impression, even when SbS judgments are required. Alternatively, incremental 
theorists believe ability can be developed. Therefore, in the EoS condition, incremental 
theorists are likely to consider all evidence, as their impressions are based on the effort 
and learning that takes place. With this additional processing, recency is expected in 
both the EoS and SbS conditions. 
Hypothesis 5 
In both the EoS and SbS response conditions, primacy effects are predicted for entity 
theorists. 
Hypothesis 6 
In both the EoS and SbS response conditions, recency effects are predicted for 
incremental theorists. 
Motivation to Think 
An individual's motivation to think about all information presented is a further 
personality variable that might moderate order effects. Petty and Wegener (1999) 
suggested that when motivated to engage in greater scrutiny, one's initial impressions 
can be modified. In contrast, with low motivation to think, people look for a simple, 
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quick ways to judge the merits of information, rather than examining it all carefully. In 
their study examining levels of motivation to think, Ahlering and Parker (1989) 
presented participants with adjectives in differing orders to describe a target person, and 
found an interaction between the order of information and level of motivation to think. 
More specifically, the results revealed primacy effects for those with low motivation to 
think. However, primacy effects were offset for individuals high in motivation to think. 
Theoretically, individuals with low motivation to think develop an early impression, 
which is unlikely to change as they lack motivation to process subsequent information 
carefully. In contrast, individuals high in motivation to think do not settle for their first 
impression, as they consider later evidence more thoughtfully. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) suggested that even when an EoS response is required, it is 
possible that those with high motivation to think will use an SbS processing strategy. If 
those with high motivation to think engage in effortful SbS processing, it is likely that 
primacy effects will be offset. In line with Hogarth and Einhorn's theorising, SbS 
processing was expected to force participants into more fully processing, and was thus 
expected to offset primacy effects for both levels of motivation to think. 
Hypothesis 7 
In the EoS response condition, primacy effects are predicted for participants with low 
motivation to think. 
Hypothesis 8 
In the EoS response condition, no order effects are predicted for participants with high 
motivation to think. 
Hypothesis 9 
In the SbS response condition, no order effects are predicted for either motivation to 
think group. 
Experience 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) link complexity with the amount of experience a participant 
has. They suggest experienced participants are more familiar with the evidence, finding 
it simpler and easy to process as they have more cognitive resources at their disposal. In 
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contrast, participants with less experience are expected to find information unfamiliar 
and therefore more complex. Thus, those with less experience are likely to use strategies 
such as SbS processing to handle the cognitive strain of dealing with complex 
information. Therefore, in light of greater processing of later information, lower 
experience is likely to reduce primacy effects and produce recency effects (Hogarth & 
Einhorn). 
In the impression formation literature, there is some support for these predictions 
concerning the influence of experience on order effects. For example, Aldeman, Tolcott, 
and Bresnick (1993) used an Army air defence task to investigate perceptions of 
incoming information as either `friends or foes' (p. 352). The results revealed judgments 
made by less experienced participants showed stronger recency effects in the SbS 
judgment condition. In addition, less experienced auditors were found to exhibit recency 
effects (Kennedy, 1993; Messier & Tubbs, 1994). Kennedy concurred with the 
predictions of the belief-adjustment model, proposing that when evidence is more 
complex, it is likely participants use an SbS strategy to increase their ability to cope with 
the cognitive demands of the task. However, Greenlees et al. (2007) found experience 
had no impact on order effects. Greenlees and colleagues investigated participants' 
impressions of a soccer player's ability, and used soccer coaches, players and non- 
players to examine if different levels of experience influenced order effects. In contrast 
to the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model, the results from Greenlees et 
al. 's study revealed primacy effects across all levels of experience. 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model predicts primacy in the EoS condition. However, 
they considered studies that found recency effects when an EoS response was asked for, 
and suggested that when an EoS response is asked for, participants might still use SbS 
processing. Thus, if inexperienced participants find information complex, they might 
adopt an SbS strategy to deal with the cognitive demands of the task. Thus, in the EoS 
condition, no order effects would be expected for less experienced participants. For more 
experienced participants, information would be considered simple. For simple 
information, when EoS judgments are required, Hogarth and Einhorn's model predicts 
primacy effects. In the SbS condition, no order effects would be expected if both high 
and low experienced participants processed information in an SbS manner. 
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Hypothesis 10 
In the EoS response condition, primacy effects are predicted for more experienced 
participants. 
Hypothesis 11 
In the EoS response condition, no order effects are predicted for less experienced 
participants. 
Hypothesis 12 
In the SbS response condition, no order effects are predicted for either level of 
expenence. 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study consisted of 160 club standard ultimate frisbee players (97 
male, 63 female) with a mean age of 22.76 years (SD = 3.78 years). Participants' mean 
playing experience was 3.53 years (SD = 2.95 years). The sample was predominantly 
white Caucasian (n = 153), with the remainder coming from Asian (n = 5) and mixed 
race (n = 2) backgrounds. All were volunteers and signed informed consent forms prior 
to participation. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee at the University of 
Chichester. 
Materials 
The stimuli used in this section were the 2 DVD's used in the previous study. 
Measures 
Ratings of the player's ability. To examine their impressions of the players observed, 
participants were asked to rate each model on four factors (ultimate frisbee ability 
(general), disc control, speed of thought, and athleticism) used in Study 1. Attitude was 
removed from this measurement, as it was considered a psychological trait, and not a 
measure of ability. Each factor was measured on a 10 point, likert-type scale (e. g., 1= 
poor to 10 = excellent). The alpha coefficient for the combined construct in the present 
study was 0.90. 
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Implicit theory of ability. Participants read and responded to three items, adapted from 
Dweck and Henderson's (1986) measure of theory of intelligence, and further used by 
Butler (2000). The items were "everyone has a certain amount of sporting/ultimate 
frisbee ability, and one can't do much to change this amount"; "One's sporting/ultimate 
frisbee ability is something about oneself that one can't change much"; and "people can 
learn new things in sport/ultimate frisbee, but they can't change their basic 
sporting/ultimate frisbee ability". Participants rated their agreement to items on a 6- 
point scale anchored by strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (6). Following Dweck 
and Henderson (1986), in the present study, participants were classified as entity 
theorists if their average score on the three implicit theory items was higher or equal to 
4.00, and as incremental theorists if their score was lower or equal to 3.00, and neither 
if they scored between 3.00 and 4.00. The alpha coefficient for the scale in the present 
study was 0.81. 
Need for Cognition. The Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984) was used to distinguish those individuals who tend to engage in effortful 
analytical activity from those who do not. The NCS is a highly reliable measure, with 
Cronbach's alphas exceeding . 84 across six studies; and split-half and test retest 
reliabilities averaging . 83 and . 87 respectively (Cacioppo et al., 1996). The short form of 
the NCS comprises of 18 items, which concern a person's reactions to engaging in 
effortful thinking in a variety of situations. An example item from the scale is `I prefer to 
think about small, daily projects to long-term ones'. Participants responded on a 5-point 
scale anchored by extremely uncharacteristic of me (1) to extremely characteristic of me 
(5). After completing the NCS scale, a median split was performed to create the high and 
low need for cognition groups in the present study. In this sample, the range of scores 
was 45 to 82 (possible range = 18 to 90). The median score was 65.7. The alpha 
coefficient for the NCS in the present study was 0.79. 
Experience. Participants were asked how long they had been playing ultimate frisbee. A 
median split was conducted to create the high and low experience group. In the present 
study, the range of experience was 0.5 to 20 years. The mean level of experience was 
3.53 years. An independent sample t-test revealed the mean years of experience (M = 
5.39, SD = 3.18) for the higher experience group were significantly higher than the mean 
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years of experience (M = 7.16, SD = . 74) for the lower experience group (mean 
difference = 3.73, t= 10.28, df. = 158, P <. 001). 
Procedure 
The initial procedure was identical for Study 1, with data collected in the present study 
over four weekend tournaments. Participants were assigned randomly to view either the 
declining or ascending order of information, and were randomly assigned to either the 
end-of-sequence (EoS) or step-by-step (SbS) judgment condition. After viewing the 
DVD footage and assessing the ability of the control and target players, participants 
were then instructed to fill in the two additional inventories concerning nature of ability 
and motivation to think. From their responses, participants were classified as either 1) 
entity or incremental theorists, 2) high or low in need for cognition, and 3) high or low 
in level of experience. 
Data Analysis 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for both the control and target 
players are presented in Table 4.1. As in the previous Study, high correlations emerged 
between three of the variables. The Pearson correlations indicated that for the target 
player, the correlations between ultimate ability and disc control (. 81), between 
ultimate ability and speed of thought (. 75), and between disc control and speed of 
thought (. 70) exceeded Tabachnick and Fidell's (1996) criterion value of . 70. Thus, for 
data analysis, there were two dependent variables. The scores of the ultimate ability, 
disc control, and speed of thought were averaged to give a single rating for this 
combined construct, which formed one independent variable. Athleticism was retained 
as single-item question, and was the second dependent variable. 
Two-way univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted to examine 
the ratings of the target player. Separate ANCOVAs were conducted to test the 
hypothesised relationships in each judgment condition (EoS and SbS). The first 
ANCOVAs examined the interactions between order of presentation and theory of 
learning, the second ANCOVAs examined the interactions between order of 
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Variable M SD Subscale 
1234 
Control ratings (n = 160) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 6.53 1.08 - . 79(**) . 
73(**) . 62(**) 
2. Disc Control 6.72 1.16 -- . 
67(* . 55(**) 
3. Speed of Thought 6.40 1.25 --- . 43(**) 
4. Athleticism 6.48 1.08 --- - 
Target ratings (n = 160) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 5.14 1.29 - . 81(**) . 75(**) . 
68(**) 
2. Disc Control 5.26 1.43 -- . 70(**) . 
50(**) 
3. Speed of Thought 5.06 1.39 --- . 
56(**) 
4. Athleticism 4.91 1.24 --- - 
**p<. O1 
Table 4.1. Rating means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between subscales. 
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presentation and level of need for cognition, and the third ANCOVAs examined the 
interactions between order of presentation and level of experience. The scores of the 
control player were used as a covariate to control for any differences in rating scores 
when viewing identical footage. Before conducting each analysis, the data were 
examined to determine if it satisfied the assumptions of ANCOVA (Pallant, 2001). 
Independent sample t-tests were used when necessary to evaluate main effects, using a 
change value to control for the score of the covariate. Alpha was set at P=0.05 for all 
statistical analyses. 
RESULTS 
For all of the analyses, the test of equality of regression slopes revealed these 
assumptions were not violated (see Appendix 3.2). In addition, Levene's test was not 
statistically significant for the covariate in any of the analyses, therefore the 
assumptions of homogeneity of variance were satisfied. 
Impact of order, judgment mode, and theory of learning on ratings of the target player 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (entity vs. incremental learning theory 
belief) ANCOVA conducted on the ratings of the combined construct for the target 
player in the EoS judgment condition revealed a significant main effect for order (F1662 
= 10.67, p< . 01, effect size i2= . 15, estimated power at 5% probability = . 90). 
However, the results revealed no significant main effect for theory of learning (F 1,62 = 
1.26, p> . 
05, effect size i2 = . 02, estimated power at 5% probability =. 20). In 
addition, no significant order by learning theory interaction effects were observed 
(F1.62 = . 
16, p> . 05, effect size 92 < . 01, estimated power at 5% probability = . 07). 
Thus, in the EoS condition, the main effect for order revealed a primacy effect 
regardless of participants' theory of learning beliefs. This main effect is illustrated in 
Figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.1. Mean (+SE) ratings for entity and incremental theorists, comparing the 
declining and ascending orders of information (in the EoSjudgment condition). 
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Figure 4.2. Mean (+SE) ratings for entity and incremental theorists, comparing the 
declining and ascending orders of information (in the SbSjudgment condition). 
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The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (entity vs. incremental learning theory 
belief) ANCOVA conducted on the ratings of the combined construct for the target 
player in the SbS judgment condition revealed no main effects for order (F1,58 = . 52, p 
> . 
05, effect size 712 = . 
01, estimated power at 5% probability = . 11), or learning theory 
(F1,58 = 1.15, p> . 05, effect size rl2 = . 02, estimated power at 5% probability = . 18). In 
addition, no significant order by learning theory interaction effects were observed 
(F1,5ß = . 22, p> . 05, effect size rig <. 01, estimated power at 5% probability =. 08). 
These findings are displayed in Figure 4.2. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (entity vs. incremental learning theory 
belief) ANCOVA conducted on the athleticism ratings for the target player in the EoS 
judgment condition revealed no significant main effects, and revealed a non- 
significant order by learning theory interaction effect. Similarly, the ANCOVA 
conducted on the athleticism rating for the target player in the SbS judgment condition 
revealed no significant main effects, and revealed a non-significant order by learning 
theory interaction effect (see Appendix 3.2 for full details of ANCOVA statistics). 
Impact of order, iudgment mode, and motivation to think on ratings of the target 
player 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. low need for cognition) ANCOVA 
conducted on the ratings of the combined construct for the target player in the EoS 
judgment condition revealed a significant order by motivation to think interaction 
effect (F1,75 = 5.23, p< . 05, effect size i2 = . 07, estimated power at 5% probability = 
. 
62). In addition, the results revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,75 = 10.56, 
p< . 
01, effect size TI 2 =. 12, estimated power at 5% probability = . 89), but not a 
significant main effect for motivation to think (F1,75 = . 08) p> . 05, effect size i2 < . 01, 
estimated power at 5% probability = . 06). 
Independent sample t-tests revealed the ratings for the declining order of clips were 
significantly higher than the ratings for the ascending order for participants classified 
as high motivation to think (mean difference =1.11, t=3.01, ff. = 38, P< . 01). 
However, the t-tests revealed no significant differences between the declining and 
ascending order for participants with low motivation to think (mean difference = 0.30, 
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Figure 4.3. Mean (+SE) ratings for participants with high and low motivation to think, 
comparing declining and ascending orders of information (in the EoS judgment condition). 
** Significant difference between declining and ascending order (p < . 01). 
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Figure 4.4. Mean (+SE) ratings for participants with high and low motivation to think, 
comparing declining and ascending orders of information (in the SbS judgment condition). 
** Significant difference between declining and ascending order (p <. 05). 
86 
t=0.80, df. = 38, P> . 05). These differences in the ratings in the EoS condition are 
illustrated in Figure 4.3, and indicate participants with high motivation to think 
displayed primacy effects, whereas participants with low motivation to think displayed 
no order effects. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. low need for cognition) ANCOVA 
conducted on the ratings of the combined construct for the target player in the SbS 
judgment condition revealed a significant order by motivation to think interaction effect 
(F1,75 = 8.15, p< . 01, effect size il 
2= 
. 10, estimated power at 5% probability = . 80). In 
addition, the results revealed no main effect for order (F1,75 = . 
01) p> . 
05, effect size i2 
< .01, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 06), but revealed a significant main effect 
for motivation to think (F1,75 = 5.04, p< . 05, effect size rig = . 06, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 60). 
Independent sample t-tests revealed no significant differences between the declining 
and ascending order for participants with high motivation to think (mean difference = 
0.50, t=1.07, df. = 38, P> . 05). However, 
for participants with low motivation to 
think, the t-tests revealed the ratings for the declining order were significantly lower 
than the ratings for the ascending order (mean difference = 0.73, t= -2.14, df. = 38, P< 
. 05). These 
differences in the SbS condition are illustrated in Figure 4.4, and indicate 
participants with high motivation to think displayed no order effects, whereas 
participants with low motivation to think displayed recency effects. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. low need for cognition) ANCOVA 
conducted on the athleticism ratings for the target player in the EoS judgment condition 
revealed no significant main effects, and revealed a non-significant order by 
motivation-to-think interaction effect. Similarly, the ANCOVA conducted on the 
athleticism rating for the target player in the SbS judgment condition revealed no 
significant main effects, and revealed a non-significant order by motivation-to-think 
interaction effect (see Appendix 3.2 for full details of ANCOVA statistics). 
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Impact of order, judgment mode, and level of experience on ratings of the target player 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. low experience) ANCOVA was 
conducted on the ratings of the target player in the EoS judgment condition revealed a 
significant main effect for order (F1,75 = 9.91, p< . 01, effect size rl2 = . 
12, estimated 
power at 5% probability =. 87). However, the results revealed no significant main effect 
for level of experience (F1,75 = . 18, p> . 05, effect size i2 < . 01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 07). 
In addition, no significant order by level of experience interaction 
effect was observed (F1,75 = . 
43, p> . 
05, effect size rl2 = . 
01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 10). Thus, in the EoS condition, the main effect for order of experience 
(F1,75 = . 18, p> . 05, effect size r12 < . 01, estimated power at 5% revealed a primacy effect 
regardless of the level of experience. Figure 4.5 illustrates this main effect. 
In the SbS judgment condition, the ANCOVA revealed no main effects for order (F1,76 
=. 15, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 09, estimated power at 5% probability = . 07), or 
level of 
experience (F1,76 =1.19, p> . 05, effect size tie = . 02, estimated power at 5% probability = 
. 19). However, the results revealed a significant order 
by level of experience interaction 
effect (F1,76 = 7.01, p< . 05, effect size i2 = . 
09, estimated power at 5% probability = . 74). 
Independent sample t-tests revealed no significant differences between the declining and 
ascending order for participants with a higher level of experience (mean difference = 
0.56, t=1.38, df. = 37, P> . 05). However, 
for participants with a lower level of 
experience, the t-tests revealed the ratings for the declining order were significantly lower 
than the ratings for the ascending order for participants (mean difference = 0.84) t=- 
2.16, df. = 39, P< . 05). These differences in the ratings in the SbS condition are 
illustrated in Figure 4.6, and indicate participants with higher experience displayed no 
order effects, whereas participants with lower experience displayed recency effects. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. low level of experience) ANCOVA 
conducted on the athleticism ratings for the target player in the EoS judgment condition 
revealed no significant main effects, and revealed a non-significant order by experience 
interaction effect. Similarly, the ANCOVA conducted on the athleticism rating for the 
target player in the SbS judgment condition revealed no significant main effects, and 
revealed a non-significant order by experience interaction effect (see Appendix 3.2 for 
full details of ANCOVA statistics). 
88 
7 
6 
5 
an 
4 
f3 
aw 
2 
1 
0 
Low High 
Level of Experience 
  Declining order 
11 Ascending order 
Figure 4.5. Mean (+SE) ratings for the low and high levels of experience, comparing 
declining and ascending orders of information (in the EoS judgment condition). 
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Figure 4.6. Mean (+SE) ratings for the low and high levels of experience, comparing the 
declining and ascending orders of information (in the SbS judgment condition). 
* Significant difference between declining and ascending order (p <. 05). 
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DISCUSSION 
Theory of Learning Beliefs 
The results showed little support for the hypothesised influence of theory of learning 
beliefs on order effects. In the EoS response condition, primacy effects were 
hypothesised for entity theorists and recency effects hypothesised for incremental 
theorists. However, results revealed primacy effects regardless of theory of learning 
beliefs. This main effect for order supported the findings of primacy in Study 1, and offer 
further support to previous research (e. g. Jones et al., 1968; Greenlees et al., 2007) that 
has suggested primacy is a robust finding in ability assessments when EoS judgments are 
made. 
In the SbS condition, it was hypothesised that entity theorists would display primacy 
effects, and incremental theorists would display recency effects. However, the results 
showed no significant differences in order effects due to participants' theories of learning 
beliefs. Theoretically, the rationale for the hypothesis was sound. For example, 
incremental theorists believe that ability can be developed and improved. Thus, 
intuitively, their impressions would be expected to be more influenced by later 
information, particularly when the target was seen to improve. It was therefore somewhat 
surprising the results failed to support the hypothesised influences of theory of learning 
on order effects. However, measurement issues might offer a possible explanation for 
these results. More specifically, closer analysis of the data indicated we were 
unsuccessful in classifying entity and incremental theorists in order to group the 
participants equally. Using the criteria developed by Dweck and Henderson (1993), 
groups were unequal. From a total of 160 participants, 91 were classified as incremental 
theorists, and 39 were classified as entity theorists. A further 30 participants could not be 
classified, as they fell in a middle band. This meant the power statistics of the interactions 
were very low (. 05 for the interaction in the EoS condition; . 
07 for the interaction in the 
SbS condition). Nevertheless, the p-values were not close to significance, so the results 
showed no indication that significant results would have been found with a more 
powerful test (e. g. more participants, equal group sizes). Thus, the results offered no 
support for our hypotheses that beliefs on the theory of learning influence order effects. 
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Motivation to Think 
It was hypothesised that no order effects would be displayed in the EoS judgment 
condition for participants with high motivation to think. Alternatively, it was 
hypothesised that individuals with low motivation to think would display primacy effects, 
as they would develop an early impression and stick with this due to a lack of motivation 
to fully process remaining information. However, the results were in contrast to these 
hypothesised relationships, with participants high in motivation to think showing primacy 
effects in the EoS condition, and the low motivation to think group displaying no order 
effects. It was also hypothesised no order effects would be displayed in the SbS condition 
for either level of motivation to think. The results showed partial support for this 
hypothesis, with participants high in motivation to think displaying no significant order 
effects. However, participants with low motivation to think displayed recency effects. 
It was hypothesised participants with greater motivation to think would more effortfully 
process all the information, in a manner similar to SbS processing. An SbS strategy was 
predicted to result in the greater weighting of later information, which was expected to 
offset primacy effects. However, the results suggest the higher motivation to think group 
gave greater weighting to the initial evidence compared to later evidence. A plausible 
explanation is that participants with higher motivation to think did use an SbS processing 
strategy but still primacy effects still emerged. This might be due to the strength of the 
initial anchor, and that the SbS processing used was not enough to offset the influence of 
the early information. In line with this, primacy could further be explained by `cognitive 
dissonance theory' (Learner & Tetlock, 1999) which predicts that once people have 
committed themselves to a decision, greater cognitive effort towards the task will produce 
effortful processing, but this effort will be directed towards self-justification. Learner and 
Tetlock suggested this prompts a defensive bolstering of the initial opinion developed, 
with participants focussing energy on rationalising the early opinion they have developed. 
Relating this back to Hogarth and Einhorn's model algebraic equation; Sk = Sk J+ 
wk[s(xk) - R], the initial anchor (Sk_i) would have great weight in this instance, and the 
weighting of later information (wk) would be reduced as the participants would only 
weight later information highly if it confirmed their initial opinion. This theorising is in 
line with Asch's (1946) `directed impression hypothesis', which proposed that later 
information has less weight as initial evidence sets up an expectancy to which later 
evidence was interpreted. 
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These results of the present study did not support research that has found primacy effects 
for individuals who are less motivated to think (Ahlering & Parker, 1989; Webster, 
Richter, & Kruglanski, 1996). Interestingly, Petty, Tormala, Hawkins, and Wegener 
(2001) highlighted differences in empirical findings when levels of motivation to think 
have been examined. Petty and colleagues stated how, in the impression formation 
literature, low levels of thinking have been associated with enhanced primacy effects, 
while high levels of thinking have been associated with enhanced recency effects. 
However, in persuasion studies, the opposite has been found, with primacy effects 
displayed by individuals with high motivation to think (e. g. Kassin, Reddy, & Tulloch, 
1990; Petty & Wegener, 1994). Petty and Jarvis (1996) have suggested that studies 
finding primacy under high thinking conditions involved presenting two clear sides to an 
issue (e. g. prosecution and defence statements; Kassin et al., 1990). It is possible to 
suggest the evidence used in the present study was viewed as a form of persuasion, with 
the clips used to persuade participants the target player was a talented player (or not), and 
that they demonstrated high sporting ability. In these conditions, it is possible thoughtful 
individuals would form a strong early impression after the initial early evidence which 
would bias their processing of the secondary evidence (Petty & Wegener, 1998). 
However, further research is needed to investigate this. 
In the SbS judgment condition, those with low motivation to think displayed recency 
effects. This supports the predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model of recency 
when SbS processing is required, as later evidence has greater weighting. This suggests 
the applied implications offered after Study 1 concerning the use of SbS processing 
should be made with caution, as those with low motivation to think might have their 
assessments biased by recency effects. Statistically, no significant order effects were 
displayed by participants with higher motivation to think. However, a visual inspection of 
Figure 4.4 indicates higher ratings for the declining order compared to the ascending 
order, thus suggesting a trend to primacy for those with higher motivation to think when 
using SbS processing. Such a trend would support the previous theorising that 
participants with higher motivation to think attach greater weight to early evidence, and 
are more committed to this initial impression. 
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Experience 
It was hypothesised primacy effects would be found in the end-of-sequence (EoS) 
condition for more experienced participants, but no order effects would occur for less 
experienced participants. However, primacy effects were observed in the EoS condition 
regardless of experience. It was also hypothesised that in the step-by-step (SbS) 
condition, no order effects would be displayed for either level of experience. The results 
offered some support for the second hypothesis, with more experienced participants 
displaying no order effects. However, recency effects were displayed by less 
experienced participants in the SbS condition. 
For judgments made in the EoS condition, it was hypothesised primacy effects would be 
displayed by more experienced participants, but no order effects would occur for less 
experienced participants. The results only partially supported this hypothesis, with 
primacy displayed regardless of level of experience. The results support previous 
research that has found primacy effects when EoS judgments are made (e. g. Jones et al., 
1968; Greenlees et al. 2007). Furthermore, the results of the present study support the 
results from the first study in the present thesis, and add to suggestions previously made 
that primacy effects are a robust finding when making EoS judgments of ability. 
It was hypothesised primacy effects would be offset for less experienced participants in 
the EoS condition. It was expected they would find information less familiar, and thus 
use an SbS strategy to deal with the cognitive demands of processing complex 
information. Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model predicts primacy effects will be offset 
when SbS processing is used. These findings of primacy can be explained by 
considering the level of SbS processing used, and the impact of this processing on the 
final judgment. Less experienced participants might have used some SbS processing to 
assess later evidence. However, it is possible that the anchor created by initial evidence 
was so strong that although SbS processing of later information did occur, it was 
insufficiently strong to offset the influence of this anchor. An alternative explanation is 
the evidence in the present study wasn't of sufficient complexity to force less 
experienced participants to use an SbS strategy. If the information wasn't complex 
enough to require additional processing, less experienced participants would have made 
EoS judgments, thus explaining the primacy effects. 
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It was hypothesised no order effects would be displayed in the SbS condition. The 
results only partially supported this hypothesis with more experienced participants 
displaying no order effects, but recency effects were displayed by less experienced 
participants. The findings for less experienced participants offer support for previous 
research that has examined level of experience (e. g. Aldeman, Tolcott, & Bresnick, 
1993; Messier & Tubbs, 1994), which has found less experienced individuals show 
recency effects. The findings offer some support for Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) 
model that predicts recency when SbS processing is used. In the higher experience group 
participants were required to use SbS processing, which explains why later evidence had 
enough weighting to offset primacy effects. However, it is possible that more 
experienced participants were more committed to initial judgments, and an SbS strategy 
only partially offset the weighting of initial evidence. Therefore, as in Study 1, the 
absence of order effects can be explained by the weight of the initial evidence being 
offset by the SbS processing of later evidence. 
The results of the present study did not replicate the findings of Greenlees et al., (2007) 
who found experience had no influence on order effects. Greenlees and his colleagues 
used a basic control and passing skill in soccer as the stimulus material. It is possible all 
participants found this evidence simple, regardless of their level of soccer experience. 
Furthermore, soccer is a sport that non-players are still likely to have some experience of 
watching. Thus, even the non-soccer players might have found the evidence familiar. 
This could have explained why primacy effects were found regardless of experience. 
The task used in the present study involved the target player running towards the disc, 
catching, pivoting, and making a pass to a second player who was making a run. This 
task therefore seems more complex than the task in Greenlees et al. 's study. However, it 
is open to interpretation to whether the task would be considered complex in Hogarth 
and Einhorn's (1992) model. Indeed, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) acknowledged the 
difficulties they had in classifying information as simple or complex. Future research 
might consider how different levels of task complexity might impact on order effects. 
For example, footage of 3 different drills at varying degrees of complexity could be 
used, and the complexity could be a further independent variable in the analysis. 
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Nevertheless, Greenlees et al. used a sound theoretical rationale to classify participants 
at different levels of experience. A limitation of the present study was a theoretical 
rationale was not used to distinguish experienced from non-experienced participants. 
Instead, a median split was used as an arbitrary figure to create the high and low 
experienced groups. This is an issue in creating the experience levels, for example, there 
may only be a limited number of genuinely experienced individuals. Indeed, Hogarth 
and Einhorn (1992) acknowledged the difficulties they had in classifying information as 
simple or complex. Although it is beyond the scope of the present thesis, further research 
should examine what level of experience causes information to be viewed as simple or 
complex to participants. For example, players or coaches with little experience (e. g. less 
than one year) and coaches with greater experience (e. g. more than five years) could be 
used to further examine the influence of experience on order effects. 
Taken as they are, the findings of the present study have potential implications for those 
who make assessments of ability in sport. The results of the present study offer further 
support to the suggestion that primacy effects bias ability assessments when EoS 
judgments are made. Furthermore, the results indicate that even if an individual is highly 
motivated to think, or if they are experienced in the sport, they may still be prone to 
primacy effects. Further research might examine other variables that could influence 
whether a participant is prone to primacy or recency in their assessments of ability. In 
addition, further research should examine judgments made in the EoS condition, and 
investigate variables that might offset primacy effects in this condition. For example, 
Luchins (1957) found that inserting an interpolated number task between blocks of 
information was effective in offsetting primacy effects. In addition, research has found 
that making participants accountable for their judgements influences order effects (e. g. 
Cushing & Ahlawat, 1996; Kennedy, 1993; Tetlock, 1983). Thus, future research should 
examine such conditions that might eliminate primacy effects when end-of-sequence 
assessments are required. 
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CHAPTER 5 
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STUDY 3: INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF ACCOUNTABILITY ON 
ORDER EFFECTS IN THE END-OF-SEQUENCE JUDGMENT CONDITION 
Findings in Studies 1-2 of the present thesis revealed primacy effects in the end-of- 
sequence (EoS) condition. This has supported the research of Greenlees et al. (2007), 
who found primacy effects in assessments of sporting ability when EoS judgments were 
made. Furthermore, these findings are in line with previous research in ability 
assessments (e. g. Jones et al., 1968; Benassi, 1982). Thus, it appears primacy is a robust 
finding when participants make one judgment of ability after all evidence has been 
viewed. This has applied implications in sport, as the evidence suggests people who 
make assessments of ability may be biased by early information they view. In light of 
this potential judgment bias, research is needed to explore conditions that might offset 
primacy. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether increasing levels of 
accountability for participants who have to make judgments would eliminate primacy 
effects. 
In their study examining personnel decision-making, Highhouse and Gallo (1997) 
suggested that participants had little risk for making poor decisions. Thus, the presence 
of order effects was due to participants not being motivated to consider all the evidence. 
Tetlock (1983) questioned the level of cognitive effort participants exert if they are not 
personally accountable for their judgments. Subsequently, researchers sought to 
examine whether making participants accountable for their judgments would eliminate 
the order effects. Accountability refers to the implicit or explicit expectation that a 
person has to justify their beliefs, feelings and actions to others (Tetlock, 1992). 
Research has found that making participants accountable for their judgments decisions 
has reduced or offset order effects (e. g. Tetlock, 1985; Kennedy, 1993; Cushing & 
Ahlawat, 1996). For example, Kennedy (1993) manipulated accountability by informing 
participants that their auditing judgments may be reviewed, with the possibility they 
might be selected for a conference to explain and justify their responses. The results 
revealed order effects in the non-accountable condition, however there was no evidence 
of order effects when participants were told they had to justify their decisions. Kennedy 
suggested that the judgment bias was due to a lack of effort on behalf of the 
participants, thus preventing them from accurately processing all the information. 
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Cushing and Ahlawat (1996) looked to increase accountability for auditors' judgments 
by asking them to write a document to a senior partner providing reasons to support 
their opinion. The results supported Kennedy's findings, with order effects offset in the 
accountability group. Cushing and Ahlawat concurred with Kennedy's explanation for 
order effects, suggesting that when participants were made accountable for their 
judgments, greater cognitive effort towards the judgment task occurred, and order 
effects were eliminated as greater attention was paid to all evidence. 
In line with this theorising, it was predicted that increasing levels of accountability for 
participants' judgments would result in greater cognitive effort exerted towards the 
ratings task. Thus, the bias produced by overweighting of initial evidence would be 
offset, as greater attention would be paid to all the evidence, leading to a more accurate 
and unbiased judgment. Theoretically, this manner of processing is similar to a step-by- 
step (SbS) strategy, as more accountable participants would pay attention to each piece 
of evidence, and thus, would be likely to update their judgments sequentially. In light of 
this, it was hypothesised that no order effects would occur in the accountability 
manipulation, as the results in Study 1 in the present thesis have shown SbS processing 
offsets primacy effects and produces no order effects. The present study also contained 
a control group, in which participants make assessments of ability in an end-of- 
sequence (EoS) condition with no accountability manipulation. This condition replicates 
EoS conditions in previous studies that have found a consistent primacy effect, and 
therefore, it was hypothesised that primacy effects will be displayed in this condition. 
Hypothesis 13 
In the non-accountable condition, primacy effects are predicted. 
Hypothesis 14 
In the accountable condition, no order effects are predicted. 
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METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study consisted of 100 club standard ultimate frisbee players (74 
male, 26 female), with a mean age of 21.66 years (SD = 2.43 years). Participants' mean 
playing experience was 2.86 years (SD = 2.01 years). The sample was predominantly 
white Caucasian (n = 98), with the remainder coming from mixed race (n = 2) 
backgrounds. All were volunteers and signed informed consent forms prior to 
participation. The study was carried out in line with University of Chichester's ethics 
procedures. 
Materials 
The stimulus used in this experiment was the DVD used in the previous 2 Studies (see 
page 59 for details on how the footage was recorded and edited). 
Measures 
Ratings of the player's ability. To examine their impressions of the two players observed, 
participants were asked to rate each player on three factors (ultimate frisbee ability- 
general, disc control, and speed of thought) that were used in Study 1 and Study 2. 
Athleticism was measured in the previous two studies but no significant effects were 
found for this factor. Furthermore, it can be suggested that athleticism is not a measure of 
ability, but instead a measure of a physical attribute. Therefore, athleticism was removed 
as a rating measure in this study. Each factor was measured on a 10 point, likert-type 
scale (e. g., 1= poor to 10 = excellent). 
Measure of Ef ort/Accountability. Participants read and responded to three items as a 
self-reported measure of effort in the ratings task. The items were "How much effort did 
you put into watching the clips and providing accurate ratings"; "How motivated were 
you to perform the ratings task"; and "How carefully did you watch the clips in order to 
make your judgment". Participants rated their agreement to these statements on a 10- 
point likert scale. The alpha coefficient for the scale in the present study was 0.85. 
Procedure 
The data for this Study was collected alongside the data for Study 4. The procedure for 
the present study was similar to Studies 1-2 in the present thesis, with participants 
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randomly assigned to view either the declining or the ascending order. In addition, 
participants were also randomly assigned to one of 4 experimental groups; i) a control 
(non-accountable) group; ii) the accountability group; iii) the interpolated group; and iv) 
the delay group. In the control group, participants made end-of-sequence judgments with 
no experimental manipulation (as in Study 1), and these ratings were used in the analyses 
for both Study 3 and 4. The ratings in the accountable group were also used in the 
analyses for Study 3. In this accountable condition, participants were asked to consider 
themselves in the role of a selector for a club side. They were told to watch the footage 
and make numerical ratings of ability, and also to write a short paragraph to support their 
ratings. Cushing and Ahlawat (1996) used a similar but more detailed writing process in a 
study examining order effects in accounting judgments. Cushing and Ahlawat suggested 
that as participants are being asked to justify their ratings, they become accountable for 
their judgments. Finally, in the present study, participants were told that the information 
they provided would be passed on to the target players in the DVD footage as feedback 
on their performance, in order to help them improve. Thus, referring back to Tetlock's 
(1992) definition of accountability, this manipulation created a condition that participants 
had to justify their beliefs, and this information would be passed on to the players in the 
video footage. All participants in each experimental condition made their ratings of the 
two target players' ability after all 8 clips had been viewed (end-of-sequence judgments). 
Data Analysis 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for ratings of the control and 
target players are presented in Table 5.1. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
conducted on the dependent variables to assess the data for multi-collinearity, and 
indicated low correlations for the control player. Due to these low correlations, it was 
decided to analyse the three dependent variables (ultimate ability, disc control, speed of 
thought) separately, instead of combining them into one construct as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Two-way univariate analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were conducted on the ratings 
of the target player to examine the interaction between order of presentation and 
experimental condition. The scores of the control player were used as a covariate to 
control for any differences in rating scores when viewing identical footage. Before 
conducting the analysis, the data was examined to determine if it satisfied the 
assumptions of ANCOVA (Pallant, 2001). Independent sample t-tests were used when 
100 
Variable M SD Subscale 
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Control ratings (n = 100) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 6.55 1.00 - . 64(**) . 30(**) 
2. Disc Control 6.70 1.08 - . 23(**) 3. Speed of Thought 6.57 1.06 - 
Target ratings (n = 100) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 5.40 1.23 - . 74(**) . 71(**) 2. Disc Control 5.30 1.30 - . 69(**) 
4. Sneed of Thought 5.51 1.37 
* *p<. 01 
Table 5.1. Rating means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between subscales 
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necessary to evaluate main effects, using a change value to control for the score of the 
covariate. Alpha was set at P=0.05 for all statistical analyses. The written paragraphs 
(in the accountability condition) were not analysed as they were used only as part of the 
accountability manipulation. 
RESULTS 
Impact of order and accountability condition on ratings of the target player 
The test of equality of regression slopes revealed this assumption was not violated. In 
addition, Levene's test was not statistically significant for either of the covariates, 
therefore the assumption of homogeneity of variance was satisfied. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (non-accountable vs. accountable 
experimental condition) ANCOVA, conducted on the ratings of `Ultimate Frisbee 
ability (general)' revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 9.50, p< . 01, effect 
size rig = . 10, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 862). However, the results revealed 
no significant main effect for experimental condition (F1,95 = . 31, p> . 05, effect size Tj 
2 
< .01, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 09). In addition, no significant order by 
experimental condition interaction effect was observed (F1,95 = . 37, p> . 05, effect size 
rig < .01, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 06). Thus, the main effect 
for order 
revealed a primacy effect regardless of the accountability condition for the ratings of 
Ultimate Frisbee ability (general). This main effect is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (non-accountable vs. accountable 
experimental condition) ANCOVA, conducted on the ratings of `disc control' revealed 
a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 18.78, p< .01, effect size rig = . 17, estimated 
power at 5% probability =. 99). However, the results revealed no significant main effect 
for experimental condition (F1,95 = 1.24, p> . 05, effect size rj 
2= 
. 01, estimated power at 
5% probability =. 20). In addition, no significant order by experimental condition 
interaction effect was observed (F1,95 = . 02, p> . 05, effect size q2 <. 01, estimated power 
at 5% probability = . 05). Thus, the main effect for order revealed a primacy effect 
102 
6 
5 
a 
3 
2  Declining order 
1 
Q Ascending order 0 
Control (end-of- Accountability 
sequence) Manipulation 
Judgment Condition 
Figure 5.1. Mean (+SE) ratings for `ultimate Frisbee ability (general)' for the control 
(end-of-sequence) and accountability manipulation conditions in descending and 
ascending orders of information. 
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Figure 5.2. Mean (+SE) ratings for `disc control 'for the control (end-of-sequence) and 
accountability manipulation conditions in descending and ascending orders of information. 
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Figure 5.3. Mean (+SE) ratings for `speed-of-thought' for the control (end-of-sequence) and 
accountability manipulation conditions in descending and ascending orders of information. 
103 
regardless of the accountability condition for the ratings of disc control. This main 
effect is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (non-accountable vs. accountable 
experimental condition) ANCOVA, conducted on the ratings of `speed-of-thought' 
revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 4.09, p< . 
05, effect size i2 = . 
04, 
estimated power at 5% probability = . 52). However, the results revealed no significant 
main effect for experimental condition (F1,95 = 0.19, p> . 05, effect size i2 < . 01, 
estimated power at 5% probability = . 07). In addition, no significant order by 
experimental condition interaction effect was observed (F1,95 = . 
89, p> . 
05, effect size 
Ti Z< .01, estimated power at 5% probability = . 16). Thus, the main effect for order 
revealed a primacy effect regardless of the accountability condition for the ratings of 
speed-of-thought. This main effect is illustrated in Figure 5.3. 
Manipulation Check 
Independent sample t-tests were used to reveal if there were significant differences 
between the control and accountability experimental conditions with regards to the 
manipulation check. If the manipulation had been successful, the accountability group 
would be expected to show higher effort and motivation levels in completing the ratings 
task on the self-reported manipulation check. However, the t-tests revealed no 
significant difference between the accountability and control group (mean difference = 
0.10, t=0.44, df. = 96, p> . 05). This indicated that the manipulation check had not 
been effective in creating a group of participants who put more cognitive effort into 
assessing the evidence due to higher levels of accountability. 
The manipulation check indicated the accountability manipulation was unsuccessful. 
However, it was decided to carry out a further, opportunistic analysis, as the data from 
the manipulation check could be used to distinguish participants who put greater 
cognitive effort into the ratings task. In this sample, the range of average scores for the 
manipulation check was 5.33 to 10, with a median score of 8.24, and this median split 
created the high and low cognitive effort groups. An independent sample t-test revealed 
the mean score (M = 8.92, SD = . 58) for the high cognitive effort group was 
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significantly higher than the mean score (M = 7.16, SD = . 74) for the low cognitive 
effort group (mean difference = 1.76, t =13.01, df. = 94, P< . 001). 
Following the median split, three further 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x2 (high vs. 
low cognitive effort) ANCOVAs were conducted on the ratings of the target player for 
each of the three dependent variables. The ratings for `Ultimate Frisbee ability 
(General)' revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 9.40, p <. O1, effect size 
r1 2= . 09, estimated power at 5% probability = . 86). This main effect is illustrated 
in 
Figure 5.4. However, the results revealed no significant main effect for level of 
cognitive effort (F1,95 = . 13, p> . 05, effect size rl2 < . 
01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 07). In addition, no significant order by cognitive effort interaction effect 
was observed (F1,95 = . 84, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 15). 
The ratings for `disc control' revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 17.38, 
p <. 01, effect size i2 = . 16, estimated power at 5% probability = . 99). This main effect 
is illustrated in Figure 5.5. However, the results revealed no significant main effect for 
level of cognitive effort (F1,95 = 1.24, p> . 05, effect size i2 < .01, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 09). In addition, no significant order by cognitive effort interaction 
effect was observed (F1,95 = 1.76, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 02, estimated power at 5% 
probability =. 26). 
The ratings for `speed-of-thought' revealed a significant main effect for order (F1,95 = 
4.61, p< . 
05, effect size 92 = . 
06, estimated power at 5% probability =. 47). This main 
effect is illustrated in Figure 5.6. However, the results revealed no significant main 
effect for level of cognitive effort (F1,95 = 0.19, p> . 
05, effect size 11 2< . 
01, estimated 
power at 5% probability = . 07). In addition, no significant order by cognitive effort 
interaction effect was observed (F,, 95 = . 
37, p> . 
05, effect size 11 2 <. 01, estimated power 
at 5% probability = . 09). 
In summary, the main effect for order for the ratings of each of the three dependent 
variables revealed a primacy effect regardless of the level of cognitive effort 
participants showed in the assessment task. 
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Figure 5.4. Mean (+SE) ratings for `ultimate Frisbee ability (general) 'for the control (end- 
of-sequence) and levels of cognitive effort in descending and ascending orders of 
information. 
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Figure 5.5. Mean (+SE) ratings for `disc control 'for the control (end-of-sequence) and 
levels of cognitive effort in descending and ascending orders of information. 
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Figure 5.6. Mean (+SE) ratings for `speed-of-thought' for the control (end-of-sequence) 
and levels of cognitive effort in descending and ascending orders of information. 
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DISCUSSION 
The present study examined whether manipulating participants' level of accountability 
would offset primacy effects when end-of-sequence (EoS) judgments were required. 
First, based on the findings of previous studies in the present thesis, it was hypothesised 
primacy effects would be found in the no accountability (control) EoS condition. 
Second, it was hypothesise that primacy would be offset in the accountability condition. 
However, the results failed to support the second hypothesis, with primacy effects 
observed in both experimental conditions for each of the three dependent variables. 
These findings of primacy offer further support to the contention that primacy is a 
robust finding when EoS assessments of ability are made, supporting previous research 
(e. g. Jones et al., 1968; Greenlees et al., 2007), and supporting the findings of primacy 
in previous studies of the present thesis. 
Theoretically, the participants in the accountability condition should have been more 
motivated to process the information, and put greater effort into the ratings task. 
However, a manipulation check involving participants' self-reported measures of effort 
and motivation towards the task revealed no significant differences between the 
accountability and control group. The accountability manipulation in the present study 
involved participants having to offer a justification for their ratings, with information 
passed onto the target players in the video footage as feedback for their performance. 
Cushing and Ahlawat's (1996) used a similar manipulation, asking participants to write 
a document to a senior partner to support their auditing judgments. However, 
participants in Cushing and Ahlawat's study thought they could be made directly 
accountable for their judgments, whereas, participants in the present study knew they 
would not have to directly defend their opinions to anyone. This might explain why the 
accountability manipulation was not successful in the present study. Future research 
might examine different ways to make participants more accountable for their 
judgments. For example, a more effective way to manipulate accountability might be to 
challenge participants to rate the target players as close to an `expert's' opinion as 
possible. Nevertheless, the non-significant differences in the manipulation check 
indicated that we were unsuccessful in creating a higher level of accountability, and 
thus, questioned the findings that primacy occurs regardless of level of accountability. 
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When conducting quantitative research, a methodological issue is getting a full and 
accurate response from participants. In the present study, the researcher had little 
difficulty in recruiting participants to complete the assessment task. Participants 
belonged to a select group (ultimate frisbee players) and as the purpose of the research 
was explained, participants were more likely to identify with the goals of the research 
and thus have a certain level of motivation to participate (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996). However, within this sample, it is still possible that participants 
would vary in the levels of cognitive effort they exerted towards the ratings task. 
Indeed, the manipulation check provided evidence that participants' levels of effort and 
motivation was variable, and this data could be used to distinguish participants who put 
greater cognitive effort into the ratings task. Thus, a further analysis was carried out 
using a median split to create the high and low cognitive effort group. The purpose of 
this further analysis was to examine whether self-reported levels of effort and 
motivation towards the ratings task would impact on order effects in the EoS condition. 
In line with Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief adjustment model, it was expected that 
participants who reported low levels of cognitive effort would display primacy effects. 
It was also expected that primacy effects would be offset for those who reported high 
cognitive effort, as increased effort would be expected to result in an SbS processing 
strategy, and in the present thesis, SbS processing has been shown to offset primacy. 
However, findings revealed significant primacy effects, regardless of the level of self- 
reported cognitive effort, and therefore did not offer support for Hogarth and Einhorn's 
theorising. These results support the findings of Study 2, in which participants with high 
motivation to think displaying primacy effects in the EoS condition. Similar theoretical 
explanations can be offered for why primacy effects are also displayed in the present 
study even when participants report higher cognitive effort or motivation towards the 
task. The most plausible explanation is that some SbS processing did occur, but this 
processing of later evidence only created weak weighting of later evidence in 
'comparison to the initial anchor. Thus, even though participants increased their 
cognitive effort towards the task, primacy effects still emerged. 
The findings of the present study have implications for coaches and others who assess 
ability in sport. The primacy bias in impressions of sporting ability that has been a 
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consistent finding in the present thesis has emerged in the present study regardless of 
the accountability manipulation, and regardless of levels of cognitive effort participants 
showed towards the ratings task. The results suggest that even the ability assessments of 
those who are motivated to process all information, and who exert high levels of effort 
to process information may still be affected by primacy effects. Further research might 
examine other experimental manipulations that might offset the primacy bias in the end- 
of-sequence condition. 
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CHAPTER 6 
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STUDY 4: INVESTIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF AN INTERPOLATED 
TASK ON ORDER EFFECTS IN THE END-OF-SEQUENCE JUDGMENT 
CONDITION 
Findings in Studies 1-3 of the present thesis have revealed consistent primacy effects in 
the end-of-sequence (EoS) condition. This has supported the research of Greenlees et al. 
(2007), who found primacy effects in assessments of sporting ability when EoS 
judgments were made. Furthermore, these findings are in line with previous research in 
ability assessments (e. g. Jones et al., 1968; Benassi, 1982). Thus, it appears that 
primacy is a robust finding when participants make one judgment of ability after all 
evidence has been viewed. In light of these findings, the purpose of the present study 
was to consider the impact of an interpolated activity inserted between viewing footage 
of the target player, and whether this variable would offset primacy in the EoS 
condition. In addition, step-by-step (SbS) methods have been shown to offset primacy 
effects in Studies 1 and 2, which led to applied suggestions being made to coaches 
about using SbS procedures in their ability assessments in order to offset primacy. 
However, in reality, this may be impractical for coaches to implement. If coaches used 
SbS methods to assess a large group, for example at a trial, the process would be long- 
winded and time consuming. Thus, a further purpose of the present study was to 
investigate other methods to offset primacy in the EoS condition, which might be more 
practical than developing SbS methods. 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model predicts primacy effects in the 
EoS condition. This prediction is backed up by the majority of studies (e. g. Asch, 1948; 
Anderson & Barrios, 1961) that have shown primacy in EoS conditions. However, 
Hogarth and Einhorn highlight how EoS studies that failed to show primacy, or resulted 
in recency, involved certain experimental manipulations. Such manipulations included 
asking participants to recall information (e. g. Anderson & Hubert, 1963), having 
another task interpolated between evidence (e. g. Luchins, 1957), and including a time 
delay (e. g. Miller & Campbell, 1959). Hogarth and Einhorn speculated these 
manipulations affected the judgment process, thus offsetting the primacy effects usually 
found in the EoS condition. The present study examined the impact of an interpolated 
activity on order effects, as coaches might have to carry out other tasks between 
111 
assessing players. A sport-specific task was used an interpolated activity, which 
participants completed half way through the 8 clips of evidence they viewed. 
Luchins (1957) investigated order effects in an impression formation task, through 
presenting participants with written paragraphs describing a target person. Luchins 
manipulated the order in which these descriptions were presented to participants, and 
found evidence of primacy effects in judgments concerning the target person. In follow 
up experiments, Luchins investigated variables that might offset the primacy effects 
found. These variables included the use of an interpolated warning, and an interpolated 
number task, which were both given in between information concerning the target 
person. Luchins found both interpolated tasks eliminated the primacy effects, and 
produced a move to recency. Luchins hypothesised the interpolated tasks created a 
break between the blocks of information, thus preventing the information being 
assessed as a continuous unit, and allowing more attention to be paid to later evidence. 
Thus, the greater weighting of later evidence explains the move away from primacy and 
towards recency. 
Hoch (1984) investigated the cognitive processes underlying predictive judgments by 
using a hypothesis-generation task (e. g. asking participants to give reasons for and 
against purchasing a video recorder). The results of the first two experiments showed 
evidence of primacy effects, with probability estimates (e. g. of purchasing the video 
recorder) more influenced by whichever side of the argument participants thought of 
first. In the third experiment, Hoch introduced a three minute interpolated task between 
the generation of different sides to the arguments. This task involved rating the 
similarity of 10 different domestic beers. The results showed an absence of order effects 
in this condition. Hoch reasoned that the delay caused by the interpolated activity meant 
greater attention could be paid to the second set of reasons, without the interference of 
the first set of the reasons. 
Although, their model predicts primacy in the EoS condition, Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992) suggested that interpolated tasks are one experimental manipulation that can 
offset primacy. Previous researchers (Luchins, 1957; Hoch, 1984) have proposed a 
move away from primacy and towards recency when interpolated tasks have been used. 
In line with Hogarth and Einhorn's theorising, interpolated tasks might cause later 
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evidence to have greater weighting. Therefore, it was hypothesised that the interpolated 
activity would offset primacy, and thus, no order effects were hypothesised in the 
interpolated condition. 
Hypothesis 15 
In the interpolated condition, no order effects are predicted. 
METHOD 
Participants 
The participants in this study consisted of 150 club standard ultimate frisbee players 
(121 male, 29 female), with a mean age of 21.44 years (SD = 2.98 years). Participants' 
mean playing experience was 2.92 years (SD = 2.09 years). The sample was 
predominantly white Caucasian (n = 145), with the remainder coming from Asian (n = 
3) and mixed race (n = 2) backgrounds. All were volunteers and signed informed 
consent forms prior to participation. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee 
at the University of Chichester. 
Materials 
The stimulus used in this experiment was the DVD used in the previous 3 Studies (see 
page 59) for details on how the footage was recorded and edited). 
Measures 
Ratings of the player's ability. To examine their impressions of the two players 
observed, participants were asked to rate each player on the same three factors (ultimate 
frisbee ability-general, disc control, and speed of thought) used in Studies 3-5. Each 
factor was measured on a 10 point, likert-type scale (e. g., 1= poor to 10 = excellent). 
Procedure 
The procedure for the present study was similar to previous studies, apart from the 
addition of an interpolated condition. Participants were randomly assigned to view 
either the declining or the ascending order of information. The data collection for this 
study was conducted alongside the data collection for Study 3. Thus, participants were 
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also assigned to either i) the end-of-sequence (EoS) response group; ii) the 
accountability manipulation group; iii) an interpolated condition; or iii) a delay 
condition. Due to the time taken to complete the interpolated task, the delay 
experimental condition was operationalised to control for this time delay. Participants in 
the delay condition were informed they would watch the first four clips of the target 
player, then there would be a 60-second delay, after which they would watch the second 
four clips. In the delay condition, the researcher manually paused the DVD for 60 
seconds after the first four clips of the target player had been viewed. All participants in 
each condition made their judgments of the two players after all 8 clips had been 
viewed. 
In the interpolated condition, participants were informed they would watch the first four 
clips of the target player, and then complete an interpolated task. Following the task, 
participants would watch the second four clips, and then make their overall assessments 
of the target player's ability. The interpolated activity was completed after 4 pieces of 
evidence which split the 8 pieces of evidence into two equal blocks. This approach most 
closely replicated Luchins' (1957) study, in which the interpolated task was completed 
between two blocks of information. The task involved designing a zone system to use as 
a defensive strategy in windy conditions (see Appendix 5.1). This task was used as it 
was specific to ultimate frisbee players and could be completed in the time frame (60 
seconds). In the interpolated condition, the researcher manually paused the DVD after 
four clips to allow participants to carry out the interpolated task. 
Data Analysis 
Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations for ratings of the control and 
target players are presented in Table 6.1. Pearson product-moment correlations were 
conducted on the dependent variables to assess the data for multi-collinearity, and 
indicated low correlations for the control player. Due to these low correlations, it was 
again decided to analyse the three dependent variables (ultimate ability, disc control, 
speed of thought) separately. 
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Variable M SD Subscale 
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Control ratings (n = 150) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 6.62 0.96 - . 58(**) . 48(**) 2. Disc Control 6.58 1.08 - . 36(**) 3. Speed of Thought 6.39 1.15 - 
Target ratings (n = 150) 
1. Ultimate Frisbee Ability 5.55 1.29 - . 79(**) . 76(**) 
2. Disc Control 5.35 1.38 - . 
69(**) 
4. Sneed of Thought 5.58 1.39 
* *p<. 01 
Table 6.1. Rating means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between subscales 
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2x3 (order x experimental condition) analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) were 
conducted on the ratings of the target player. The scores of the control player were used 
as a covariate to control for any differences in rating scores when viewing identical 
footage. Before conducting the analyses, the data was examined to determine if it 
satisfied the assumptions of ANCOVA (Pallant, 2001). Independent sample t-tests were 
used when necessary to evaluate main effects, using a change value to control for the 
score of the covariate. Alpha was set at P=0.05 for all statistical analyses. 
RESULTS 
Impact of order and judgement mode on ratings of the target player 
The test of equality of regression slopes revealed this assumption was not violated for 
any of the three dependent variables. In addition, Levene's test was not statistically 
significant for either of the covariates, therefore the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance was satisfied for each of the variables. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x3 (EoS vs. Interpolated vs. Delay experimental 
condition) ANCOVA for the ratings of `ultimate Frisbee ability(general)' revealed a 
significant order by condition interaction effect (F2,143 = 9.71, p< . 00 1, effect size i2 = 
. 
12, estimated power at 5% probability = . 98). However, the results revealed no 
significant main effects for order (F1,143 = . 
49, p> . 05, effect size 112 = . 03, estimated 
power at 5% probability = . 
11), or experimental condition (F2,143 = 1.30, p> . 05, effect 
size i2 = . 02, estimated power at 
5% probability = . 28). 
Independent sample t-tests for the ratings of `ultimate Frisbee ability (general)' revealed 
in the EoS (control) condition, participants viewing the declining order rated the target 
player significantly higher than participants viewing the ascending order (mean 
difference = . 72, t=2.11, 
df. = 48, p< . 05). In the interpolated condition, these findings 
were reversed, with participants who viewed the declining order rating the target player 
significantly lower than participants who viewed the ascending order (mean difference 
= -1.20, t= -3.30, df. = 48, p <. 01). There was no significant difference between ratings 
of the declining and ascending orders in the delay condition (mean difference = . 04, t= 
. 12, df. = 48, p> . 
05). This indicated no order effects were seen in the delay condition. 
These findings are illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1. Mean (+SE) ratings for `ultimate Frisbee ability (general) 'for end-of-sequence, 
interpolated and delay conditions for the declining and ascending orders of information. 
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Figure 6.2. Mean (+SE) ratings for `disc control 'for end-of-sequence, interpolated and 
delay conditions for the declining and ascending orders of information. 
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Figure 6.3. Mean (+SE) ratings for `speed-of-thought' for end-of-sequence, interpolated 
and delay conditions for the declining and ascending orders of information. 
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The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x3 (EoS vs. Interpolated vs. Delay experimental 
condition) ANCOVA for the ratings of `disc control' revealed a significant order by 
condition interaction effect (F2,143= 11.70, p <. 001, effect size i2 = . 14, estimated 
power at 5% probability = . 99). However, the results revealed no significant main 
effects for order (F1,143 = . 06, p> . 05, effect size i2 <. 01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 06), or experimental condition (F2,143 = . 
81, p> . 
05, effect size i2 = . 01, 
estimated power at 5% probability = . 19). 
Independent sample t-tests for the ratings of `disc control' revealed in the EoS (control) 
condition, participants viewing the declining order rated the target player significantly 
higher than participants viewing the ascending order (mean difference = 1.20, t=2.59, 
df. = 48, p< . 05). In the interpolated condition, these findings were reversed, with 
participants who viewed the declining order rating the target player significantly lower 
than participants who viewed the ascending order (mean difference = -1.44, t= -3.86, 
df. = 48, p< .0 1). There was no significant 
difference between ratings Of the declining 
and ascending orders in the delay condition (mean difference = . 00, t= . 00, 
df. = 48, p> 
. 05). This 
indicated no order effects were seen in the delay condition. These findings are 
illustrated in Figure 6.2. 
The 2 (declining vs. ascending order) x3 (EoS vs. Interpolated vs. Delay experimental 
condition) ANCOVA for the ratings of `speed-of-thought' revealed a significant order 
by condition interaction effect (F2,143 = 4.07, p< . 
05, effect size i2 = . 
05, estimated 
power at 5% probability = . 72). 
However, the results revealed no significant main 
effects for order (F1,143 = . 03, p> . 
05, effect size rl2 < . 
01, estimated power at 5% 
probability = . 05), or experimental condition 
(F2,143 = . 
53, p> . 05, effect size i2 = . 01, 
estimated power at 5% probability = . 14). 
Independent sample t-tests for the ratings of `speed-of-thought' revealed no significant 
difference between ratings of the declining and ascending orders in the EoS (control) 
condition (mean difference = . 
24, t= . 50, df. = 48, p> . 
05). In the interpolated 
condition, participants who viewed the declining order rating the target player 
significantly lower than participants who viewed the ascending order (mean difference 
= -1.04, t= -2.19, df. = 48, p< . 05). There was no significant difference 
between ratings 
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of the declining and ascending orders in the delay condition (mean difference = . 20, t= 
. 40, 
df. = 48, p> . 05). This indicated no order effects were seen in the delay condition. 
These findings are illustrated in Figure 6.3. 
In summary, primacy effects were seen in the EoS condition for the ratings of ultimate 
frisbee ability (General) and disc control. In the interpolated condition, recency effects 
were seen for each of the three dependent variables. In the delay condition, no order 
effects were seen for any of the three dependent variables. 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether an experimental 
manipulation would influence the order effects that have been a consistent finding in the 
end-of-sequence (EoS) condition in Studies 1-3. More specifically, the-present study 
examined whether an interpolated activity inserted between clips of information would 
offset primacy effects in the EoS condition. It was hypothesised that the interpolated 
activity would offset the primacy effects, and no order effects were predicted to occur in 
this condition. The results of the present study failed to fully support this hypothesis, as 
recency effects were observed in the interpolated condition for each of the three 
dependent variables. 
The findings again revealed primacy effects in the EoS condition. Relating this back to 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) algebraic equation in the EoS mode - Sk = S(xj) + 
wk[s(x2, ....... xk) - R], primacy effects are predicted as the initial evidence S(xl) 
forms a strong anchor, and the remaining evidence s(x2, ....... xk) is aggregated. As 
the interpolated condition has eliminated primacy effects, and produced recency effects, 
it appears that the interpolated condition has both reduced the weighting of the initial 
anchor [S(xl)], and also caused later evidence to have increased weighting on the final 
impression. Luchins (1957) suggested that impact of the interpolated tasks created a 
break between the blocks of information, consequently making it less likely information 
was perceived as a homogeneous unit. Thus, it appears the interpolated manipulation 
meant the evidence following the anchor wasn't just aggregated due to the break 
between blocks of evidence. Thus, the interpolated activity most likely meant a standard 
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EoS response was not made, and consequently, primacy didn't emerge. However, this 
fails to explain why recency occurred in the interpolated condition. 
Miller and Campbell (1959) proposed primacy effects were offset by a time delay placed 
between blocks of information. Miller and Campbell suggested recency effects emerged 
due to more recent information having a stronger presence in the short-term memory. In 
the present study, a further experimental condition was operationalised to control for the 
time delay created by carrying out the interpolated activity. In this delay condition, for 
each of the three dependent variables, no order effects were displayed. Thus, the results 
indicated that a time delay (of 60 seconds) offset primacy effects, whereas the 
interpolated condition produced recency effects. 
It is apparent that both the delay and the interpolated conditions resulted in greater 
weighting being placed on later evidence compared to the weighting of the initial anchor. 
This might be due to the explanations of Miller and Campbell (1959) who suggested a 
time delay results in later evidence having a stronger presence in the short-term memory. 
The differing order effects that occurred in the interpolated and delay conditions are 
likely explained by the level of processing that resulted in each experimental condition. 
With the delay creating a break between the two blocks of evidence, Hogarth and 
Einhorn's (1992) algebraic equation can be adjusted to explain how the end judgment (Sk) 
was arrived at in light of processing the eight pieces of information. 
Sk = wk[s(xi + x2 + x3 + x4)/4 - 
R] + Wk[s(X5 + x6 + X7 + x8)/4 - R]) 
In the interpolated condition, it is unlikely the first four pieces of information were 
processed fully, as the interpolated task would take up cognitive resources. 
Consequently, with less active processing of early evidence, it is possible that early 
evidence had less weighting (wk) and thus less influence on the overall impression in the 
interpolated condition, compared to the greater weighting of later information, which 
resulted in recency effects. In contrast, it is likely the time delay in the delay condition 
allowed more active processing of the first four pieces of evidence. Thus, the weighting 
of the first half of evidence was higher in the delay condition compared to the 
interpolated condition. In the delay condition therefore, the early evidence had a more 
equal weighting on the overall impression, and this would explain why no order effects 
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occurred. Further research would be needed concerning the processing strategies used in 
the delay condition before such a proposal can be substantiated. 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate whether an interpolated activity was 
an experimental manipulation that would reduce order effects. The results revealed the 
primacy bias which has been a consistent finding in the end-of-sequence (EoS) condition 
is replaced by a recency bias in the interpolated condition. The findings of the present 
study have implications for coaches and others who assess ability in sport. Thus, if 
someone assessing players in sport is distracted by another task during observing players 
at a trial, the player who starts well but declines in performance (e. g. loses focus, 
concentration, gets tired, has an injury) will be judged unfavourably compared to a player 
who starts poorly, but improves and finishes well. As the present study found that an 
interpolated task failed to eliminate order effects, future research might examine other 
experimental manipulations that might offset order effects in the EoS condition. 
However, in the delay condition used to control for the time delay created by the 
interpolated activity, primacy effects were eliminated, and no order effects occurred. 
These findings also have applied implications for those who assess ability in sport. The 
results indicate that if there is a break between viewing information, this is likely to 
produce additional processing of information which might eliminate the primacy bias, 
creating a form of SbS processing. Indeed, this is comparable to the findings in Study 1 
that showed SbS processing after each piece of information to offset order effects. In 
effect, the time delay in the present study allowed a form of SbS processing to take place, 
with evidence actively processed after half the clips and then again after all the clips. 
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CHAPTER 9 
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GENERAL DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The aim of this thesis was to extend the work of Greenlees et al. (2007) through a more 
systematic examination of order effects in assessments of sporting ability. Within the 
social psychology literature, many errors have been identified when social judgments of 
others are made (Funder, 2003). The order effect is one such phenomenon that has been 
shown to bias social judgments. If judgments of sport performances follows the general 
principles of social judgments (Plessner & Haar, 2006), then it would be expected that 
order effects might bias sporting judgments, and the results of Greenlees et al. provided 
initial evidence of order effects in sport. The present thesis therefore sought to provide a 
more thorough test of the incidence of order effects in sporting judgments. Hogarth and 
Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model provided a theoretical underpinning for the 
thesis, and the programme of studies tested the predictions of the model in a sporting 
domain. In addition, the present thesis sought to replicate and extend the research of 
Greenlees et al. in a different sport setting. Thus, the present thesis makes three specific 
contributions to the order effects literature in assessments of sporting ability. First, 
Study 1 provided a more thorough examination of the impact of step-by-step processing 
on order effects in assessments of sporting ability. Second, Study 2 investigated the 
influence of various moderating variables on the incidence of order effects. Third, 
Studies 3-4 have examined the impact of certain experimental conditions on order 
effects in the end-of-sequence condition. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a summary of the findings from this programme of 
research. Furthermore, this chapter provides a discussion of the findings in light of 
previous theory and research, and considers the implications of these findings for those 
who make assessments of ability in sport. In addition, a further aim of this chapter is to 
make recommendations concerning the direction of future research into order effects. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
) judgments End-of-sequence (EoS 
A key finding of the research was the consistency with which primacy effects occurred 
when end-of-sequence (EoS) assessments were required. In Study 1, significant primacy 
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effects emerged in the EoS condition. In Study 2, participants who were classified as 
having higher motivation to think showed primacy effects in the EoS condition, and 
primacy effects were displayed regardless of theory of learning beliefs. Also in Study 2, 
primacy effects emerged in the EoS condition for both high and low levels of 
experience, which supported findings of Greenlees et al. (2007) who found primacy 
effects regardless of levels of experience. In Study 3, primacy effects were displayed by 
participants, regardless of their levels of accountability. These consistent findings of 
primacy in the EoS condition provided strong evidence that primacy effects occur when 
EoS assessments of sporting ability are used. Furthermore, from this finding, it can be 
proposed that primacy effects may be common in sporting contexts. These findings also 
support previous research that has found primacy effects when ability has been assessed 
(Jones et al., 1968; Newtson & Rindner, 1979; McAndrew, 1981; Benassi, 1982). 
It is proposed (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) that primacy effects occur when EoS 
assessments are made, as there is greater weighting of earlier information on the overall 
judgment compared to the weighting of later information, which has less weighting on 
the end judgment. However, the precise reasons for the primacy bias are unclear. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) propose that the first piece of evidence viewed creates an 
anchor, and then the remaining pieces of evidence are aggregated together. Thus, the 
initial evidence has greater weighting compared to later evidence. This can be can be 
written in algebraic terms as 
Sk = S(xj) + Wk[S(x2+x3, +...... xk/x) - R] 
Mathematical calculations can be made to demonstrate how such primacy effects would 
emerge in the EoS condition, by assigning numerical values to the pieces of evidence, 
and numerical values to the weighting of evidence. These calculations can be seen in 
Equations 2-3 (Appendix 8). Further to this theorising, Anderson and Hubert (1963) 
suggested that people pay less attention to later evidence, thus explaining why later 
evidence has reduced weighting on the overall judgment. Anderson and Jacobsen (1965) 
propose that people discount later information as it fails to confirm the early impression 
they have developed. Future research might examine the precise reasons that explain 
why primacy emerges. 
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It was hypothesised in Study 2 that participants with high motivation to think would 
show no order effects in the EoS condition. In line with Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) 
model, it was expected that those with high motivation to think would more effortfully 
process information in a SbS manner. Similarly, participants with less experience were 
expected to use SbS strategies to deal with the demands of processing information 
(Study 2), and participants reporting higher accountability were also expected to use 
more effortful processing (Study 3). However, in each of these conditions, primacy 
effects were displayed in the EoS condition. A possible explanation is that some SbS 
processing was used but the processing of later information involved a very weak 
weighting compared to the weighting of the anchor. Thus, primacy effects would 
emerge (see equations 9-10, Appendix 8). 
In Study 4, the results showed recency effects in the interpolated condition, whereas in 
the delay condition, order effects were offset. Indeed, this 60-second delay was the only 
experimental condition that resulted in primacy effects being offset when EoS 
judgments were asked for. Luchins (1957) suggested the interpolated tasks created a 
break between the blocks of information, consequently making it less likely information 
was perceived as a homogeneous unit. The results indicate a standard EoS response was 
not made, as the interpolated and delay manipulations meant the evidence following the 
anchor wasn't aggregated due to the break between blocks of evidence. With such a 
break between the two blocks of evidence, Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) algebraic 
equation can be adjusted to explain how the overall judgment (Sk) was arrived at in light 
of processing the eight pieces of evidence as two blocks of information; 
Sk=Wk[s(XI+x2+x3+ x4)/4-R]+Wk[S(xs+x6+ x7+X8)/4-R]} 
The differing order effects that occurred in the interpolated and delay conditions may be 
explained by different weightings of the two sections of information resulting from each 
experimental condition. It can be proposed that the time delay condition allowed 
participants the opportunity to more fully process early information. Consequently, 
there would be equal weighting of the first block and the second block, and this would 
explain why no order effects occurred (See equations 14-15 in appendix 8). However, in 
the interpolated condition, it is unlikely that the first four pieces of information would 
be processed fully, as the interpolated task would take up cognitive resources. It is 
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therefore likely the early block of evidence had less weighting compared to the later 
block in the interpolated condition, which explains why recency emerged (See equations 
16-17 in appendix 8 for the mathematical calculations that show how these order effects 
would occur). 
Step-by-step (SbS) judgments 
While the findings of the present thesis support Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) 
predictions in the EoS condition, several other findings failed to support the hypotheses 
drawn from the model. For example, the belief-adjustment model predicts recency in the 
SbS condition. However, in Study 1 of the present thesis, primacy effects were found 
for an incomplete SbS processing strategy, and no order effects were found when an 
extended SbS strategy was used. In the incomplete SbS condition replicating the SbS 
processing used in Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study, primacy effects were also displayed 
in the present thesis. Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) explain how SbS processing results in 
later information having greater weighting compared to the anchor. This can be 
represented by the equation Sk = Sk_I + Wk[S(Xk) - R], where Wk represents the adjustment 
weight of a piece (the kth piece) of evidence. With this weakened method of SbS 
processing, the adjustment weight (wk) is reduced, meaning later evidence had less 
weighting on the overall judgment, in comparison with the weighting of initial evidence. 
Thus, it is apparent the strength of the weighting of later evidence was not enough to 
offset the influence of the initial anchor. Consequently this weaker SbS processing 
strategy failed to eliminate primacy effects (this primacy effect can be numerically 
shown in equations 7-8 in Appendix 8). 
In the extended SbS condition though, no order effects were displayed. This more 
thorough SbS strategy led to an increased weighting of later evidence in comparison to 
the incomplete SbS processing used in Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study. Thus, if the 
initial anchor was sufficiently strong, then the extended SbS manipulation may only 
produce a weighting of later evidence that has the strength to offset primacy effects and 
leave no order effects (rather than reversing primacy effects to recency effects as 
suggested by Hogarth and Einhorn). Such a proposal (with crude values assigned) can 
be demonstrated by the mathematical calculations in Equations 9-10 (Appendix 8). 
These reduced weightings of later evidence compared to the anchor provided a tentative 
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explanation for the absence of primacy effects in the SbS condition, and further research 
is needed before such proposals can be substantiated. 
The primacy effects displayed in Study 1 were offset when an extended SbS processing 
strategy was required. The data suggests the SbS processing increased the relative 
weighting of later evidence compared to the initial anchor, which resulted in primacy 
effects being offset. This finding provided partial support for Hogarth and Einhorn's 
(1992) model, which predicts SbS processing eliminates primacy effects and produces 
recency effects. In this case, it appears that order effects can be offset when more 
systematic SbS processing is used. A strength of Study 1 was the delay in making these 
SbS judgments was controlled for, and more data was collected. The primacy effects 
found in this delay condition indicated that it was the more thorough SbS processing 
eliminated primacy effects, and not any time delay caused by the SbS processing 
condition. 
In Study 2, less experienced participants showed recency effects when they made SbS 
judgments. This offered support to Hogarth and Einhorn's predictions of recency in the 
SbS condition. However, order effects were offset for more experienced participants. 
This could be due to the different weighting of later information compared to the anchor. 
For less experienced participants, it is apparent they simply gave an equal weighting to 
each piece of evidence following the anchor, which explains why recency emerges (e. g. 
see equations 5-6, Appendix 8). For more experienced participants, if the weighting of 
later evidence is reduced compared to the anchor (e. g. because they were more 
committed to their early impression, they discounted or paid less attention to later 
evidence) then this would explain why order effects are offset in the SbS condition (e. g. 
see equations 9-10, Appendix 8). 
In summary, primacy effects have been found to be a consistent finding when EoS 
judgments were required. Social cognition theory suggests than people use shortcuts to 
deal with the demands of processing large amounts of information (Baron & Byrne, 
2002). This produces automatic thinking which can result in mental structures such as 
schemas and stereotypes occurring, which can save mental effort and preserve cognitive 
capacity (Jonas et al., 2001), but can also result in errors when making judgments. In 
the present programme of research, it is likely that people use mental shortcuts in the 
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EoS condition, and the results have provided evidence of an order effect (primacy) bias. 
Furthermore, in line with schema theory (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), it is possible that the 
initial evidence produces a schema of a good or bad player, which produces a strong 
early anchor that leads to primacy effects. In the social psychology literature, order 
effects have been shown to bias judgments in a variety of other domains (Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992), and findings in the present thesis suggest that order effects also bias 
judgments of sporting ability. In addition, order effects were eliminated in the thorough 
SbS condition in Study 1. Furthermore, the 60 second delay in Study 4 eliminated 
primacy effects in the EoS condition. Thus, the present thesis has provided evidence 
that SbS processing and delays may reduce or eliminate order effects in assessments of 
sporting ability. 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model 
Overall, the results of the present thesis offered some support for the predictions of 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) model. The consistent findings of primacy in Studies 1-3 
in the End-of-sequence condition support the predictions of primacy Hogarth and 
Einhorn's model when this processing strategy is used. However, while Hogarth and 
Einhorn's model offers a theoretical explanation for why primacy effects occur (page 
30), it is still unclear what cognitions occur to explain precisely why initial evidence has 
so much influence, and later evidence has much less impact (e. g., through lack of 
attention to, or discounting of later information). In addition, results in Study 1 in the 
extended SbS condition revealed no order effects, yet Hogarth and Einhorn's model 
predicts recency in this condition. Theoretically, it is likely that the additional 
processing created by the SbS strategy was able to offset primacy, but was not strong 
enough to produce recency effects. Hogarth and Einhorn's model only offers a partial 
explanation for why this might occur. 
There is also a question of sequence length (Greenlees et al., 2007), and thus, whether 
the sequence of information used in the present study is considered a long or short series. 
Hogarth and Einhorn suggest that a long series of information will result in primacy 
effects, but in their model, they use an arbitrary split of the research to categorise long 
and short series. In the present study, each piece of evidence could be broken down into 
smaller components, thus the series of information could theoretically be much longer 
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than just the 8 actual pieces of evidence. Future research should examine this element of 
Hogarth and Einhorn's model to more effectively categorise long and short series of 
information. Hogarth and Einhorn's model also predicts that complex information will 
offset primacy effects, due to an increase in information processing. However, in Study 
2 (greater motivation-to-think) and Study 3 (increased accountability), an apparent 
increase in information processing failed to offset primacy. In light of these findings, 
Hogarth and Einhorn's model might be revised to explain why primacy effects still 
occur, even in light of increased processing. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) also distinguish between evaluation and estimation tasks. 
Evaluation tasks involve encoding whether evidence is true or false relative to the 
hypothesis. In contrast, estimation tasks involve assessing some form of "moving 
average". In the present thesis, an estimation task was used, with participants asked to 
assess levels of ability on a 10-point scale, from `poor' (= 1) to `excellent' (= 10). 
Future research might examine evaluation tasks. For example, participants could be 
asked if the target player has the ability to be selected for a certain squad. 
APPLIED IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSESSING SPORTING ABILITY 
In an applied setting, Cushing and Ahlawat (1996) suggested people with greater 
experience, and who are motivated to exert cognitive effort would not allow their 
judgments to be affected by the order in which evidence was evaluated. Thus, Cushing 
and Ahlawat questioned whether order effects found in experimental research would 
still emerge in applied settings. However, primacy was a constant finding in the present 
thesis. Indeed, participants with higher motivation to think (Study 2) and higher levels 
of accountability (Study 3) showed primacy effects in the EoS condition. In addition, 
participants showed primacy effects regardless of level of experience in the EoS 
condition (Study 2). Thus, the results strongly suggest that primacy is a robust 
phenomenon when making EoS assessments. Consequently, there are implications for 
those (e. g. coaches or scouts) who make assessments of sporting ability, as they operate 
in an environment where they are accountable for their judgments and thus are likely to 
exert full cognitive effort to make accurate judgments. The consistent finding of 
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primacy effects in the present thesis strongly indicates that primacy is an applied 
concern for those who make assessments of sporting ability. Furthermore, those who 
make assessments of ability should be made aware of the way early information might 
overly bias their overall judgments. 
The findings of primacy have further applied implications for athletes themselves. In 
other experimental settings, for example, studies examining criminal proceedings (e. g. 
Kerstholt & Jackson, 1998; Costabile & Klein, 2005) have shown recency effects 
prevalent. Such findings indicate lawyers should present their strongest arguments last 
to have greatest influence on jurors' judgments. Similarly, the findings from the present 
thesis can be used to guide players as to how best they might create a favourable 
impression of their ability. More specifically, as the findings have provided evidence of 
a primacy effect, then players should be advised to make a strong start, and perform 
well initially to most positively impact on the judgments of observers. 
The potential for early information to bias perceptions of ability might also impact on 
the coach-athlete relationship. For example, if a player performs well initially, but their 
performance level subsequently drops, a coach might judge the player's ability higher 
than it actually is. In this instance, a coach might push an athlete harder or promote 
them to play at a higher level than they are capable of. However, such a declining 
performance level might mean the player is lacking confidence at that time. Thus, 
coach-athlete disagreements might result in light of conflicting perceptions and 
expectations. Alternatively, an improving athlete might not be rated as highly as they 
should be, and consequently might be removed from a team or squad just at the time 
when they were improving. In addition, in this situation, the player may not get the 
recognition his/her ability deserves. Jones et al. (1968) found evidence of primacy 
effects when participants observed targets solving intelligence questions, but found 
recency for participants when assessing their own performance. This indicates further 
potential problems for the coach-athlete relationships, if the coach was to attribute 
changes in performance very differently from the athlete themselves. This theorising 
suggests primacy effects might negatively impact on coach-athlete relationships. 
The results of the present thesis suggest a more thorough SbS processing strategy 
offsets primacy effects. Consequently, these findings could inform the development of 
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practical coaching guidelines. More specifically, individuals who frequently make 
assessments of ability should be guided to make detailed evaluations of performance 
regularly in order to offset primacy effects, thus replicating the extended SbS condition. 
For example, coaches might devise an assessment template, to allow judgments to be 
updated after new evidence is viewed. Furthermore, in light of the findings in Study 6, 
short delays might be integrated into the assessment process, to allow for more thorough 
processing of the evidence. However, it is apparent that such a method of information 
processing might be difficult to implement in applied settings. For example, the use of 
SbS methods could be long-winded and time consuming, and thus may be an 
impractical strategy for selectors to use when observing a large group of athletes at a 
trial. 
LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The present study makes a unique contribution to the order effects literature by 
providing a more thorough examination of the incidence of order effects in sporting 
judgments. Strengths of the programme of studies include the relatively large sample 
sizes, the thorough examination of step-by-step strategies, and the additional data 
collected (in Studies 1 and 4) to control for time delays created in experimental 
procedures. 
The present thesis used the same video footage throughout the programme of studies, 
with the order of footage arranged so that the target player's performance was seen to 
start well and then decline, or this same order but reversed. This created a controlled 
experimental task which allowed us to test certain hypotheses and examine order effects 
in sporting assessments of ability. However, while this research design has been 
similarly used in previous order effects' research, there are limitations to this approach. 
For example, it is questionable how closely this footage actually reflects the type of 
evidence that a coach would view when making assessments of ability in real settings. It 
is unlikely that they would see the performance improve or decline in such a linear way. 
In addition, they might see a certain player perform, and then view performances from 
other individuals before seeing that player perform again. And finally, a selector might 
make judgments of a players' ability from viewing performances over a series of time, 
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but the footage in the present thesis only uses a chunk of information from one session, 
and not over a longer period of time. 
In light of these limitations, future research should seek to utilise research designs that 
most closely match the actual demands placed on an observer making sporting 
judgments. Indeed, Cushing and Ahiawat (1996) questioned whether order effects found 
in experimental research would still emerge in applied settings. Thus, future research 
should use more ecologically valid methodologies to examine order effects in sporting 
situations. For example, footage of a target player in match situations could be shown to 
participants, with the footage manipulated to show either a declining or improving 
performance. In addition, a talent scout or coach viewing a group of players in a training 
match will have to assess the ability of a number of players. Further research could 
address this issue by creating situations which order effects might be observed in more 
complex situations. One suggestion might be for participants to rate footage of two or 
more players mixed together (with the clips for one target player manipulated in a 
declining and ascending order). Such a task would more closely match the demands 
placed on individuals who assess and evaluate a number of players in sporting situations. 
In addition, to match the demands of selectors who observe a player over a number of 
sessions, future longitudinal research might be used to examine whether order effects 
would bias judgments over a longer time frame (e. g., several performances/a whole 
season). 
In addition, procedures used in the present thesis might not fully replicate the demands 
places on observers making judgments in sport. For example, a talent scout or coach 
viewing a group of players in a training match will have to assess the ability of a 
number of players. Further research could address this issue by creating situations 
which order effects might be observed in more complex situations. One suggestion 
might be for participants to rate footage of two or more players mixed together (with the 
clips for one target player manipulated in a declining and ascending order). Such a task 
would more closely match the demands placed on individuals who assess and evaluate a 
number of players in sporting situations. 
Future research should examine the strategies participants use to process information in 
the different judgment conditions, in order to determine more precisely why order 
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effects occur. One avenue worthy of future research is to consider why primacy has 
emerged as a consistent finding in the EoS condition. One explanation is later 
information might have less influence on the overall judgment due to a reduction of 
attention paid to later evidence (Anderson & Hubert, 1963). Past research has used eye- 
tracking systems (e. g. Savelsbergh et al., 2002; Williams & Davids, 1998) to investigate 
visual search behaviour. Such software could be used to examine whether participants 
pay less visual attention to later evidence. Thus, such procedures would establish if 
visual attention decreased through the series of evidence, which would indicate attention 
decrement is a reason for primacy. Such information would more accurately inform an 
intervention (such as increased concentration/attention) aimed at increasing attention to 
relevant later stimuli. 
Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) suggested that even when an EoS strategy is required, SbS 
processing could be used to process information. Hogarth and Einhorn propose that those 
motivated to think and effortfully process information will use SbS strategies to more 
fully process information even when an EoS response was required. Such SbS strategies 
were predicted to offset the influence of early information. However, some findings in the 
present study failed to support this theorising. For example, primacy effects were 
displayed by participants with high motivation to think (Study 2) and high accountability 
(Study 3) when they were expected to use an SbS processing strategy. Future research 
might use qualitative methods to investigate reasons for these primacy effects. For 
example, participants could be interviewed to examine how they arrived at their final 
ratings, and the processing strategies they used. In addition, such qualitative methods 
might explain reasons participants give for attributing changes in performance. This 
might support information discounting (Anderson & Jacobson, 1965) which proposed 
how once a person commits to an initial judgment, they discount further information (due 
to reasons such as increasing tiredness or changes in motivation) as it fails to confirm 
their early impression. 
A further recommendation for future research in assessments of order effects in sport is to 
develop a more thorough and reliable measure of assessment of ability. Participants rated 
the target players on four factors, ultimate frisbee ability (general), disc control, speed of 
thought, and athleticism. These factors were adapted from Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study, 
which examined assessments of footballing ability. High correlations between three of 
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the variables (ultimate frisbee ability-general, disc control, speed-of-thought) created a 
statistical justification for these three variables to be combined into one dependent 
variable in the present study. A more reliable measure of assessment of ability is needed, 
but for the present thesis, the priority was to use a suitable measure of ability ratings to 
allow a more thorough examination into the incidence of order effects in sporting 
judgments. 
Plessner and Haar (2006) highlighted the importance of impressions of players' ability 
and performance not being biased by any internal or external factors. In the present thesis, 
strong evidence of an assessment bias was shown, with primacy a consistent finding 
when one (EoS) judgment of ability was made. Step-by-step judgments offset primacy 
effects, but in applied settings, these might be time-consuming to implement. Therefore, 
more research is needed to examine how order effects might be offset in the EoS 
condition. The present thesis has also provided a more systematic examination of the 
predictions of Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model. However, factors 
from the model remain untested (e. g. evaluation/estimation judgments) and furthermore, 
the preceding discussion has identified a number of further worthwhile research 
directions. In light of this, it is hoped that the present thesis will stimulate further research 
in the area, thus producing a broader examination of order effects in sporting judgments. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this thesis has provided support for the predictions of Hogarth and 
Einhorn's (1992) belief-adjustment model when assessing sporting ability. Greenlees 
(2007) and his colleagues were the first to investigate order effects in assessments of 
sporting ability, and this thesis has extended this research by providing a more 
systematic examination of order effects in the sporting domain. The findings of this 
research, considered with earlier research in assessments of general ability (e. g. Jones et 
al., 1968) and research in assessments of sporting ability (Greenlees et al. ) suggest that 
early information can overly influence overall impressions. More specifically, the 
research has demonstrated a primacy bias when one assessment of ability is asked for 
after all evidence has been viewed. Furthermore, the findings have indicated that if 
judgments are updated in a step-by-step manner, then the primacy bias might be offset. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary of hypotheses tested 
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Hypothesis Hypothesis Fully Supported - 
 
no. Partially Supported - 
Not Supported -X 
Study 1 
1 In the EoS response condition, primacy  
effects are predicted. 
2 In the SbS (short) response condition,  
primacy effects are predicted. 
3 In the SbS (extended) response condition, x 
recency effects are predicted. 
4 In the delay condition, primacy effects are  
predicted. 
Study 2 
5 In both the EoS and SbS response  
conditions, primacy effects are predicted for 
entity theorists. 
6 In both the EoS and SbS response x 
conditions, recency effects are predicted for 
incremental theorists. 
7 In the EoS response condition, primacy x 
effects are predicted for participants with 
low motivation to think. 
8 In the EoS response condition, no order x 
effects are predicted for participants with 
high motivation to think. 
9 In the SbS response condition, no order  
effects are predicted for either motivation to 
think group. 
10 In the EoS response condition, primacy  
effects are predicted for more highly 
experienced participants. 
11 In the EoS response condition, no order x 
effects are predicted for less experienced 
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participants. 
12 In the SbS response condition, no order  
effects are predicted for either level of 
experience. 
Study 3 
13 In the EoS (control) condition, primacy  
effects are predicted. 
14 In the accountability manipulation group, x 
no order effects are predicted. 
Study 4 
15 In the interpolated condition, no order x 
effects are predicted. 
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Appendix 2 
Study 1 Assessment Instruments and SPSS Outputs 
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Appendix 2.1 
End-of-Sequence Assessment instrument 
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Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
Introduction and Rationale 
In the current study we are interested in how people make judgments about the 
abilities of the individuals they observe when playing and coaching. In this 
experiment we will be asking you to observe an ultimate frisbee player perform a 
series of the same skill, which involves the player cutting towards the disc, making a 
catch, pivoting, and making a forehand pass to a team-mate on the run. You will 
then be asked to rate his performance and ability. There is no right or wrong answer, 
just your own impression that is important. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Name: 
Age: 
Ethnic Origin: 
Ultimate playing experience: (years) 
(EOS -PN-A1) 
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University of Chichester 
CONSENT FORM 
I........................................................ (PRINT NAME) 
hereby give my consent to participate in the following test/activity [investigating 
impressions of ability in sport] 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
9 the purpose of the testlactivity has been explained to me; 
91 am satisfied that I understand the procedures involved; 
" the possible benefits and risks of the testlactivity have been explained to 
me; 
" any questions which I have asked about the test/activity have been 
answered to my satisfaction; 
"I understand that, during the course of the test/activity, I have the right to 
ask further questions about it; 
" the information which I have supplied to University of Chichester prior to 
taking part in the test/activity is true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief and I understand that I must notify promptly of any 
changes to the information; 
"I understand that my personal information will not be released to any third 
parties without my permission; 
"I understand that my participation in the testlactivity is voluntary and I am 
therefore at liberty to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that, if there is any concern about the appropriateness of my 
continuing in the test/activity, I may be asked to withdraw my involvement 
at any stage; 
"I understand that once the test/activity has been completed, the 
information gained as a result of it will be used for the following purposes 
only: [To explore the way people make impressions of the sporting 
ability of others]. 
SIGNATURE OF THE SUBJECT ....................................... 
DATE ................................................ 
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Evaluation of Player 1 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Evaluation of Player 2 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Appendix 2.2 
Step-by-Step (short) Assessment Instrument (Player 1 only) 
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Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
Introduction and Rationale 
In the current study we are interested in how people make judgments about the 
abilities of the individuals they observe when playing and coaching. In this 
experiment we will be asking you to observe an ultimate frisbee player perform a 
series of the same skill, which involves the player cutting towards the disc, making a 
catch, pivoting, and making a forehand pass to a team-mate on the run. You will 
then be asked to rate his performance and ability. There is no right or wrong answer, 
just your own impression that is important. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Name: 
Age: 
Ethnic Origin: 
Ultimate playing experience: (years) 
(SBS-PN-A1) 
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University of Chichester 
CONSENT FORM 
I........................................................ (PRINT NAME) 
hereby give my consent to participate in the following test/activity [investigating 
impressions of ability in sport] 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
9 the purpose of the test/activity has been explained to me; 
91 am satisfied that I understand the procedures involved; 
9 the possible benefits and risks of the test/activity have been explained to me; 
" any questions which I have asked about the test/activity have been answered to 
my satisfaction; 
"I understand that, during the course of the test/activity, I have the right to ask 
further questions about it; 
" the information which I have supplied to University of Chichester prior to taking 
part in the test/activity is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief and I understand that I must notify promptly of any changes to the 
information; 
"I understand that my personal information will not be released to any third 
parties without my permission; 
"I understand that my participation in the test/activity is voluntary and I am 
therefore at liberty to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that, if there is any concern about the appropriateness of my 
continuing in the test/activity, I may be asked to withdraw my involvement at 
any stage; 
"I understand that once the test/activity has been completed, the information 
gained as a result of it will be used for the following purposes only: [To explore 
the way people make impressions of the sporting ability of others]. 
SIGNATURE OF THE SUBJECT ....................................... 
DATE ................................................ 
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Overall rating of Player 1- After Clip 1 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Overall rating of Player 1- After Clip 2 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall rating of Planer 1- After Clip 3 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Overall ratine of Player 1- After Clip 4 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall rating of Player 1- After Clip 5 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor 
12345 
Excellent 
6789 10 
Overall rating of Player 1- After Clip 6 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
150 
Overall rating of Player 1- After Clip 7 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for his overall 
level of ability. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ability Level 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall ratine of planer 1- after all Clips 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Appendix 2.3 
Step-by-Step (extended) Assessment Instrument (Player 1 only) 
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Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
Introduction and Rationale 
In the current study we are interested in how people make judgments about the 
abilities of the individuals they observe when playing and coaching. In this 
experiment we will be asking you to observe an ultimate frisbee- player perform a 
series of the same skill, which involves the player cutting towards the disc, making a 
catch, pivoting, and making a forehand pass to a team-mate on the run. You will 
then be asked to rate his performance and ability. There is no right or wrong answer, 
just your own impression that is important. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Name: 
Age: 
Ethnic Origin: 
Ultimate playing experience: (years) 
(SBS-PN-A1) 
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University of Chichester 
CONSENT FORM 
I........................................................ (PRINT NAME) 
hereby give my consent to participate in the following test/activity [investigating 
impressions of ability in sport] 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
" the purpose of the test/activity has been explained to me; 
"I am satisfied that I understand the procedures involved; 
" the possible benefits and risks of the test/activity have been explained to me; 
" any questions which I have asked about the test/activity have been answered to 
my satisfaction; 
"I understand that, during the course of the test/activity, I have the right to ask 
further questions about it; 
" the information which I have supplied to University of Chichester prior to taking 
part in the test/activity is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief and I understand that I must notify promptly of any changes to the 
information; 
"I understand that my personal information will not be released to any third 
parties without my permission; 
"I understand that my participation in the test/activity is voluntary and I am 
therefore at liberty to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that, if there is any concern about the appropriateness of my 
continuing in the testlactivity, I may be asked to withdraw my involvement at 
any stage; 
"I understand that once the test/activity has been completed, the information 
gained as a result of it will be used for the following purposes only: [To explore 
the way people make impressions of the sporting ability of others]. 
SIGNATURE OF THE SUBJECT ....................................... 
DATE ................................................ 
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Overall rating of Player 1 (After Clip 1) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall Ratine of Planer 1- (after Clio 2 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall Rating of Player 1 (After Clip 3) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
158 
Overall Rating of Player 1 (After Clip 4) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
159 
Overall rating of Player 1 (After Clip 5) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
five criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
160 
Overall Rating of Player 1 (After Clip 6) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall rating of Player 1 (After Clip 7) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Overall rating of slaver 1 (after Clip 8) 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Attitude 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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Appendix 2.4 
SPSS Outputs for Study 1 
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Ordering the Clips 
Within-Subjects Factors 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
rating 
Dependent 
Variable 
1 clipl4 
2 clipl1 
3 clip9 
4 clip20 
5 clip? 
6 clipl 
7 clip22 
8 clip8 
9 clipl9 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
clipl4 7.5000 1.06904 8 
clipl 1 7.2500 1.28174 8 
cIip9 6.7500 1.38873 8 
clip20 5.3750 1.40789 8 
clip7 4.7500 . 70711 8 
ciipl 4.3750 . 51755 8 
clip22 3.2500 . 46291 8 
clip8 3.1250 . 64087 8 
clipl9 1.2500 . 46291 8 
Measure: MEASURE 1 
Mauchly's Test of Spherldty(b) 
Within Subjects Approx. Chin 
Effect Mauchl 's W Square Df Sig. Epsilon(a) 
Greenhouse- Lower- Greenhous Lower- Greenhouse- 
Geisser Hu nh-Feidt bound e-Geisser Hu nh-Feidt bound Geisser 
rating . 000 35 . 400 . 775 . 125 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error covariance matrix of the orthonormalized transformed dependent 
variables is proportional to an identity matrix. 
a May be used to adjust the degrees of freedom for the averaged tests of significance. Corrected tests are 
displayed in the Tests of Within-Subjects Effects table. 
b Design: Intercept Within Subjects Design: rating 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Measure: MEASURE 
-1 Transformed Variable: Averaae 
Type III Sum of 
Source Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Intercept 1691.681 1 1691.681 612.945 . 
000 
Error 19.319 7 2.760 
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Measure: MEASURE 
-1 
Estimates 
rating Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Bound Bound Lower Bound U er Bound 
1 7.500 . 378 6.606 8.394 
2 7.250 . 453 6.178 8.322 
3 6.750 
. 491 5.589 7.911 
4 5.375 
. 498 4.198 6.552 
5 4.750 
. 
250 4.159 5.341 
6 4.375 . 183 3.942 4.808 
7 3.250 . 164 2.863 3.637 
8 3.125 . 227 2.589 3.661 
9 1.250 . 164 . 863 1.637 
Measure: MEASURE 
-1 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Mean 
Difference (I- 95% Confidence Interval for 
rating J rating J) Std. Error Si .a Difference a 
Upper Lower 
Lower Bound Bound Bound Upper Bound Lower Bound 
12 
. 
250 
. 313 1.000 -1.350 1.850 3 
. 
750 
. 
453 1,000 -1.564 3.064 
4 2.125 . 479 . 109 -. 324 4.574 
5 2.750(*) . 412 . 010 . 647 4.853 6 3.125(*) . 515 . 018 . 493 5.757 
7 4.250(7 . 366 . 000 2.381 6.119 8 4.375(*) . 
324 
. 000 2.721 6.029 
9 6.250(*) 
. 
313 
. 000 4.650 7.850 
21 
-. 250 . 313 1.000 -1.850 1.350 
3 
. 500 . 463 1.000 -1.864 2.864 
4 1.875 
. 549 . 403 -. 928 4.678 5 2.500(*) 
. 463 . 036 . 136 4.864 6 2.875(') 
. 549 . 043 . 072 5.678 
7 4.000(*) . 500 . 003 1.447 6.553 8 4,125(") 
. 350 . 000 2.336 5.914 
9 6.000(*) 
. 378 . 000 4.070 7.930 
31 
-. 750 . 453 1.000 -3.064 1.564 
2 
-. 500 . 463 1.000 -2.864 1.864 
4 1.375(*) . 263 . 
044 
. 032 2.718 5 2.000 
. 
500 
. 187 -. 553 4.553 6 2.375 . 498 . 
073 -. 167 4.917 7 3.500(") 
. 567 . 016 . 605 6.395 
8 3.625(*) . 532 . 009 . 
906 6.344 
9 5.500(') . 378 . 000 3.570 7.430 41 
-2.125 . 479 . 109 -4.574 . 324 
2 
-1.875 . 549 . 403 -4.678 . 
928 
3 
-1.375(*) . 263 . 044 -2.718 -. 032 
5 
. 625 . 532 1.000 -2.094 3.344 
6 1.000 
. 535 1.000 -1.730 3.730 7 2.125 
. 515 . 160 -. 507 4.757 8 2.250 
. 
526 
. 132 -. 437 4.937 9 4.125(") 
. 
441 
. 001 1.875 
6.375 
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51 -2.750(") . 412 . 010 -4.853 -. 
647 
2 -2.500(') . 463 . 036 -4.864 -. 
136 
3 -2.000 . 500 . 187 -4.553 . 
553 
4 -. 625 . 532 1.000 -3.344 
2.094 
6 
. 375 . 263 1.000 -. 
968 1.718 
7 1.500(") . 267 . 029 . 
135 2.865 
8 1.625(*) . 263 . 016 . 
282 2.968 
9 3.500(') . 267 . 
000 2.135 4.865 
61 -3.125(") . 515 . 
018 -5.757 -. 493 
2 -2.875(') . 549 . 
043 -5.678 -. 072 
3 -2.375 . 498 . 073 -4.917 . 
167 
4 -1.000 . 535 1.000 -3.730 
1.730 
5 -. 375 . 
263 1.000 -1.718 . 968 
7 1.125 . 295 . 238 -. 
382 2.632 
8 1.250 . 366 . 403 -. 
619 3.119 
9 3.125(') . 227 . 000 
1.968 4.282 
71 -4.250(') . 366 . 000 -6.119 -2.381 
2 -4.000(') . 500 . 003 -6.553 -1.447 
3 -3.500(") . 567 . 
016 -6.395 -. 605 
4 -2.125 . 515 . 160 -4.757 . 
507 
5 -1.500(') . 267 . 029 -2.865 -. 
135 
6 -1.125 . 295 . 238 -2.632 . 
382 
8 
. 125 . 227 1.000 -1.032 
1.282 
9 2.000(') . 267 . 005 . 635 
3.365 
81 -4.375(*) . 324 . 000 -6.029 -2.721 
2 
-4.125(") . 350 . 
000 -5.914 -2.336 
3 
-3.625(7 . 532 . 
009 -6.344 -. 906 
4 -2.250 . 526 . 132 -4.937 . 
437 
5 -1.625(") . 263 . 016 -2.968 -. 
282 
6 -1.250 . 366 . 403 -3.119 . 
619 
7 -. 125 . 227 1.000 -1.282 
1.032 
9 1.875(') . 295 . 014 . 
368 3.382 
91 -6.250(*) . 313 . 000 -7.850 -4.650 
2 -6.000(1 . 378 . 000 -7.930 -4.070 
3 -5.500(") . 378 . 000 -7.430 -3.570 
4 -4.125(') . 441 . 
001 -6.375 -1.875 
5 -3.500(') . 267 . 
000 -4.865 -2.135 
6 -3.125(") . 227 . 
000 -4.282 -1.968 
7 -2.000(*) . 267 . 
005 -3.365 -. 635 
8 -1.875(') . 295 . 014 -3.382 -. 
368 
Based on estimated marginal means 
* The mean difference is significant at the. 05 Ievel. a Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Bonferroni. 
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Descriptive Statistics (Study 1) 
Statistics 
gender 
N Valid 240 
Missing 0 
gender 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
slid male 187 77.9 77.9 77.9 
female 53 22.1 22.1 100.0 
Total 240 100.0 100.0 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
age 240 16.00 41.00 23.2917 4.17884 
experience 240 . 25 20.00 4.0094 3.46269 
Valid N (listwise) 240 
Correlations between subscales (Study 1) 
Correlations 
121-ultimate 
- 
P1 speed of 
ability P1 athleticism P1-disc control thought P1 attitude 
PI ultimate Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 622- . 673" . 595" . 468" 
ability Sig. (2-tailed) . 
000 
. 
000 
. 
000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P1 Pearson Correlation 
_ . 
622" 1.000 . 4437 . 
418" . 513- 
ath ieticiam Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P1 diac_ Pearson Correlation . 673 . 
443 1.000 . 555- . 304 
control Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P1 speed_ Pearson Correlation . 5957 . 418 . 5557 1.000 . 469- 
of thought Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P1_attitude Pearson Correlation . 468- . 513" . 304 . 469 
1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 
000 
. 
000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
'". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
P2 ultimate_ P2_disc_ P2_speed_ 
ability P2 athleticism control of thought P2_attitude 
P2_ultimate Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 710- . 777- . 719W . 496- 
ability 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P2 athieticis Pearson Correlation . 710" 1.000 . 499- . 579- . 
477 
m Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P2 disc con Pearson Correlation . 777- . 499- 1.000 . 652- . 430- trol Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P2 speed o Pearson Correlation . 
719 
. 579- . 652- 1.000 . 470W f thought Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
P2_attitude Pearson Correlation . 496- . 477' . 430" . 470 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 240 240 240 240 240 
". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
ANCOVA assumptions (Study 1) 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 120 
2 np 120 
sbs_eos_delay 1 EOS 60 
2 SbS (short) 60 
3 SbS (extended) 60 
4 delay 60 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Vanable: P1 UA DC SoT 
pn_np sbs_eos_delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 6.6000 . 86392 30 
SbS (short) 6.2444 . 84728 30 
SbS (extended) 6.3556 1.07900 30 
delay 6.7333 . 85948 30 
Total 6.3583 . 98273 120 
np EOS 6.4444 1.02211 30 
SbS (short) 6.4222 . 86185 30 
SbS (extended) 6.7222 1.22579 30 
delay 6.2889 
. 81993 30 
Total 6.4694 
. 
99532 120 
otal EOS 6.5222 . 94154 60 
SbS (short) 6.0833 
. 91364 60 
SbS (extended) 6.5389 1.15973 60 
delay 6.5111 
. 86241 60 
Total 6.4139 
. 
98854 240 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P1 UA DC SoT 
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F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.428 7 232 . 195 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + pn_np + sbs_eos_delay + pn_np 
sbs_eos_delay 
Dependent Variable: P1_UA_DC_SoT 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 20.998' 7 3.000 3.274 . 
002 
Intercept 9873.113 1 9873.113 10776.299 . 000 
pn_np . 741 1 . 
741 . 809 . 
369 
sbs_eos_delay 8.765 3 2.922 3.189 . 024 
pn_np ' sbs eos_delay 11.493 3 3.831 4.181 . 
207 
Error 212.556 232 . 916 
Total 10106.667 240 
Corrected Total 233.554 239 
a. R Squared = . 090 (Adjusted R Squared = . 062) 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 120 
2 np 120 
sbs_eos_delay 1 EOS 60 
2 SbS (short) 60 
3 SbS (extended) 60 
4 delay 60 
Descriptive Statistics 
Deoendent Variable: P1_athletcism 
pn_np sbs_eos_delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 6.4667 1.10589 30 
SbS (short) 5.9667 1.32570 30 
SbS (extended) 6.2667 . 98027 30 
delay 6.3667 1.29943 30 
Total 6.2667 1.18629 120 
np EOS 6.4333 1.04000 30 
SbS (short) 6.3000 1.29055 30 
SbS (extended) 6.7333 1.20153 30 
delay 6.2000 1.27035 30 
Total 6.4167 1.20631 120 
Total EOS 6.4500 1.06445 60 
SbS (short) 6.1333 1.30795 60 
SbS (extended) 6.5000 1.11233 60 
delay 6.2833 1.27680 60 
Total 6.3417 1.19620 240 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P1_athleticism 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.001 7 232 . 431 
Tests the null hypothesis mat the error variance or the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + pn_np + sbs_eos_delay + pn_np 
* sbs_eos_delay 
Dependent Variable: P1 athleticism 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 10.383' 7 1.483 1.038 . 405 
Intercept 9652.017 1 9652.017 6752.919 . 000 
pn_np 1.350 1 1.350 . 945 . 332 
sbs_eos_delay 5.017 3 1.672 1.170 . 322 
pn_np * sbs_eos delay 4.017 3 1.339 . 937 . 424 
Error 331.600 232 1.429 
Total 9994.000 240 
Corrected Total 341.983 239 
a. R Squared =. 030 (Adjusted R squared = . uui ) 
Order by iudament condition interactions (Study 1) 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 Pn 120 
2 Np 120 
sbs_eos_delay 1 EOS 60 
2 SbS (short) 60 
3 SbS (extended) 60 
4 Delay 60 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2 UA DC SoT 
pn_np sbs_eos delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.8889 1.04068 30 
SbS (short) 5.5000 1.30546 30 
SbS (extended) 4.8111 1.50779 30 
delay 5.8556 1.12809 30 
Total 5.4389 1.30572 120 
np EOS 4.9778 1.08829 30 
SbS (short) 4.9444 1.19091 30 
SbS (extended) 5.1657 1.44834 30 
delay 4.8887 1.28854 30 
Total 4.9389 1.25318 120 
Total EOS 5.4333 1.14207 60 
SbS (short) 5.1722 1.25998 80 
SbS (extended) 4.9889 1.47871 80 
delay 5.1611 1.29826 80 
Total 5.1889 1.30138 240 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent VariablerUA DC SoT 
171 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.321 7 232 . 241 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 UA_DC_SoT + pn_np + 
sbs_eos_delay + pn_np * sbs_eos_delay 
DependentVanable: P2_UA DC_SoT 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power° 
Corrected Model 75.670' 8 9.459 6.639 
. 000 . 187 53.114 
1.000 
Intercept 31.490 1 31.490 22.103 . 000 . 087 22.103 . 997 
P1_UA DC_SoT 37.492 1 37.492 26.316 . 000 . 
102 26.316 . 999 
pn_np 17.868 1 17.868 12.542 . 000 . 051 12.542 . 
941 
sbs_eos_delay 7.325 3 2.442 1.714 . 165 . 022 5.142 . 445 
pn_np" 
sbs_eos_delay 
11.189 3 3.730 2.618 . 052 . 033 7.854 . 637 
Error 329.100 231 1.425 
Total 6866.667 240 
Corrected Total 404.770 239 
a. R Squared = . 187 (Adjusted R Squared = . 159) 
ATHLETICISM 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 120 
2 np 120 
sbs_eos_delay I EOS 60 
2 SbS (short) 60 
3 SbS (extended) 60 
4 elay 80 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
pn_np sbs_eos delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 4.8333 1.35146 30 
SbS (short) 4.7000 1.74494 30 
SbS (extended) 4.3667 1.44993 30 
delay 5.0333 1.32570 30 
Total 4.6833 1.47804 120 
np EOS 4.6000 . 96847 30 
SbS (short) 4.7000 1.70498 30 
SbS (extended) 4.7667 1.47819 30 
delay 4.6667 1.37297 30 
Total 4.6833 1.39014 120 
Total EOS 4.8167 1.16578 80 
SbS (short) 4.7000 1.71039 60 
SbS (extended) 4.5667 1.46561 80 
delay 4.8500 1.35077 60 
Total 4.6833 1.43176 240 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Valances' 
Dependent Varlable: P2 athleticism 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.086 7 232 . 373 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.086 7 232 . 373 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1_athleticism + pn np + 
sbs_eos_delay + pn_np * sbs_eos_delay 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power° 
Corrected Model 29.280' 8 3.660 1.835 . 071 . 060 14.683 . 772 
Intercept 74.005 1 74.005 37.111 . 000 . 138 37.111 1.000 
P1_athleticism 22.080 1 22.080 11.072 . 001 . 046 11.072 . 
912 
pn_np . 090 1 . 090 . 045 . 832 . 000 . 045 . 055 
sbs_eos_delay 4.266 3 1.422 . 713 . 545 . 
009 2.139 . 201 
pb np * 2.752 3 . 917 . 460 . 710 . 
006 1.380 . 142 
Error 460.654 231 1.994 
Total 5754.000 240 
Corrected Total 489.933 239 
a. R Squared = . 060 (Adjusted 
R Squared = . 027) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 05 
ATTITUDE 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 120 
2 np 120 
sba eoa delay 1 EOS 80 
2 SBS 80 
3 delay 80 
4 sbs(short) 80 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_attitude 
pn_np sbs_eos delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.8667 1.40770 30 
SBS 4.8667 1.45586 30 
delay 5.7667 1.52414 30 
sba(short) 5.7333 1.48401 30 
Total 5.5583 1.50515 120 
np EOS 5.6667 1.24106 30 
SBS 5.5333 1.73669 30 
delay 5.9667 1.62912 30 
sbs(short) 5.8000 1.54026 30 
Total 5.7417 1.53664 120 
Total EOS 5.7667 1.31956 60 
SBS 5.2000 1.62397 60 
delay 5.8667 1.56732 60 
sbs(short) 5.7667 1.49991 60 
Total 5.6500 1.52057 240 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_attitude 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.090 7 232 . 370 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 attitude + pn np + 
sbs_eos_delay + pn_np * sbs_eos_delay 
Dependent Variable: P2 attitude 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power' 
Corrected Model 106.385' 8 13.298 6.884 . 000 . 193 55.074 1.000 
Intercept 51.179 1 51.179 26.495 . 000 . 103 26.495 . 999 
P1 attitude 81.852 1 81.852 42.374 . 
000 
. 
155 42.374 1.000 
pn_np . 
601 1 
. 601 . 311 . 577 . 001 . 311 . 086 
sbs_eos_delay 13.613 3 4.538 2.349 . 073 . 030 7.048 . 585 
pn_np' 10.368 3 3.456 1.789 
. 
150 
. 
023 5.367 . 463 
Error 446.215 231 1.932 
Total 8214.000 240 
Corrected Total 552.600 239 
a. R Squared = . 193 (Adjusted R Squared = . 165) 
b. Computed using alpha =. 05 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Post-hoc tests (Study 1) 
Group Statistics 
Std. Std. Error 
sba eos_delay pn_np N Mean Deviation Mean 
EOS Player2_adjustedscore pn 30 -. 7111 1.31229 . 23959 
np 30 -1.4667 1.17313 . 21418 
SbS (short) Player2_adjustedscore pn 30 -. 3444 1.29982 . 23731 
np 30 -1.4778 1.14699 . 
20941 
SbS (extended) Player2_adjustedscore pn 30 -1.5444 1.41281 . 25794 
np 30 -1.5556 1.43394 . 
26180 
delay Player2_adjustedscore pn 30 -1.0000 1.31306 . 23973 
np 30 -1.6889 1.33888 . 24444 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig (2- Mean Error Std Difference 
sbs_eos delay F Sig. t df . tailed) Difference . Difference Lower Upper 
EOS Player2_ Equal variances 
adjusted assumed 
1.557 . 217 2.351 58 . 022 . 75556 . 32137 . 11227 1.39885 
score Equal variances 
not assumed 2.351 57.28 . 022 . 75556 . 32137 . 
11210 1.39902 
SbS Player2_ Equal variances 1.778 188 3 581 58 001 1 13333 31650 49980 1 76687 (short) adjusted assumed . . . . . . 
score Equal variances 
not assumed 3.581 57.11 . 001 1.13333 . 31650 . 49959 1.76708 
SbS Player2_ Equal variances 
. 004 . 952 . 030 58 976 01111 36752 7245 - 74679 (exten adjusted assumed . . . . . 
ded) score Equal variances 
not assumed 
030 57.98 . 976 . 01111 . 36752 -. 7245 . 74680 
delay Player2_ Equal variances 
adjusted assumed . 537 . 467 2.012 58 . 047 . 68889 . 
34238 
. 00354 1.37424 
score Equal variances 
not assumed 
2.012 57.97 . 047 . 68889 . 34238 . 00353 1.37424 
Average Means after each piece of evidence in the SbS (extended condition) 
Descriptive Statistics 
pn_np N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
pn 1? 2_Q1 30 3.33 8.33 5.6222 1.27377 
P2_02 30 2.00 8.33 5.6000 1.58634 
P2_Q3 30 3.00 8.00 5.8889 1.52208 
P2_Q4 30 2.67 8.33 8.1111 1.64779 
P2_05 30 1.00 8.33 5.3889 1.69082 
P2_Q6 30 1.00 7.33 4.8333 1.62299 
P2_Q7 30 1.00 7.33 4.3556 1.81455 
P2_Q8 30 1.33 7.33 4.8111 1.50779 
Valid N (listwise) 30 
np P2_QI 30 2.67 7.00 3.7889 . 96563 
P2_Q2 30 1.00 5.33 2.9111 1.16768 
P2_Q3 30 1.67 5.33 3.7556 . 95466 
P2_Q4 30 2.00 6.33 3.8000 . 97713 
P2_Q5 30 2.33 7.00 4.6000 1.27877 
P2_Q6 30 3.33 7.33 5.3222 1.30276 
P2_Q7 30 3.00 8.00 5.2111 1.45028 
P2_Q8 30 2.67 8.67 5.1667 1.44834 
Valid N (listwise) 30 
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Study 2 Assessment Instruments and SPSS Outputs 
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Appendix 3.1 
End of Sequence assessment instrument (with personality questionnaires) 
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Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
Introduction and Rationale 
In the current study we are interested in how people make judgements about the 
abilities of the individuals they observe when playing and coaching. In this 
experiment we will be asking you to observe an ultimate frisbee player perform a 
series of the same skill, which involves the player cutting towards the disc, making 
a catch, pivoting, and making a forehand pass to a team-mate on the run. You will 
then be asked to rate his performance and ability. There is no right or wrong 
answer, just your own impression that is important. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Name: 
Age: 
Ethnic Origin: 
Ultimate playing experience: (years) 
(EOS - PN - Al) 
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University of Chichester 
CONSENT FORM 
I ........................................................ (PRINT NAME) hereby give my consent to participate in the following test/activity [investigating 
impressions of ability in sport]. 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
" the purpose of the test/activity has been explained to me; 
"I am satisfied that I understand the procedures involved; 
" the possible benefits and risks of the test/activity have been explained to 
me; 
" any questions which I have asked about the test/activity have been 
answered to my satisfaction; 
"I understand that, during the course of the test/activity, I have the right to 
ask further questions about it; 
" the information which I have supplied to University of Chichester prior to 
taking part in the test/activity is true and accurate to the best of my 
knowledge and belief and I understand that I must notify promptly of any 
changes to the information; 
"I understand that my personal information will not be released to any third 
parties without my permission; 
"I understand that my participation in the test/activity is voluntary and I am 
therefore at liberty to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that, if there is any concern about the appropriateness of my 
continuing in the test/activity, I may be asked to withdraw my involvement 
at any stage; 
"I understand that once the test/activity has been completed, the 
information gained as a result of it will be used for the following purposes 
only: [To explore the way people make impressions of the sporting 
ability of others]. 
SIGNATURE OF THE SUBJECT ....................................... 
DATE ................................................ 
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Evaluation of Player 1 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the 
following four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor 
123456 
Disc control 
Poor 
12 3 45 
Speed of Thought 
Poor 
123 
Athleticism 
Poor 
12 
45 
6 
6 
3456 
7 
7 
7 
89 
89 
89 
789 
Excellent 
10 
Excellent 
10 
Excellent 
10 
Excellent 
10 
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Evaluation of Player 2 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the 
following four criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Athleticism 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
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On a scale of 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic), please circle the 
number that closest matches your own beliefs. 
1) I would prefer complex to simple problems. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
2) I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
3) Thinking is not my idea of fun. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
4) I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
5) I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think i 
depth about something. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
6) I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
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7) I only think as hard as I have to. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
8) I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
9) I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
10) The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
11) I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
12) Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
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13) I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
14) The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
15) I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
16) I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
17) It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
18) I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
Extremely Uncertain Extremely 
Uncharacteristic Characteristic 
12345 
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On a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), please circle the number that 
closest matches your own beliefs. 
1) Everyone has a certain amount of sporting/ultimate ability, and one can't do 
much to change this amount. 
Strongly 
disagree 
123 
Strongly 
agree 
456 
2) One's sporting/ultimate ability is something about oneself that one can't change 
much. 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
123456 
3) People can learn new things in sport/ultimate, but they can't change their basic 
sporting/ultimate ability. 
Strongly Strongly 
disagree agree 
123456 
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Appendix 3.2 
SPSS Outputs (Study 2) 
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Descriptive Statistics (Study 2) 
Statistics 
gender 
N Valid 160 
Missing 0 
gender 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
Valid male 97 60.6 60.6 60.6 
female 63 39.4 39.4 100.0 
Total 160 100.0 100.0 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
age 
Valid N (listwise) 
160 
160 
16.00 37.00 22.7625 3.78093 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Entity_overall 
Valid N (Iistvrise) 
160 
160 
1.00 6.00 2.9895 1.06830 
NEED FOR COGNITIONIMOTIVATION TO THINK 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
NFC total 
Valid N (listwise) 
160 
160 
45.00 82.00 65.6500 8.16435 
Group Statistics 
high_low_NFC N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
NFC total highNFC >66 
low NFC <65 
79 
81 
72.3165 
59.1481 
4.72729 
4.89926 
. 53186 
. 
54436 
187 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Std Interval of the 
(2- Mean . Error 
Difference 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
NFC_ Equal variances 
. 283 . 596 17.295 158 000 . 
1683 13 76140 11 6644 14 67214 
assumed total . 1 . . 
Equal variances 17.303 157.98 . 000 
13.1683 76106 11 6651 14 67147 not assumed 1 . . . 
EXPERIENCE 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
experience 
Valid N (Iistwise) 
160 
160 
. 25 20.00 3.5297 2.95343 
Group Statistics 
Experience_ 
high_low N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
experience 2.9_or below 80 1.6656 . 65234 . 07293 
3.0 or above 80 5.3938 3.17695 . 35519 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Interval of the 
(2- Mean Std. Error Difference 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
experience Equal variances 55 833 000 -10.282 158 000 72812 -3 36260 -4 44430 01195 -3 assumed . . . . . . . 
Equal variances 
not assumed -10.282 
1, 
8.650 . 000 
1 1 
-3.72812 . 36260 -4.44900 -3.00725 
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Correlations between subscales (Study 2) 
Correlations 
P1_ultimate_ P1_disc P1 speed of 
ability control thought P1-athleticism 
P1_ultimate_ Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 794' . 730- . 617 ability Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 . 
000 
N 160 160 160 160 
P1 disc control Pearson Correlation . 794 1.000 . 666- . 547 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 . 000 
N 160 160 159 159 
P1_speed_of Pearson Correlation 
. 730" . 666- 1.000 . 428= thought Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 
000 
N 160 160 160 160 
P1 athleticism Pearson Correlation . 617- . 547 . 428- 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 160 160 160 160 
--. t. orreiation is signmcant at the u. ui ievei (z-tanea). 
Correlations 
P2_ultimate_ P2-disc P2_speed_of 
ability control thought P2 athleticism 
P2_ultimate_ Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 808 . 752" . 676- 
ab ility Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 
000 " . 
000 
N 160 160 160 160 
P2_disc_control Pearson Correlation . 8087 1.000 . 
704- 
. 497- 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 
000 
N 160 160 160 160 
P2_speed_oi Pearson Correlation . 752- . 
704- 1.000 . 556 thought Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 160 160 160 160 
P2_athleticism Pearson Correlation . 
676- 
. 497" . 556 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 . 000 
N 160 160 160 160 
°. uorreianon is signmcant at the u. ui level (1-tanea). 
Reliability statistics (learning theory) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
. 814 3 
Item Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
ENTITY1 3.0886 1.25368 158 
ENTITY2 2.5759 1.15264 158 
ENTITY3 3.2911 1.34640 158 
Item-Total Statistics 
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Corrected Item- Cronbach's 
Scale Mean if Scale Variance Total Alpha if Item 
Item Deleted if Item Deleted Correlation Deleted 
ENTITY1 5.8671 4.906 . 690 . 719 ENTITY2 6.3797 5.384 . 
673 
. 743 
ENTITY3 5.6646 4.734 . 642 . 775 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
8.9557 10.310 3.21094 3 
ANCOVA assumptions (learning theory) 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs_eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
entity_incre 1.00 incremental 40 
2.00 entity 40 
SBS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
entity_lncre 1.00 incremental 40 
2.00 entity 40 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT Dlaverl 
sbs eos on n ent incre Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn incremental 6.5833 . 89145 24 
entity 6.7917 . 83333 16 
Total 6.6667 . 86397 40 
np incremental 6.8333 1.12875 16 
entity 6.4722 
. 91639 
24 
Total 6.6167 1.00865 40 
Total incremental 6.6833 . 98695 40 
entity 6.6000 . 88739 40 
Total 6.6417 . 93348 80 
SBS pn incremental 6.6970 
. 72673 
22 
entity 6.0741 1.20215 18 
Total 6.4167 1.00639 40 
np incremental 6.6078 1.38060 18 
entity 6.3939 1.27506 22 
Total 6.4872 1.30864 40 
Total incremental 6.6581 1.04710 40 
entity 6.2500 1.23747 40 
Total 6.4515 1.15844 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Varlances(a) 
De ndent Variable: UA DC Sol la erl 
sbs eoa F dfl df2 S;. 
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EOS 
. 
551 3 76 
. 
649 
SBS 2.730 3 75 . 170 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a Design: Intercept+pn_np+entity_incre+pn np * entity_incre 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
flwnandant Variable: LIA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powers 
EOS Corrected Model 1.719(b) 3 . 573 . 649 . 586 . 025 1.946 . 
180 
Intercept 3416.890 1 3416.89 3868.92 . 000 . 981 3868.924 
1.000 
pn np . 023 1 . 023 . 026 . 872 . 000 . 
026 . 053 
entity_incre . 112 1 . 112 . 127 . 723 . 
002 
. 
127 . 064 
pn_np * entity_incre 1.556 1 1.556 1.762 . 188 . 023 
1.762 . 259 
Error 67.120 76 . 883 
Total 3597.778 80 
Corrected Total 68.839 79 
SBS Corrected Model 4.378(c) 3 1.459 1.091 . 358 . 042 
3.274 . 284 
Intercept 3235.640 1 3235.64 2419.54 . 000 . 
970 2419.545 1.000 
pr np . 259 1 . 259 . 194 . 661 . 
003 . 194 . 072 
entity_incre 3.411 1 3.411 2.551 . 114 . 
033 2.551 . 351 
pn_np * entity_incre . 815 
1 
. 
815 
. 609 . 438 . 
008 . 609 . 120 
Error 100.297 75 1.337 
Total 3392.778 79 
Corrected Total 104.675 78 
Computed using alpha = . 05 
R Squared = . 025 (Adjusted R Squared = -. 
014) 
R Squared = . 042 (Adjusted 
R Squared = . 
003) 
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Order/learnin2 theory interactions (EoS and SbS). 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs_eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1 pn 32 
2 np 35 
Dweck_entity 1 < 31ncremental 48 
2 >4_entity 19 
SBS pn_np 1 pn 33 
2 np 30 
Dweck entity 1 < 3incremental 43 
2 1>4 entity 20 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: UA_DC_SoT_P2_average 
sbs_ 
eos pn_np Dweck_entity Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn < 3incremental 5.6933 1.07978 25 
>4_entity 6.2381 . 80999 7 
Total 5.8125 1.04019 32 
np <3incremental 4.9565 . 97600 23 
>4_entity 5.1392 1.08687 12 
Total 5.0191 1.00314 35 
Total <31ncremental 5.3403 1.08610 48 
>4 entity 5.5440 1.11230 19 
Total 5.3981 1.08904 67 
SBS pn < 3incremental 4.9394 1.25835 22 
>4_entity 4.6361 1.62251 11 
Total 4.8383 1.37219 33 
np <_3incremental 4.9208 1.28191 21 
>4 entity 5.1815 2.06902 9 
Total 5.0890 1.54355 30 
Total < 3incremental 4.9303 1.25473 43 
>4_entity 5.0165 1.83690 20 
Total 4.9577 1.44988 63, 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: UA_DC_SoT P2_average 
sbs_eos F dfl df2 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
1.470 
. 186 
3 
3 
63 
59 
. 231 
. 905 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + UA DC SoT. playerl + pn_np + 
Dweck_entity + pn_np' Dweck_entity 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT P2 average 
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sbs eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
EOS Corrected Model 19.273' 4 4.818 5.063 . 001 . 246 20.252 . 
952 
Intercept 12.725 1 12.725 13.371 . 001 . 177 13.371 . 949 
UA_DC_SoT_playerl 6.866 1 6.866 7.214 
. 
009 
. 104 7.214 . 
753 
pn_np 10.155 1 10.155 10.671 . 002 . 147 10.671 . 895 
Dweck_entity 1.200 1 1.200 1.261 
. 
266 
. 020 1.261 . 
198 
pn np * Dweck_entity . 
164 1 . 164 . 172 . 680 . 003 . 172 . 069 
Error 59.004 62 . 952 
Total 2030.593 67 
Corrected Total 78.277 66 
SBS Corrected Model 36.480c 4 9.120 5.636 . 001 . 280 22.544 . 970 
Intercept 1.896 1 1.896 1.172 . 284 . 020 1.172 . 187 
UA DC_SoT playerl 32.837 1 32.837 20.292 . 000 . 259 20.292 . 993 
pn_np . 842 1 . 842 . 521 . 473 . 009 . 521 . 109 
Dweck_entity 1.863 1 1.863 1.151 . 288 . 019 1.151 . 184 
pn_np * Dweck_entity . 362 1 . 362 . 224 . 638 . 004 . 224 . 075 
Error 93.854 58 1.618 
Total 1678.780 63 
Corrected Total 130.334 62 
a. R Squared = . 246 (Adjusted R Squared = . 196) 
b. Computed using alpha =. 05 
c. R Squared =. 280 (Adjusted R Squared = . 230) 
ATHLETICISM 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1 pn 32 
2 np 35 
Dweck_entity 1 < 3incremental 48 
2 >4 entity 19 
SBS pn_np 1 pn 33 
2 np 30 
Dweck_entity 1 < 31ncremental 43 
2 >4 entity 20 
193 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
sbs eos pn_np Dweck_entity Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn <_3incremental 4.6000 1.32288 25 
>4 entity 5.1429 . 89974 7 
Total 4.7188 1.25040 32 
np <3incremental 4.6522 . 93462 23 
>4_entity 4.8333 1.11464 12 
Total 4.7143 . 98731 35 
Total <_3incremental 4.6250 1.14157 48 
>4_entity 4.9474 1.02598 19 
Total 4.7164 1.11200 67 
SBS pn <_3incremental 4.5000 1.26303 22 
>4_entity 4.4545 1.50756 11 
Total 4.4848 1.32574 33 
np <_3incremental 4.7619 1.33809 21 
>4_entity 5.5556 1.23603 9 
Total 5.0000 1.33907 30 
Total < 3incremental 4.6279 1.29142 43 
>4_entity 4.9500 1.46808 20 
Total 4.7302 1.34652 63 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Valances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
sbs_eos F dfl df2 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
1.339 
. 611 
3 
3 
63 
59 
. 
270 
. 611 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1_athleticism + pn_np + Oweck entity + 
pn_np * Dweck_entity 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent 
Vanable: P2 athleticism 
sbs_ 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramet 
er 
Observed 
Power° 
EOS Corrected 
Model 3.661' 4 . 915 . 728 . 576 . 045 2.912 . 222 
Intercept 25.729 1 25.729 20.464 . 000 . 248 20.464 . 994 
P1 athleticism 1.790 1 1.790 1.424 . 237 . 022 1.424 . 
217 
pn_np . 
297 1 
. 297 . 237 . 628 . 004 . 237 . 077 
Dweck_entity 1.710 1 1.710 1.360 
. 
248 
. 
021 1.360 . 209 
pn_np " 
Dweck entity . 327 1 . 327 . 260 . 612 . 004 . 260 . 079 
Error 77.951 62 1.257 
Total 1572.000 67 
Corrected 81 612 66 Total . 
SBS Corrected 17.902° 4 4.475 2 746 037 159 10 986 722 Model . . . . . 
Intercept 10.166 1 10.166 6.239 . 015 . 097 6.239 . 690 
P1 athleticism 9.748 1 9.748 5.982 . 018 . 
093 5.982 . 
672 
pn_np 4.121 1 4.121 2.529 . 117 . 042 2.529 . 346 
Dweck_entity 3.250 1 3.250 1.995 
. 
163 
. 
033 1.995 
. 
284 
pn_np 1.552 1 1.552 
. 
952 
. 333 016 952 160 Dweck entity . . . 
Error 94.511 58 1.630 
Total 1522.000 63 
Corrected 112.413 62 Total 
a. R Squared = . 045 (Adjusted R Squared = -. 017) 
b. Computed using alpha =. 05 
c. R Squared = . 
159 (Adjusted R 
Squared = . 101) 
Reliability statistics (motivation to think) 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's 
Alpha N of Items 
. 790 18 
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Item Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
NC1 3.5220 1.01779 160 
NC2 3.8805 . 81415 160 
NC3 4.0000 . 89301 160 
NC4 3.9874 . 85675 160 
NC5 3.9937 . 83056 160 
NC6 3.1824 1.12427 160 
NC7 3.0252 1.06705 160 
NC8 3.1887 1.05644 160 
NC9 3.1321 1.09147 160 
NC10 3.7925 . 94852 160 
NC11 4.1824 . 71028 160 
NC12 4.0377 . 85600 160 
NC 13 3.4717 1.00512 160 
NC 14 3.7736 1.01211 160 
NC15 3.7044 . 93831 160 
NC 16 3.5220 1.10715 160 
NC 17 3.6478 1.07996 160 
NC18 3.6101 . 98670 160 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale Variance 
If Item Deleted 
Corrected Item- 
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha If Item 
Deleted 
NCI 62.1321 61.660 . 274 . 787 
NC2 61.7736 62.695 . 288 . 785 
NC3 61.6541 59.785 . 470 . 774 
NC4 61.6667 60.021 . 476 . 774 
NC5 61.6604 61.074 . 409 . 778 
NC6 62.4717 59.694 . 
352 
. 782 
NC7 62.6289 61.172 . 286 . 786 
NC8 82.4654 62.947 . 180 . 794 
NC9 62.5220 60.125 . 
340 
. 
782 
NC 10 61.8616 60.285 
. 400 . 
778 
NC 11 61.4717 61.656 
. 441 . 
777 
NC 12 61.6164 59.959 
. 
482 
. 
773 
NC 13 62.1824 57.239 . 
580 
. 
765 
NC 14 61.8805 59.334 
. 
431 . 776 
NC 15 61.9497 59.959 . 429 . 
776 
NC 16 62.1321 58.634 
. 426 . 776 
NC 17 62.0063 60.184 . 342 . 782 
NC 18 62.0440 63.840 . 143 . 795 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
65.6541 67.076 8.18998 18 
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ANCOVA assumptions (motivation to think) 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
high_low_NFC 1.00 highNFC >66 40 
2.00 low NFC <65 40 
SBS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
high low NFC 1.00 highNFC >66 39 
2.00 low NFC <65 41 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs eos nn high low NFC Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn highNFC >66 6.5490 
. 83284 17 
low NFC <65 6.7536 
. 89453 23 
Total 6.6667 
. 86397 40 
np highNFC >66 6.4203 . 94397 23 
low NFC <65 6.8824 1.06027 17 
Total 6.6167 1.00865 40 
Total hlghNFC >66 6.4750 
. 88960 40 
low NFC <65 6.8083 
. 95746 40 
Total 6.6417 
. 
93348 80 
SBS pn highNFC >66 6.1884 1.01914 23 
low NFC <65 6.7255 
. 92972 17 
Total 6.4167 1.00639 40 
np highNFC >66 6.6458 1.37958 16 
low NFC <65 6.3611 1.25076 24 
Total 6.4750 1.29405 40 
Total highNFC >66 6.3761 1.18514 39 
low NFC <65 6.5122 1.13063 41 
Total 6.4458 1.15219 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances(a) 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs eos F dfl df2 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
. 255 
1.466 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 858 
. 231 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a Design: Intercept+pn_np+high_lovv_NFC+pn_np * high low_NFC 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
nnnnndant Variahle" 11A DC SeT nlaverl 
sbs_ 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
S uared 
Noncent. 
Para 
meter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
EOS Corrected Model 2.546(b) 3 . 849 . 973 . 410 . 
037 2.919 . 256 
Intercept 3459.574 1 3459.6 3966.16 . 000 . 
981 3966.16 1.000 
pn_np . 000 1 . 000 . 000 1.000 . 000 . 
000 . 050 
high_Iow_NFC 2.172 1 2.172 2.490 . 119 . 032 
2.490 . 344 
pn_np * high_low_NFC . 324 1 . 324 . 371 . 544 . 005 . 
371 . 092 
Error 66.293 76 . 872 
Total 3597.778 80 
Corrected Total 68.839 79 
SBS Corrected Model 3.666(c) 3 1.222 . 918 . 437 . 
035 2.753 . 243 
Intercept 3254.202 1 3254.2 2443.61 . 000 . 970 
2443.61 1.000 
pn_np . 042 1 . 042 . 031 . 860 . 000 . 
031 . 054 
high_low_NFC 
. 308 1 . 308 . 232 . 632 . 003 . 
232 . 076 
pn_np * high_low_NFC 3.271 1 3.271 2.456 . 121 . 
031 2.456 . 340 
Error 101.210 76 1.332 
Total 3428.778 80 
Corrected Total 104.876 79 
a Computed using alpha =. 05 
bR Squared =. 037 (Adjusted R Squared = -. 001) 
cR Squared = . 035 (Adjusted 
R Squared = -. 003) 
Order/motivation to think interactions (EoS and SbS) 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
high_Iow NFC 1.00 highNFC >66 40 
2.00 low NFC <65 40 
SBS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 np 40 
high_low NFC 1.00 highNFC >66 39 
2.00 low NFC <65 41 
Lsvsns's Test of Equality of Error Vartancas(a) 
nenwndent Variable- UA DC SoT P2 averaae 
sbs eos F dfl df2 SIG. 
EOS 
SBS 
E 
. 632 
, 504 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 597 
. 681 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a Design: Intercept+UA DC SoT_playerl+pn_np+hlgh low_NFC+pn_np " high_low NFC 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT P2 averaae 
sbs eos pn-np high low NFC Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn highNFC >66 6.0196 1.05719 17 
low NFC <65 5.5217 . 97352 23 
Total 5.7333 1.02726 40 
np highNFC >66 4.7826 . 96195 23 
low NFC <65 5.3531 . 98234 17 
Total 5.0251 . 99973 40 
Total highNFC >66 5.3083 1.16792 40 
low NFC <65 5.4501 . 96832 40 
Total 5.3792 1.06834 80 
sas pn highNFC >66 4.7972 1.40251 23 
low NFC <65 4.8625 1.14306 17 
Total 4.8250 1.28324 40 
np highNFC >66 4.2708 . 87955 16 
low NFC <65 5.4725 1.31104 24 
Total 4.9918 1.29099 40 
Total highNFC >66 4.5813 1.23003 39 
low NFC <65 5.2196 1.26630 41 
Total 4.9084 1.28170 80 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
nanandent Variable- UA DC SoT P2 averaae 
sbs 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
S uare F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
S uared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
EOS Corrected Model 21.620(b) 4 5.405 5.914 . 000 . 
240 23.655 . 979 
Intercept 17.209 1 17.209 18.829 . 000 . 
201 18.829 . 990 
UA DC_SoT_playerl 5.982 1 5.982 8.546 . 013 . 
080 6.546 . 714 
pn_np 9.656 1 9.656 10.565 . 
002 . 123 10.565 . 894 
high_low_NFC 
. 
077 1 . 077 . 084 . 772 . 001 . 084 . 059 
pn_np * high_low_NFC 4.777 1 4.777 5.227 . 025 . 065 5.227 . 617 
Error 68.548 75 . 914 
Total 2405.038 80 
Corrected Total 90.167 79 
SBS Corrected Model 33.508(c) 4 8.377 6.526 . 
000 
. 
258 26.105 . 988 
Intercept 9.723 1 9.723 7.575 . 007 . 
092 7.575 . 775 
UA DC_SoTpIayerl 19.048 1 19.048 14.839 . 000 . 
165 14.839 . 967 
pn_np 
. 009 1 . 
009 . 007 . 933 . 
000 . 007 . 051 
high_Iow_NFC 6.469 1 6.469 5.040 . 028 . 063 
5.040 . 601 
pn_np * high_low_NFC 10.456 1 10.456 8.146 . 006 . 098 8.146 . 
804 
Error 96.270 75 1.284 
Total 2057.182 80 
Corrected Total 129.778 79 
a Computed using alpha =. 05 
bR Squared -. 240 (Adjusted R Squared =. 199) 
cR Squared   . 258 (Adjusted 
R Squared = . 219 
ATHLETICISM 
Between-Subjects Factors 
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sbs_eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
high low_NFC 1 highNFC >66 40 
2 low NFC <65 40 
SBS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
high_Iow_NFC I highNFC >66 40 
2 low NFC <65 40 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
sbs_eos pn_np high_Iow NFC Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn highNFC >66 4.5294 1.37467 17 
low NFC <65 4.7391 1.35571 23 
Total 4.6500 1.35021 40 
np highNFC >66 4.4783 . 99405 23 
low NFC <65 5.0588 . 96635 17 
Total 4.7250 1.01242 40 
Total highNFC >66 4.5000 1.15470 40 
low NFC <65 4.8750 1.20229 40 
Total 4.6875 1.18635 80 
SBS pn highNFC >66 4.3043 1.42812 23 
low NFC <65 4.5294 1.06757 17 
Total 4.4000 1.27702 40 
np highNFC >66 4.2500 1.00000 16 
low NFC <65 4.9565 1.49174 24 
Total 4.6667 1.34425 40 
Total highNFC >66 4.2821 1.25549 40 
low NFC <65 4.7750 1.32988 40 
Total 4.5316 1.30909 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Valances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_athleticism 
sbs_eos F dfl d12 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
1.896 
. 961 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 137 
. 416 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 athleticism + pn_np + high_low_NFC + 
pn_np * hlgh_low_NFC 
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Dependent 
Variable: P2 athleticism 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
sbs_ 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observe 
d Powert 
EOS Corrected 5.423' 4 1.356 . 961 434 049 845 3 291 Model . . . . 
Intercept 30.439 1 30.439 21.585 . 000 . 
223 21.585 . 
996 
P11-athleticism 1.586 1 1.586 1.125 . 292 . 015 1.125 . 182 
pn_np . 279 1 . 279 . 198 . 658 . 003 . 
198 . 072 
high_low NFC 2.550 1 2.550 1.808 . 183 . 024 1.808 . 264 
pn_np " 
high_low_NFC . 770 1 . 770 . 546 . 462 . 007 . 546 . 113 
Error 105.765 75 1.410 
Total 1869.000 80 
Corrected 111187 79 
Total 
SBS Corrected 21886° 4 5.472 3.622 009 164 14 489 855 Model . . . . 
Intercept 6.659 1 6.659 4.408 . 039 . 056 4.408 . 545 
P1 athleticism 15.277 1 15.277 10.113 . 002 . 120 10.113 . 881 
pn_np . 105 1 . 105 . 069 . 793 . 001 . 
069 
. 
058 
high_low NFC 2.965 1 2.965 1.963 . 165 . 026 1.963 . 282 
pn_np * 2 878 1 2.878 1.905 172 025 905 1 276 
high low_NFC . . . . . 
Error 111.784 75 1.511 
Total 1756.000 80 
Corrected 133 671 79 
Total . 
a. R Squared = . 049 (Adjusted R Squared 
= -. 002) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 
05 
c. R Squared = . 164 (Adjusted R Squared 
=. 119) 
Post-hoc tests (motivation to think). 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Group Statistics 
sbs_ 
eos high_Iow NFC pn_np N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
EOS highNFC >66 P2adjustedchange Pn 17 -. 5294 1.32318 . 32092 
Np 23 -1.6377 1.00460 . 
20947 
low NFC <65 P2adjustedchange Pn 23 -1.2319 1.15223 . 
24026 
Np 17 -1.5292 1.16109 . 28160 
SBS highNFC >66 P2adjustedchange Pn 23 -1.4781 1.35539 . 28262 
Np 17 -1.9792 1.54665 . 38666 
low NFC <65 P2adjustedchange Pn 17 -1.8629 1.04764 . 25409 
Np 23 -1.1303 1.08564 . 22637 
201 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
b 
Sig. 
(2- 
Std. Difference 
s s_ Mean Error 
eos high_low_NFC F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
EOS high P2adjusted Equal variances 3 697 062 014 3 38 005 1.10827 . 36768 . 36394 1.85260 NFC change assumed . . . . 
Equal variances 2 892 28.74 007 1.10827 . 38323 . 32416 1.89238 not assumed . . 
low P2adjusted Equal variances 
. 255 . 616 804 38 . 426 . 29733 . 36973 -. 45115 
1.04581 
NFC change assumed . 
Equal variances 803 34 48 427 . 29733 . 37017 -. 
45455 1.04922 
not assumed . . . 
SBS high P2adjusted Equal variances 
, 092 . 763 072 1 38 . 291 . 50105 . 46748 -. 
44615 1.44826 
NFC change assumed . 
Equal variances 1 046 29 55 304 . 50105 . 47894 -. 47769 1.47979 not assumed . . . 
low P2adjusted Equal variances 
. 262 612 -2 14 38 . 039 -. 73265 . 34217 -1.4253 -. 
03996 
NFC change assumed . 
Equal variances 
-2 15 35 30 038 -. 73265 . 
34030 -1.4233 -. 04201 not assumed . . . 
ANCOVA assumptions (level of experience) 
RRtwoonSublecta Factors 
sbs eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1.00 Pn 40 
2.00 Np 40 
Ex_high low 1.00 2.9_or below 39 
2.00 3.0 or above 41 
SIBS pn_np 1.00 pn 40 
2.00 Np 40 
EX_high_Iow 1.00 2.9_or_beiow 41 
2.00 3.0 or above 39 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs eos pn-np Ex high low Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn 2.9-or below 6.7667 . 97992 20 
3.0-or above 6.5667 
. 74221 20 
Total 6.6667 
. 86397 40 
np 2.9-or below 6.7368 . 75014 19 
3.0_or above 6.5079 1.20471 21 
Total 6.6167 1.00865 40 
Total 2.9-or below 6.7521 . 86423 39 
3.0 or above 6.5366 . 99409 41 
Total 6.6417 . 93348 80 
SBS pn 2.9-or below 6.7500 . 74829 20 
3.0-or above 6.0833 1.13362 20 
Total 6.4167 1.00639 40 
np 2.9 or below 6.9841 1.27138 21 
3.0_or above 5.9123 1.09343 19 
Total 6.4750 1.29405 40 
Total 2.9-or below 6.8699 1.04317 41 
3.0_or above 6.0000 1.10289 39 
Total 6.4458 1.15219 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances(a) 
Deoendent Variable: UA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs eos F df1 df2 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
3.015 
2.273 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 115 
. 087 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable Is equal across groups. 
a Design: Intercept+pn_np+Ex_high_low+pn_np * Ex_high_low 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT olaverl 
sbs_ 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
EOS Corrected Model 
. 973(b) 3 . 324 . 363 . 780 . 014 1.089 . 118 
Intercept 3527.560 1 3527.56 3950.33 . 000 . 981 3950.338 1.000 
pn_np 
. 
039 1 . 039 . 044 . 835 . 001 . 044 . 
055 
Ex_high low 
. 919 1 . 
919 1.029 
. 
314 
. 
013 1.029 
. 
170 
pn_np * 
. 004 1 004 005 946 000 . 005 . 051 Ex_high_low . . . . 
Error 67.866 76 . 893 
Total 3597.778 80 
Corrected Total 68.839 79 
SBS Corrected Model 15.972(c) 3 5.324 4.551 . 005 . 
152 13.654 
. 
870 
Intercept 3305.955 1 3305.95 2826.11 . 
000 
. 
974 2826.109 1.000 
pn_np . 020 1 . 020 . 017 . 897 . 000 . 017 . 052 
Ex-high-low 15.093 1 15.093 12.903 . 001 . 145 12.903 . 944 
pn_np " 
. 820 1 820 701 405 009 701 . 131 Ex_high low . . . . . 
Error 88.904 76 1.170 
Total 3428.778 80 
Corrected Total 104.876 79 
Computed using alpha = . 05 
R Squared = . 014 (Adjusted R Squared = -. 025) R Squared = . 152 (Adjusted R Squared = . 
119) 
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Order/experience interaction (EoS and SbS). 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs_eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
Ex_high_low 1 2.9 or below 39 
2 3.0-or above 41 
SBS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
Ex_high_low 1 2.9_or below 41 
2 3.0-or above 39 
Descriptive Statistics 
Danendent Variable: UA DC SoT P2 averaoe 
sbs eos pn np Experience high low Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn 2.9_or below 5.8833 . 
98096 20 
3.0_or above 5.5833 1.07538 20 
Total 5.7333 1.02726 40 
np 2.9-or below 5.0353 . 78500 19 
3.0-or above 5.0159 1.18075 21 
Total 5.0251 . 99973 40 
Total 2.9_or below 5.4702 . 97849 39 
3.0_or above 5.2927 1.15276 41 
Total 5.3792 1.06834 80 
SBS pn 2.9_or below 4.7998 1.03401 20 
3.0_or above 4.8502 1.51973 20 
Total 4.8250 1.28324 40 
np 2.9_or below 5.6825 1.27574 21 
3.0_or above 4.1933 1.04453 19 
Total 4.9752 1.38037 40 
Total 2.9-or below 5.2520 1.23335 41 
3.0_or above 4.5302 1.33500 39 
Total 4.9001 1.32638 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances(a) 
Dependent Variable: UA DC SoT P2 averaae 
sbs eos F dfl df2 Sig. 
EOS 
Sss 
1.894 
1.227 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 138 
. 306 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a Design: Intercept+UA DC SoT playerl+pn_np+Experience_high_low+pn_np * Experience_high_low 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: UA DC_SoT_P2_average 
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sbs 
eos Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power(a) 
EOS Corrected Model 17.343(b) 4 4.336 4.465 . 003 . 192 
17.861 . 925 
Intercept 16.804 1 16.804 17.306 . 000 . 187 
17.306 . 984 
UA_DC_SoT_playerl 6.406 1 6.406 6.598 . 012 . 081 6.598 . 718 
pn_np 9.620 1 9.620 9.907 . 002 . 117 9.907 . 
874 
Experience_high_low 
. 
173 1 
. 
173 . 179 . 674 . 002 . 179 . 070 
pn_np * Ex high_low 
. 418 1 . 418 . 431 . 514 . 006 . 431 . 099 
Error 72.825 75 . 971 Total 2405.038 80 
Corrected Total 90.167 79 
SBS Corrected Model 43.531(c) 4 10.883 8.551 . 000 . 
313 34.204 . 998 
Intercept 6.483 1 6.483 5.094 . 
027 . 064 5.094 . 606 
UA_DC_SoT_playerl 20.933 1 20.933 16.448 . 000 . 180 16.448 . 979 
pn_np . 190 1 . 190 . 150 . 700 . 002 . 150 . 
067 
Experience_high_low 1.513 1 1.513 1.189 . 279 . 016 
1.189 . 190 
pn_np * Ex high_low 8.924 1 8.924 7.012 . 010 . 085 7.012 . 
743 
Error 95.452 75 1.273 
Total 2059.849 80 
Corrected Total 138.984 79 
Computed using alpha = . 05 R Squared =. 192 (Adjusted R Squared =. 149) 
R Squared =. 313 (Adjusted R Squared =. 277) 
ATHLETICISM 
Between-Subjects Factors 
sbs_eos Value Label N 
EOS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
Experience_high_low I 2.9 or below 39 
2 3.0 or above 41 
SBS pn_np 1 pn 40 
2 np 40 
Experience_highlow 1 2.9 or below 41 
2 3.0_or above 39 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2 athleticism 
Experience_high_I 
sbs_eos pn_np ow Mean Std. Deviation N 
EOS pn 2.9-or below 4.6500 1.46089 20 
3.0-or above 4.6500 1.26803 20 
Total 4.6500 1.35021 40 
np 2.9-or below 4.6316 1.01163 19 
3.0_or above 4.8095 1.03049 21 
Total 4.7250 1.01242 40 
Total 2.9-or below 4.6410 1.24578 39 
3.0 or above 4.7317 1.14071 41 
Total 4.6875 1.18635 80 
SBS pn 2.9-or below 4.2500 1.11803 20 
3.0-or above 4.5500 1.43178 20 
Total 4.4000 1.27702 40 
np 2.9-or below 5.1429 1.27615 21 
3.0-or above 4.1111 1.23140 19 
Total 4.6667 1.34425 40 
Total 2.9-or below 4.7073 1.26972 41 
3.0-or above 4.3421 1.34116 39 
Total 4.5316 1.30909 80 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2 athleticism 
sbs_eos F dfl df2 Sig. 
EOS 
SBS 
2.040 
. 216 
3 
3 
76 
76 
. 115 
. 885 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance OT the dependent 
variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 athleticism + pn_np + 
Experience_high_Iow + pn_np * Experience_high_low 
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Dependent 
Vanable: P2 athleticism 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
sbs_ 
eos Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Paramet 
er 
Observe 
d Powert 
cted EOS Corre 2.594' 4 . 649 . 448 774 023 1 792 150 e Mod . . . . 
Intercept 27.918 1 27.918 19.282 
. 
000 
. 205 19.282 . 991 
P1_athleticism 2.166 1 2.166 1.496 . 225 . 020 1.496 . 227 
pn_np . 067 1 . 067 . 
046 
. 831 . 001 . 046 . 055 
Experience_ 
. 288 1 . 288 . 
199 
. 657 003 199 072 high_Iow . . . 
pn np 
Experience_ . 221 1 . 221 . 153 . 697 . 
002 
. 
153 
. 
067 
high_low 
Error 108.593 75 1.448 
Total 1869.000 80 
Corrected 187 111 79 Total . 
SBS Corrected 25.227c 4 6.307 4.304 003 189 214 17 915 
Model . . . . 
Intercept 8.262 1 8.262 5.638 
. 020 . 071 5.638 . 
649 
P1 athleticism 12.605 1 12.605 8.601 . 004 . 104 8.601 . 825 
pn_np . 292 1 . 292 . 199 . 857 . 003 . 199 . 073 
Experience_hi 
. 433 1 . 433 . 295 589 004 295 084 gh_low . . . . 
pn_np " 
Experiencehi 8.782 1 8.782 5.993 . 017 . 075 5.993 . 
676 
gh_low 
Error 108.444 74 1.465 
Total 1756.000 79 
Corrected 671 133 78 Total . 
a. R Squared = . 023 (Adjusted R Squared 
= -. 029) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 05 
c. R Squared = . 189 (Adjusted R 
Squared 
=. 145) 
Post hoc tests (Experience) 
COMBINED CONSTRUCT 
Group Statistics 
sbs_ 
os Ex_high_low pn_np N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
SBS 2.9_or_below P2adjustedchange pn 20 -2.0502 1.03299 . 23098 
np 21 -1.2063 1.42391 . 31072 
3.0_or above P2adjustedchange pn 20 -1.2332 1.30737 . 29234 
np 19 -1.7961 1.20512 . 
28405 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Std 
Interval of the 
sbs (2- M . E 
Difference 
ean rror 
eos Ex_high_low F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
SBS Low P2adjusted Equal variances 
. 522 474 -2 163 39 037 - 84382 39019 -1 6331 - 05459 
_Ex change assumed 
. . . . . . . 
Equal variances 
not assumed -2.179 36.48 . 036 -. 84382 . 38717 -1.6287 -. 05896 
High P2adjusted Equal variances 
. 566 . 457 1 375 37 178 56294 40940 -. 26737 1 3933 change assumed . . . . . 
Ex Equal variances 
not assumed 1.381 36.97 . 176 . 56294 . 40761 -. 26375 1.3896 
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Descriptive Statistics (Study 3) 
Statistics 
gender 
N Valid 100 
Missing 0 
Gender 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
slid male 74 74.0 74.0 74.0 
female 26 26.0 26.0 100.0 
Total 100 100.0 100.0 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
age 
Valid N (Iistwise) 
100 
100 
16.00 31.00 21.6563 2.43232 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
experience 
Valid N (listwise) 
100 
100 
. 50 10.00 2.8568 2.00812 
Correlations between subscales (Study 3) 
Correlations 
P1_ultimate_ PI-Speed-OL 
ability P1 disc control thought 
P1 ultimate_ability Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 
643" . 302" 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 003 
N 100 100 100 
P1_disc control Pearson Correlation . 
643 1.000 . 228 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 
027 
N 100 100 100 
P1 speed_of thought Pearson Correlation . 302 . 226 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 003 . 
027 
N 100 100 100 
Correlation Is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Correlations 
P2_ultimate_ P2_speed_of 
ability P2 disc control thought 
P2_ultimate_ability Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 743 . 
714- 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 
N 100 100 100 
P2_disc_control Pearson Correlation 
. 743- 1.000 . 
689- 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 
N 100 100 100 
P2_speed_of_thought Pearson Correlation 
. 714- . 689- 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 
000 
N 100 100 100 
°. correiation is signmcant at the u. ui ievet (z-tauea). 
Order/accountability interaction (Study 3) 
ULTIMATE FRISBEE ABILITY 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 50 
2 np 50 
eos int acc I EOS 50 
3 accountability 50 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_uftimate_ability 
pn_np eos_int acc Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.7600 1.16476 25 
accountability 5.7391 1.28691 25 
Total 5.7500 1.21185 50 
np EOS 4.9130 1.08347 25 
accountability 5.1600 1.21381 25 
Total 5.0417 1.14777 50 
Total EOS 5.3542 1.19377 50 
accountability 5.4375 1.27005 50 
Total 5.3958 1.22671 100 
Lsvsne's Test of Equality of Error Varlancss' 
Dependent Variable: P2_0imate_ability 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
. 070 3 96 . 976 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 ultimate ability + pn np + 
eos_inLacc + pn_np * eos_int acc 
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Dependent 
Variable: P2_ultimate_ability 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powers' 
ied 20.286' 4 5.072 3.762 . 007 . 142 15.049 . 
874 
Model 
Intercept 27.209 1 27.209 20.184 . 000 . 182 20.184 . 
994 
P1 ultimate- 7.509 1 7.509 570 5 . 020 . 058 5.570 . 
646 
ability . 
pn_np 12.803 1 12.803 9.497 . 003 . 095 9.497 . 
862 
eos_int_acc . 413 
1 . 413 . 
307 
. 
581 . 003 . 307 . 085 
p n_n p" 
. 
161 1 . 161 . 119 . 731 . 
001 . 119 . 063 eos_int_acc 
Error 122.672 95 1.348 
Total 2938.000 100 
Corrected 142 958 99 
Total . 
a. R Squared = . 142 (Adjusted R Squared 
= . 104) 
b. Computed using alpha =. 05 
DISC CONTROL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np I pn 50 
2 np 50 
eos_int_acc 1 EOS 50 
3 accountability 50 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_disccontrol 
pn_np eos int acc Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.7200 1.10000 25 
accountability 5.9565 1.49174 25 
Total 5.8333 1.29374 50 
np EOS 4.6087 1.11759 25 
accountability 4.9200 1.03763 25 
Total 4.7708 1.07663 50 
Total EOS 5.1875 1.23178 50 
accountability 5.4167 1.36574 50 
Total 5.3021 1.29874 100 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variabie: P2 disc control 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
. 630 3 96 . 
597 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 disc control + pn_np + 
eos_int acc + pn_np * eos_int_acc 
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Dependent 
Variable: P2_disccontrol 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power' 
Corrected Model 28.928' 4 7.232 5.012 . 001 . 181 20.048 . 
955 
Intercept 67.036 1 67.036 46.456 . 
000 
. 338 46.456 1.000 
P1 disc control . 
004 1 
. 004 . 002 . 961 . 000 . 002 . 050 
pn_np 27.094 1 27.094 18.776 . 000 . 
171 18.776 
. 
990 
eos int_acc 1.784 1 1.784 1.236 . 269 . 013 1.236 . 196 
pn_np ' 
. 034 1 . 034 . 024 . 878 000 024 053 eos_int_acc . . . 
Error 131.311 95 1.443 
Total 2859.000 100 
Corrected Total 160.240 99 
a. R Squared = . 181 (Adjusted R Squared 
=. 145) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 05 
SPEED OF THOUGHT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 50 
2 np 50 
eos_int acc 1 EOS 50 
3 accountability 50 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2 speed of thought 
pn_np eoa int , 
acc Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.8800 1.23558 25 
accountability 5.7391 1.42118 25 
Total 5.8125 1.31531 50 
np EOS 5.0000 1.38170 25 
accountability 5.4000 1.35401 25 
Total 5.2083 1.36769 50 
Total EOS 5.4583 1.36769 50 
accountability 5.5625 1.38235 50 
Total 5.5104 1.36879 100 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_speed_ofthought 
dfl df2 Sig. F 
. 560 . 691 3 96 0 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable Is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 speed_of thought + pn_np + 
eos_int acc + pn_np * eos_int_acc 
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Dependent 
Variable: P2 speed_of thought 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powerb 
Corrected Model 11.284' 4 2.821 1.540 . 197 . 063 6.159 . 459 
Intercept 59.049 1 59.049 32.233 . 000 . 262 32.233 1.000 
P1_speed_of th 
. 369 1 . 369 . 201 . 655 . 002 201 . 073 ought . 
pn_np 7.498 1 7.498 4.093 . 046 . 043 4.093 . 517 
eos_int_acc . 355 1 . 355 . 194 . 661 . 002 . 194 . 072 
pn_np" 
eos_int_acc 
1.636 1 1.636 . 893 . 347 . 010 . 893 . 155 
Error 166.706 95 1.832 
Total 3093.000 100 
Corrected Total 177.990 99 
a. R Squared = . 063 (Adjusted R Squared 
= . 022) 
b. Computed using alpha =. 05 
Reliability statistics (accountability manipulation) 
Case Processing Summary 
N % 
Cases Valid 100 100.0 
Excluded' 0 .0 
Total 100 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha IN of Items 
. 846 
3 
Item Statistics 
Mean Std. Deviation N 
cc-1 8.3750 1.08821 100 
AccL. 2 7.9167 1.31122 100 
Acc-3 8.4375 1.27165 100 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if item Scale Variance if Corrected Item- Cronbach's Alpha 
Deleted Item Deleted Total Correlation If Item Deleted 
cc 1 16.3542 5.326 . 768 . 747 
cc_2 16.8125 4.638 . 710 . 792 
x3 16.2917 4.925 . 678 . 821 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
24.7292 10.368 3.21994 3 
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Did the accountability manipulation work? 
Group Statistics 
eos int_acc N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Ace 
-8113 
EOS 
accountability 
50 
50 
8,1944 
8,2917 
1.17265 
. 97395 
. 16926 
. 14058 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Sig (2- Mean Error Std Difference . . 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
cc Equal variances 
3.312 . 072 -. 442 
96 . 660 -. 09722 . 22002 =. 53408 . 33964 a113 assumed 
Equal variances 
-. 442 92.94 . 660 -. 09722 . 22002 -. 53427 . 33983 
not assumed 
Descriptive statistics of accountability (for median split) 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Acc_a113 
! lid N (listwise) 
100 
100 
5.33 10.00 8.2431 1.07331 
Group Statistics 
Acc high_low N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
cc aH3 below 8.2 
above 8.3 
37 
59 
7.1622 
8.9209 
. 73544 
. 58178 
. 12091 
. 07574 
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Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Sig. (2- Mean Std. Error 
F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
Acc_ Equal variances 2 856 . 094 -13 003 94 000 75874 -1 . 
13525 -2.02729 -1.49019 a113 assumed . . . . 
Equal variances 
-12.327 63.709 . 000 -1.75874 . 
14267 -2.04378 -1.47370 not assumed 
Order/motivation interaction 
ULTIMATE FRISBEE ABILITY 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 50 
2 np 50 
cc high_low 1 below 8.2 39 
2 above 8.3 61 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_ultimate_ability 
pn_np Acc_high_low Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn below 8.2 5.8261 1.23038 25 
above 8.3 5.6800 1.21518 25 
Total 5.7500 1.21165 50 
np below 8.2 4.8571 1.29241 15 
above 8.3 5.1176 1.09447 35 
Total 5.0417 1.14777 50 
Total below 8.2 5.4595 1.32486 39 
above 8.3 5.3559 1.17095 61 
Total 5.3958 1.22671 100 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
DeDendent Variable: P2_ulimate_ability 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
261 3 961 . 
853 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1-ultimate ability + pn_np + 
Acc high_low + pn_np * Acc high_low 
217 
Dependent 
Variable: P2_utimate_ability 
Teats of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power° 
Corrected Model 21.096' 4 5.274 3.938 . 005 . 148 15.753 . 890 
Intercept 24.180 1 24.180 18.056 . 000 . 166 18.056 . 988 
P11-ultimate- 
ability 
8.126 1 8.126 6.068 . 016 . 063 6.068 . 683 
pn_np 12.593 1 12.593 9.404 . 003 . 094 9.404 . 
859 
cc high_Iow . 179 1 . 179 . 134 . 715 . 001 . 134 . 065 
p n_n p' 1.124 1 1.124 839 362 009 . 839 . 148 cc_high_low . . . 
Error 121.862 95 1.339 
Total 2938.000 100 
Corrected Total 142.958 99 
a. R Squared =. 148 (Adjusted R Squared = 
. 110) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 05 
DISC CONTROL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 50 
2 np 50 
cc high low I below 8.2 39 
2 above 8.3 61 
Descrlptivw Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2 disc control 
pn_np Ace high_low Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn below 8.2 6.3043 1.18455 25 
above 8.3 5.4000 1.25831 25 
Total 5.8333 1.29374 50 
np below 8.2 4.9286 . 99725 15 
above 8.3 4.7059 1.11544 35 
Total 4.7708 1.07663 50 
otal below 8.2 5.7838 1.29390 39 
above 8.3 5.0000 1.21769 61 
Total 5.3021 1.29874 100 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2 disc control 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
. 634 3 96 . 595 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable Is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1dlscýcontrol + pn_np + 
Acc high_low + pn_np * Acc high_low 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
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Dependent 
Variable: P2 disc control 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power° 
Corrected Model 37.616' 4 9.404 6.979 . 000 . 235 27.915 . 993 
Intercept 56.345 1 56.345 41.814 . 000 . 315 41.814 1.000 
P1 disc control . 233 1 . 233 . 173 . 679 . 002 . 173 . 070 
p n_n p 23.431 1 23.431 17.388 . 000 . 160 17.388 . 985 
Acc_high_low 7.071 1 7.071 1.247 
. 
224 
. 055 5.247 . 093 
p n-n p' 2.377 1 2.377 1 764 187 019 1 764 260 high_low . . . . . 
Error 122.624 95 1.348 
Total 2859.00 100 0 
Corrected Total 160.240 99 
a. R Squared = . 235 (Adjusted R Squared 
=. 201) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 05 
SPEED OF THOUGHT 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 50 
2 np 50 
cc high low 1 below 8.2 39 
2 above 8.3 61 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Vanable: P2_speed_ofthought 
pn_np Ace-high-low Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn below 8.2 5.9565 1.10693 25 
above 8.3 5.6800 1.49220 25 
Total 5.8125 1.31531 50 
np below 8.2 5.1429 1.29241 15 
above 8.3 5.2353 1.41547 35 
Total 5.2083 1.36769 50 
Total below 8.2 5.6486 1.22964 39 
above 8.3 5.4237 1.45274 61 
Total 5.5104 1.36879 100 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_speed_oithought 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
2.002 3 96 . 119 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 speed of thought + pn_np + 
Acc high_low + pn np * Aco high_low 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: P2 speed of thought 
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Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power° 
lied 10.429° 4 2.607 1.416 . 
235 
. 059 664 5 . 
425 Mode . 
Intercept 54.656 1 54.656 29.683 . 
000 
. 246 29.683 
1.000 
P1 
_speed_of . 667 1 . 667 . 362 . 549 . 004 . 362 . 092 thought 
pn_np 6.642 1 6.642 4.607 . 041 . 058 3.607 . 468 
Acchigh_low . 
346 1 
. 
346 
. 
188 
. 
666 
. 
002 
. 
188 . 071 
pn_np * 
. 
674 1 . 674 . 366 . 547 . 004 . 366 . 
092 Acc high_Iow 
Error 167.561 95 1.841 
Total 3093.000 100 
Corrected 177.990 99 
Total 
a. R Squared = . 059 (Adjusted R Squared = 
. 
017) 
b. Computed using alpha = . 
05 
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Appendix 5.1 
End of Sequence assessment instrument (with interpolated task) 
222 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. 
Introduction and Rationale 
In the current study we are interested in how people make judgments about the abilities 
of the individuals they observe when playing and coaching. In this experiment we will 
be asking you to observe an ultimate frisbee player perform a series of the same skill, 
which involves the player cutting towards the disc, making a catch, pivoting, and making 
a forehand pass to a team-mate on the run. You will then be asked to rate his 
performance and ability. There is no right or wrong answer, just your own impression 
that is important. 
All information you provide will be treated in the strictest of confidence. 
Name: 
Age: 
Ethnic Origin: 
Ultimate playing experience: (years) 
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University of Chichester 
CONSENT FORM 
I........................................................ (PRINT NAME) 
hereby give my consent to participate in the following test/activity [investigating 
impressions of ability in sport] 
By signing this form I confirm that: 
9 the purpose of the test/activity has been explained to me; 
91 am satisfied that I understand the procedures involved; 
" the possible benefits and risks of the test/activity have been explained to me; 
" any questions which I have asked about the test/activity have been answered to my 
satisfaction; 
"I understand that, during the course of the testlactivity, I have the right to ask further 
questions about it; 
" the information which I have supplied to University of Chichester prior to taking 
part in the test/activity is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief and 
I understand that I must notify promptly of any changes to the information; 
"I understand that my personal information will not be released to any third parties 
without my permission; 
"I understand that my participation in the test/activity is voluntary and I am therefore 
at liberty to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that, if there is any concern about the appropriateness of my continuing 
in the test/activity, I may be asked to withdraw my involvement at any stage; 
"I understand that once the test/activity has been completed, the information gained 
as a result of it will be used for the following purposes only: [To explore the way 
people make impressions of the sporting ability of others]. 
SIGNATURE OF THE SUBJECT ....................................... 
DATE ................................................ 
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Evaluation of Player 1 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Excellent 
Poor 
123456789 10 
Speed of Thought 
Excellent 
Poor 
123456789 10 
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Activity 
Task 1- there is a swirling wind and you want to play zone. The opposition is a 
decent side, with pretty good handling skills and quick wings that provide a 
credible deep threat. 
Mark on the two diagrams the positions you would put your 7 defensive players. 
Disc starts in middle of pitch. Disc swung to the sideline. 
Task 2 
The players in the team playing zone are rather inexperienced? What 
specific/key advice/coaching hints would you offer to the defending team? 
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Evaluation of Player 2 
On a scale of 1 (poor) to 10 (excellent), please rate the ultimate player for the following 
criteria. Please circle the number that you feel best rates the player. 
Ultimate Ability (general) 
Poor Excellent 
123456789 10 
Disc control 
Poor 
12345 6789 
Excellent 
10 
Speed of Thought 
Excellent 
Poor 
123456789 10 
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Appendix 5.2 
SPSS Output for Study 4 
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Descriptive Statistics (Study 4) 
gender 
Cumulative 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Percent 
slid male 121 80.7 80.7 80.7 
female 29 19.3 19.3 100.0 
Total 150 100.0 100.0 
Descriptive Statistics 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
age 150 16.00 31.00 21.4400 2.98200 
experience 150 . 50 10.00 2.9217 2.09308 
Valid N (listwise) 150 
Correlations between subscales (Study 4) 
Correlations 
P1-. speed-of 
P1 ultimate_ability P1 disc control thought 
P1_ultimate_ability Pearson Correlation 1.000 . 582- . 480- 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 
N 150 150 150 
P1_disc control Pearson Correlation . 582- 1.000 . 357 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 
N 150 150 150 
P1 speed_of thought Pearson Correlation . 480' . 357 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 000 . 000 
N 150 150 150 
". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Correlations 
P2_speed_of 
P2_ulimate_ability P2_disc_control thought 
P2_ultimate_ability Pearson Correlation 1.000 
. 792- . 7557 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 
N 150 150 150 
P2 disc control Pearson Correlation . 792- 1.000 . 
688 
Sig. (2-tailed) . 000 . 000 
N 150 150 150 
P2_speed_of thought Pearson Correlation . 755- . 688- 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
. 
000 
. 000 
N 11 150 150 150 
". Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Reliability statistics 
Case Processing Summary 
N % 
Cases Valid 150 100.0 
Excluded' 0 .0 
Total 150 100.0 
a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the 
procedure. 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
896 3 
Item-Total Statistics 
Scale Mean if Item Scale Variance if Corrected Item- Cronbach's Alpha 
Deleted Item Deleted Total Correlation if Item Deleted 
P2_ultimate_ability 10.9333 6.465 . 
842 . 815 
P2 disc_control 11.1267 6.326 . 788 . 
859 
P2_speed of thought 10.9000 6.386 . 761 . 883 
Order/judgment condition interactions (Study 4) 
ULTIMATE ABILITY 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 75 
2 np 75 
eoa_int_delay 1 EOS 50 
2 interpolated 50 
3 Interpolated 
_delay . 
50 
Descriptive Statistics 
DeDendent Variable: P2_ultlmate_ablI ty 
pn_np eoa_int_delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.7600 1.16476 25 
interpolated 4.9600 1.05987 25 
interpolated delay 5.7600 1.36260 25 
Total 5.4933 1.24524 75 
np EOS 4.8800 1.05357 25 
Interpolated 6.2000 1.35401 25 
interpolated_delay 5.7200 1.30767 25 
Total 5.6000 1.34566 75 
Total EOS 5.3200 1.18563 50 
interpolated 5.5800 1.35662 50 
interpolated delay 5.7400 1.32187 50 
Total 5.5467 1.29318 150 
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Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_ultimate_ability 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
. 6491 51 1441 . 663 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
Dependent 
Variable: P2 ultimate ability 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Power" 
Corrected Model 55.148' 6 9.191 6.774 . 000 . 221 40.645 . 999 
Intercept 25.773 1 25.773 18.995 
. 000 . 117 18.995 . 991 
P11-ultimate-ability 21.735 1 21.735 16.019 . 000 . 101 16.019 . 978 
pn_np . 665 1 . 665 . 490 . 485 . 003 . 490 . 
107 
eos_int_delay 3.536 2 1.768 1.303 . 275 . 018 2.606 . 279 
pn_np' 
eos_int delay 
26.341 2 13.171 9.707 . 000 . 120 19.414 . 981 
Error 194.025 143 1.357 
Total 4864.000 150 
Corrected Total 249.173 149 
a. R Squared = . 221 (Adjusted R Squared = . 189) 
Group Statistics 
Std. Std. Error 
eos_int_delay pn_np N Mean Deviation Mean 
EOS P2_adJusted_ pn 25 -. 8800 1.53623 . 30725 UA 
np 25 -1.6000 1.25831 . 25166 
interpolated P2_adjusted_ pn 25 -1.6400 . 90738 . 18148 UA np 25 -. 4400 1.55671 . 31134 
interpolated_ P2_adjusted_ pn 25 -. 9600 1.33791 . 26758 delay UA np 25 -. 9200 1.07703 . 21541 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Std 
Interval of the 
(2- M . E 
Difference 
ean rror 
eos inLdelay F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
EOS P2 adjusted Equal variances 435 513 2 113 48 . 
046 72000 39716 -. 07854 1.51854 UA assumed . . . . . 
Equal variances 2.113 46.208 . 046 . 72000 . 39716 -. 07934 
1.51934 
not assumed 
Interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 6.327 015 -3 330 48 . 002 -1 20000 36037 -1.92457 -. 
47543 lated 
_UA assumed 
. . . . 
Equal variances 
not assumed -3.330 
38.620 . 002 -1.20000 . 36037 -1.92915 -. 47085 
Interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 741 394 - 116 48 908 04000 - 34351 - 73068 . 65068 lated_ 
_UA assumed 
. . . . . . 
delay Equal variances 116 - 45 906 908 04000 - 34351 -. 73149 . 65149 not assumed . . . . . 
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DISC CONTROL 
Between-Subjects Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 75 
2 np 75 
eos_int_delay 1 EOS 50 
2 interpolated 50 
3 interpolated_delay. 50 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: P2_disc_control 
pn_np eos_int delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.7200 1.10000 25 
interpolated 4.7200 1.20830 25 
interpolated delay 5.5600 1.26095 25 
Total 5.3333 1.25562 75 
np EOS 4.6800 1.10755 25 
interpolated 6.0800 1.49778 25 
interpolated_delay 5.3600 1.55134 25 
Total 5.3733 1.49570 75, 
Total EOS 5.2000 1.21218 50 
interpolated 5.4000 1.51186 50 
Interpolated delay 5.4600 1.40277 50 
Total 5.3533 1.37639 150 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Vadances' 
Dependent Variable: P2 disc_control 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
1.089 5 144 . 369 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 disc_control + pn_np + 
eos_int delay + pn_np * eos_int_delay 
Dependent 
Variable: P2 disc control 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powe' 
Corrected Model 47.756' 6 7.959 4.853 . 000 . 169 29.120 . 990 
Intercept 57.981 1 57.981 35.354 . 000 . 198 35.354 1.000 
P1 disc control 8.762 1 8.762 5.343 . 
022 
. 
036 5.343 . 632 
pn_np . 
090 1 . 090 . 055 . 815 . 000 . 055 . 056 
eos int_deiay 2.646 2 1.323 . 
807 
. 448 . 
011 1.614 . 186 
pn_np " 38.368 2 19.184 11.698 . 000 . 141 23.395 . 994 
Error 234.518 143 1.640 
Total 4581.000 150 
Corrected Total 282.273 149 
1. K SgU8fea = .1b (AaJuatea K Squared = 134) 
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POST-HOC T-TESTS 
Group Statistics 
Std. Std. Error 
eos int_delay pn_np N Mean Deviation Mean 
_ 
EOS P2 adjusted- pn 25 -. 9200 1.65630 . 33126 DC 
np 25 -2.1200 1.61555 . 32311 
interpolated P2 adjusted_ pn 25 -1.8400 1.31276 . 26255 DC 
np 25 -. 4000 1.32288 . 26458 
interpolated delay P2 adjusted_ pn 25 -1.0400 1.67033 . 
33407 
DC 
np 25 -1.0400 1.56738 . 31348 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Sig. Std Interval of the 
(2- Mean . Error Difference 
eos int_delay F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
EOS P2_adjusted Equal variances 
. 010 921 . 2.593 48 013 1 20000 46275 26959 2 13041 
_DC assumed . . . . . 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
2.593 47.970 . 013 1.20000 . 46275 . 26957 2.13043 
interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 
. 000 . 988 -3.863 48 . 000 -1.44000 37274 -2 18944 - 69056 lated DC assumed . . . 
Equal variances 
not assumed -3.863 
47,997 . 000 -1.44000 . 
37274 -2.18944 -. 69056 
interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 
. 069 . 794 . 000 48 1.000 00000 45811 - 92110 92110 lated_ DC assumed . . . . 
delay Equal variances 
. 
000 47.807 1.000 00000 45811 - 92119 92119 not assumed . . . . 
SPEED OF THOUGHT 
Between-Sub], cb Factors 
Value Label N 
pn_np 1 pn 75 
2 np 75 
eos int_delay 1 EOS 50 
2 interpolated 50 
3 Interpolated delay 50 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Vanable: P2_speed_of thought 
pn_np eos int delay Mean Std. Deviation N 
pn EOS 5.8800 1.23558 25 
interpolated 5.2400 1.30000 25 
interpolated delay 5.7200 1.51438 25 
Total 5.6133 1.36454 75 
np EOS 5.0000 1.32288 25 
Interpolated 5.9600 1.54056 25 
interpolated delay 5.6800 1.28193 25 
Total 5.5467 1.42652 75 
Total EOS 5.4400 1.34255 50 
interpolated 5.6000 1.45686 50 
interpolated_delay 5.7000 1.38873 50 
Total 5.5800 1.39159 150 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances' 
Dependent Variable: P2_speed_ofthought 
F dfl df2 Sig. 
. 871 5 144 . 502 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the 
dependent variable is equal across groups. 
a. Design: Intercept + P1 speed of thought + pn_np + 
eos_int delay + pn_np " eoa int delay 
Dependent 
Variable: P2 speed_of thought 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Noncent. 
Parameter 
Observed 
Powers' 
Corrected Model 19.904' 6 3.317 1.766 . 110 . 069 10.595 . 651 
Intercept 109.134 1 109.134 58.094 . 000 . 
289 58.094 1.000 
P1 speed_of 
thought 2.004 1 2.004 1.067 . 303 . 007 1.067 . 
177 
pn_np . 057 1 . 
057 
. 
030 
. 
862 . 000 . 030 . 053 
eos_intdelay 1.973 2 . 987 . 525 . 593 . 007 1.050 . 
135 
pn_np " 
eos_Int_delay 
15.308 2 7.654 4.074 
. 
019 . 054 8.148 . 716 
Error 268.636 143 1.879 
otal 4959.000 150 
Corrected Total 288.540 149 
a. R Squared = . 069 (Adjusted R Squared 
. 030) 
b. Computed using alpha - . 05 
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POST HOC T-TESTS 
Group Statistics 
Std. Std. Error 
eos_int_delay pn_np N Mean Deviation Mean 
EOS P2_adjusted_ pn 25 -. 9600 1.39881 . 27976 SOT 
np 25 -1.2000 1.93649 . 38730 
interpolated P2_adjusted_ pn 25 -1.2000 1.58114 . 31623 SoT np 25 -. 1600 1.77200 . 35440 
interpolated_ P2_adjusted_ pn 25 -. 5600 1.89473 . 37895 delay SoT np 25 -. 7600 1.61452 . 32290 
Independent Samples Test 
Levene's Test 
for Equality of 
Variances t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the Sig. Difference (2- M Error Std ean . 
eos_int_delay F Sig. t df tailed) Difference Difference Lower Upper 
EOS P2_adjusted Equal variances 3.616 . 063 . 502 48 618 24000 . 47777 -. 72063 1.20063 
_SOT 
assumed . . 
Equal variances 
. 502 43.686 . 618 . 24000 . 47777 -. 72308 1.20308 not assumed 
interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 129 . 721 -2.190 48 033 -1.04000 . 47497 -1.99500 -. 
08500 
lated 
_SoT assumed 
. 
Equal variances 
-2.190 47.390 034 04000 -1 . 47497 -1.99532 -. 08468 not assumed . . 
interpo P2_adjusted Equal variances 
. 953 . 334 . 402 48 . 690 . 20000 . 49786 -. 80102 1.20102 lated_ SOT assumed 
delay Equal variances 
. 402 46.821 690 20000 49786 -. 80167 1.20167 not assumed . . . 
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Appendix 6 
Hogarth and Einhorn's (1992) belief adjustment model: Mathematical calculations. 
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HOGARTH AND EINHORN'S (1992) BELIEF-ADJUSTMENT MODEL: 
MATHEMATICAL CALCULATIONS 
If we attach a value to the eight pieces of evidence used in the present study, we can 
examine the potential reasons for primacy effects from a mathematical perspective, 
when referring back to the algebraic equations presented by Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992). 
For EoS judgments, the anchoring and adjustment can be written in algebraic terms as 
Sk=S(XI)+Wk[S(X2+X3,....... xk/x)-R] (1) 
Sk = The overall judgment (after evaluating k pieces of evidence) 
s(xk) = an individual's subjective evaluation of a certain piece (kth piece) of evidence 
(e. g. S(xi) is the evaluation of the first piece of evidence 
Wk = the adjustment weight of a piece/pieces of evidence. 
S(X2 + x3, ....... xk / x) = the averaged aggregate of evidence following the anchor. 
R= The reference point against which the impact of evidence is evaluated. 
We can say that evidence has a weighting of between 0 (no weighting) and 1 (maximum 
weighting). 
We can also insert the values of the evidence between 1 (weakest performance) to 10 
(strongest performance). In the present thesis, we had 3 examples of `good' 
performance (xi = 8, x1= 8, x3 = 8), 2 examples of moderate performance (x4 = 5, xs = 5), 
and 3 examples of poor performance (X6 = 8, X7 = 8, X8 = 8). 
Hogarth and Einhorn propose that when there is no prior information, the first piece of 
evidence (S(xi)) becomes the anchor. Following this, the remaining evidence 
(S(X2 + x3, ....... xk/x)) is some weighted average, of the individual evaluations of 
items of evidence that follow the anchor. 
This theorising can explain why primacy effects occur. If participants give a medium 
weighting (0.5) to the evidence following the anchor, then mathematically for the 
declining order of clips (xi - x8), the overall judgment would be; 
= S(xj) + Wk[S(X2 + x3, ....... xk /x) - R] 
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=8+0.5[(8+8+5+5+2+2+2)/7 - 8] 
= 6.29. (2) 
Alternatively, for the ascending order of clips (x8 - xi), the overall judgment would be; 
=2+0.5[(2+2+5+5+8+8+8)/7 - 2] 
= 3.71 (3) 
Thus, the final numerical judgment is higher when viewing the declining order of clips, 
compared to the ascending order, which highlights the primacy effect. 
The present thesis aimed to test the predictions and theorising of Hogarth and Einhorn's 
(1992) model. Several findings failed to support the hypotheses drawn from Hogarth 
and Einhorn's model, and thus raised some important questions. For example; 
Why did primacy effects emerge in the incomplete method of SbS processing? 
Why did primacy effects emerge in the incomplete method of SbS processing? 
Why did no order effects emerge in the SbS condition, when the model predicts 
recency? 
SbS processing would be expected to create recency effects, if equal weighting was 
given to each piece of evidence. Hogarth and Einhorn explain how SbS processing 
results in later information having greater weighting. An SbS processing strategy can be 
written in algebraic terms as 
Sk = Sk_I + Wk[S(Xk) - Rý (4) 
With S, - 1 representing the anchor and then being adjusted as many times as there are 
pieces of evidence, and where wk represents the adjustment weight of a piece (the kth 
piece) of evidence. If each piece of evidence is given a medium weighting (0.5), then 
mathematically for the declining order of clips (xi - x8), the overall judgment would be; 
=8+ [0.5(8-8)] + [0.5(8-8)] + [0.5(5-8)] + [0.5(5-6.5)] + [0.5(2-5.75)] + [0.5(2-3.88)] + 
[0.5(2-2.94)] 
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=8+0+0+-1.5+-0.75+-1.88+-0.94+-0.47 
= 2.47 (5) 
Alternatively, for the ascending order of clips (x8 - xi), the overall judgment would be; 
=2+ [0.5(2-2)] + [0.5(2-2)] + [0.5(5-2)] + [0.5(5-3.5)] + [0.5(8-4.25)] + [0.5(8-6.13)] + 
[0.5(8-7.06)] 
=2+0+0+ 1.5+0.75+1.875+0.93+0.47 
= 7.53 (6) 
The results of these equations indicate recency effects are expected in the SbS condition 
as the overall judgment is higher viewing the ascending order compared to viewing the 
declining order. 
However, in the SbS condition that replicated the SbS processing that was used in 
Greenlees et al. 's (2007) study, primacy effects still emerged in the present thesis. With 
a weak method of SbS processing, the adjustment weight (wk) was reduced, meaning 
later evidence had less weighting on the overall judgment. Thus, the later evidence was 
not strong enough to offset the influence of the initial anchor, and consequently this SbS 
processing failed to eliminate primacy effects. 
Primacy Effects in the incomplete SbS condition 
If each piece of evidence is given a reduced weighting (e. g. a value of 0.1), then 
mathematically for the declining order of clips (x, - x8), the overall judgment would be; 
=8+ [0.1(8-8)] + [0.1(8-8)] + [0.1(5-8)] + [0.1(5-7.7)] + [0.1(2-7.43)] + [0.1(2-6.89)] + 
[0.1(2-6.40)] 
=8+0+0+-0.3+-0.27+-0.54+-0.66+-0.56+-0.44 
= 5.96 (7) 
Alternatively, for the ascending order of clips (x8 - xi), the overall judgment would be; 
=2+ [0.1(2-2)] + [0.1(2-2)] + [0.1(5-2)] + [0.1(5-2.3)] + [0.1(8-2.57)] + [0.1(8-3.11)] + 
[0.1(8-3.60)] 
=2+0+0+0.3 +0.27+0.54+0.49+0.44 
= 4.04 (8) 
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The numerical rating from these calculations using a weak weighting of later 
information demonstrates a primacy effect, with the rating in the declining order higher 
(5.96) compared to the ascending condition (4.04). 
No order effects in the extended SbS condition 
In the extended SbS condition, no order effects were displayed. This more thorough SbS 
processing would result in greater weighting of later evidence compared to the more 
incomplete SbS measure, described above. However, if the weighting of the later 
evidence is of a certain level relative to the initial anchor, this weighting might only be 
strong enough to offset the influence of the initial anchor, and not produce recency 
effects. For example, if the weighting given to later information was reduced (e. g. to a 
value of 0.16), the following mathematical calculations could be made. 
For the declining order of clips (xi - x8); 
=8+ [0.16(8-8)] + [0.16(8-8)] + [0.16(5-8)] + [0.16(5-7.52)] + [0.16(2-7.12)] + 
[0.16(2-6.30)] + [0.16(2-5.61)] 
=8+0+0+-0.48+-0.40+-0.82+-0.69+-0.58 
= 5.03 (9) 
Alternatively, for the ascending order of clips (x8 - xl); 
=2+ [0.16(2-2)] + [0.16(2-2)] + [0.16(5-2)] + [0.16(5-2.48)] + [0.16(8-2.88)] + 
[0.16(8-3.70)] + [0.16(8-4.16)] 
=2+0+0+0.48+0.40+0.82+0.69+0.58 
= 4.97 (10) 
Participants with high motivation to think/high accountability/low experience showing 
primacy (in EoS condition) 
It was hypothesised in Study 3 that participants with high motivation to think, high 
accountability, and low experience would show no order effects in the EoS condition, as 
they would more effortfully process information in a SbS manner. However, in each of 
these conditions, primacy effects were displayed in the EoS condition. One explanation 
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is that some SbS processing was used but the processing of later information involved a 
very weak weighting compared to the weighting of the anchor. Referring to the 
calculations in the SbS condition (above), if the weighting of later information was 
reduced further, then that would result in primacy effects even if SbS processing was 
used. Thus, even when SbS processing is used, such an algebraic equation, with reduced 
weighting of later evidence, could be written as; 
=S(xi) + 0.5[s(x2) - R] + 0.5[s(x3) - R] + 0.3[s(x4) - R] + 0.2[s(xs) - R] + 0.1 [s(x6) - R] 
+0.1[s(x7)-R]+0.1[s(x8)-RI (11) 
For the declining order of clips (xl - x8), such a weighting of later evidence would 
produce the overall judgment; 
=8+ [0.5(8-8)] + [0.5(8-8)] + [0.2(5-8)] + [0.2(5-7.4)] + [0.1(2-6.92)] + [0.1(2-6.47)] + 
[0.1(2-6.02)] 
=8+0+0+-0.6+-. 0.49+-0.44+-0.45+-0.40 
= 5.62 
And for the ascending order of clips (x8 - xi); 
(12) 
=2+ [0.5(2-2)] + [0.5(2-2)] + [0.2(5-8)] + [0.2(5-2.6)] + [0.1(8-3.08)] + [0.1(8-3.57)] + 
[0.1(8-4.01)] 
=2+0+0+ 0.6 + 0.48 + 0.49 + 0.44 + 0.40 
= 4.41 (13) 
Again, a crude set of ratings were used, but such a reduction of weighting of later 
evidence would explain why reduced weighting of later evidence produced primacy 
effects with ratings higher in the declining order (5.62) compared to the ascending order 
(4.41) 
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Participants in the interpolated condition showed recency, while participants in the 
delay condition showed no order effects. 
When the interpolated activity/delay were in place, the equation could be adjusted to; 
Sk = Wk[S(X I+ X2 + X3 + X414 - RI + Wk[S(xs + X6 + x7 + x8)/4 - R] 
It appears that the delay condition allowed participants opportunity to assess the early 
series of information (i. e. clips 1-4), and thus, it is likely that the weighting of the early 
series of information was similar in weight to the later series of information. 
So for the declining order; 
Sk = Wk[S(XI + X2 + X3 + X4)4 - R] + Wk[S(X5 + X6 + X7 + x8)14 - 
R]I 
=0.5[(8+8+8+5)/4]+0.5[(5+2+2+2)/4] 
= 3.625 + 1.375 
=5 (14) 
And for the ascending condition; 
Sk = Wk[s(XJ + x2 + x3 + x4)/4 - R] + wk[s(x5 + x6 + x7 + x8)/4 - R] 
} 
=0.5[(5+2+2+2)/4]+0.5[(8+8+8+5)/4] 
= 1.375 + 3.625 
=5 (15) 
Thus, equal weighting of the first and second series of information in the delay 
condition, results in the same rating for the declining and ascending order, and therefore, 
no order effects. 
The interpolated condition caused cognitive resources to be taken away from processing 
the initial information. Consequently, and in comparison to the delay condition, the later 
series has more weighting on the overall impression compared to the early information. 
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So for the declining order; 
, 
S'g= Wk[S(XJ+X2+X3+X4 /4-R]+Wk[S(X5+X6+X7+X8 /4-R] 
=0.3[(8+8+8+5)/4]+0.7[(5+2+2+2)/4] 
= 2.175 + 1.925 
= 4.1 
And for the ascending condition; 
Sk = Wk[s(xl + x2 + x3 + x4)14 - R] + Wk[S(xs + x6 + x7 + x8)/4 - R] } 
=0.3[(5+2+2+2)/4]+0.7[(8+8+8+5)/4] 
= 0.825 + 5.075 
= 5.9 
(16) 
(17) 
Thus, the interpolated condition produces a recency effect with the declining order (4.1) 
rated lower than the ascending order (5.9). 
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